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In Search of Effective Disability Policy examines the poten-
tials of two very different strategies of integrating disabled
people into the working life. In the Netherlands employers
have great responsibility for the integration. In contrast
employers have limited responsibility in the Danish strategy,
where public authorities are crucial.
This book finds that there are virtues and drawbacks of both
strategies. While the Dutch policy promotes work-retention
of sick-listed workers, it hampers the labour market entry of
non-employed disabled people. This is so because employers
avoid hiring disabled people as future work-disability inflicts
costs upon employers. This is not the case in Denmark. 
But here too many workers with health problems lose their
labour market attachment because employers are allowed to
dismiss them and as public reintegration measures do not
work as intended. Consequently, an effective disability 
policy should demand neither too little nor too much of
employers. By combing macro-level analyses with empirical
analyses at the micro-level this book distinguishes itself from
most other studies in the field.
Jan Høgelund is Senior Researcher at the Danish National
Institute of Social Research in Copenhagen.
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1 Disability Policies Under Pressure 
Effective disability policies are increasingly important for the sustainability
of modern welfare states. How policies inﬂuence employers and disabled
people is crucial for nations succeed in integrating disabled people into the
labour market. Policies may motivate disabled people to participate actively
in the labour market and provide them with skills and abilities that increase
their employability. Policies also, in different ways and to varying degrees,
motivate employers to employ disabled people. This may happen by de-
manding that employers have a certain number of disabled people in their
staff, by forbidding the dismissal of sick-listed workers or by making it eco-
nomically attractive to employ people with disabilities. By putting the focus
on this last aspect, this book adds to the existing knowledge about the conse-
quences of different disability policies. It outlines some of the different ways
that disability policies inﬂuence employers, and how this in turn has impor-
tant implications for the labour market attachment of disabled people.
Dutch and Danish disability policies are examples of two policies that rest
on very different principles. In the Netherlands the responsibility for the in-
tegration of disabled people rests to a large extent on the individual employ-
er. The policy not only gives employers huge incentives to limit work dis-
ability, it also legally requires employers to take on a considerable responsi-
bility for the employment of disabled people. In Denmark employers are a
protected species; they have almost no formal or economic responsibility for
the integration of disabled people. Instead this responsibility rests with pub-
lic authorities. This book analyses how differences in employers’ responsi-
bilities translate into differences in employers’ costs, which in turn inﬂu-
ences both how the integration of disabled people takes place and the
chances for disabled people in the labour market. The main conclusion is
that the Dutch policy reinforces the division between insiders and outsiders;
it promotes the reintegration of sick-listed workers, but counteracts the inte-
gration of people without attachment to an employer. In contrast, the Dan-
ish policy facilitates the integration of disabled people without prior labour
market attachment, but does not sufﬁciently support the reintegration in
11
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work of sick-listed workers. It is therefore argued that there is scope for im-
provement in both nations’ disability policies and thus that more disabled
people could participate in working life.
The need for welfare states to increase the labour market participation of
people with health problems may become an even more greatly contested is-
sue in the future than today. Globalisation, changing family patterns and
labour market structures seem to make the ‘average citizen’ more exposed
to social risks and labour market exclusion, while ageing populations at the
same time make it increasingly important that people remain in the labour
market during their adult working years. The analyses provided in this book
indicate that the ability of national disability policies to cope with these
pressures depends on how they deﬁne the responsibilities of employers. In
this respect, the Dutch disability policy appears to be more vulnerable to fu-
ture welfare state challenges than the Danish policy.
The welfare state under pressure
In the 1970s and 1980s the pressure on the modern welfare state was caused
directly by economic problems. Reduced economic growth hampered na-
tions’ ability to increase employment and, coupled with an increasing
labour supply, unemployment ﬁgures soared. As a consequence, govern-
ments’ budgets became overloaded giving rise ﬁrst to expansive Keynesian
policies and later to retrenchment in order to limit social expenditure.
While the problems caused by persistent unemployment continued into
the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, observers stress that the
welfare state increasingly has to deal with other pressures. The most com-
monly cited pressures are increasing interdependency between nations and
globalisation, changing social risks structures, and ageing populations.
These pressures are qualitatively different from those experienced in the
1970s and 1980s. Whereas the pressures in the 1970s and 1980s were relat-
ed to the welfare state itself, the present pressures are said to be exogenous.
They are forced upon the welfare state from the outside and related to mal-
functioning in the market and the family (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1999).
Globalisation
Globalisation, which often refers to the increasing internationalisation of
capital and trade and the deregulation of capital and currency markets, ex-
erts pressure in several ways. Firstly, it is argued that in order to avoid capital
12 diasability policies under pressure
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ﬂeet and currency speculation, nations to a certain extent have to abandon
Keynesian demand policies that aim to stimulate employment and reduce in-
come inequalities (Thompson, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1996a; Standing,
1999).
Secondly, it is argued that the internationalisation of capital increases the
power of capital relatively to that of labour eroding the ‘social contract’ be-
tween capital and labour, where wage retainment is exchanged for econom-
ic growth (Rhodes, 1997). The capability of the corporatist welfare state to
maximise employment and social security may therefore be hampered. 
Thirdly, the increasing mobility of goods intensiﬁes the competition from
low wage nations able to produce industrial goods at much lower cost than
developed countries. This competition drives up the unemployment rate of
unskilled workers and eventually also of skilled workers. Western welfare
states will in turn be forced to accept greater (wage) inequalities between
unskilled workers and certain groups of skilled workers, on the one hand,
and professionals and other groups of skilled workers, on the other hand
(Rhodes, 1997; Esping-Andersen, 1996a; Navarro, 1998). In other words,
the mobility of goods will reinforce unemployment problems and increase
wage inequalities in the advanced welfare states.
Changing risk structures
The today’s post-industrial society increasingly involves social risks that
our social security systems have not been designed to alleviate. The social
security programmes, as we know them today, were devised in a period of
relatively high economic growth, low unemployment and stable family and
labour market patterns. During the 1960s and 1970s it could be expected
that a male worker would be in stable employment, and thus contributing to
the ﬁnancing of public expenditure, from the age of 18 to 65. It could also be
expected that his wife would care for their children. Today, the typical em-
ployment pattern is considerably shorter because education is completed
later and retirement begins earlier (Navarro, 1999). In addition, the labour
market is increasingly demanding ﬂexible manpower, which makes periods
of unemployment during the working years a more common event. A typical
worker has therefore fewer productive years, more passive years that require
ﬁnancial support, and suffers a higher risk of becoming marginalised from
the labour market. At the same time the female labour force participation is
much higher than just a decade ago, resulting in an increased need for day
care services.
Family patterns are also different today. On the one hand, the increasing
13the welfare state under pressure
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female labour force participation means that the dual-income family is be-
coming more widespread. On the other hand, marriage is declining while di-
vorce and separation are rising, indicating that single motherhood is becom-
ing more and more common (cf. ﬁgure 6.3 in Hatland, 2001). This raises the
demand for social security because single households and especially single
parents are more vulnerable to poverty than the nuclear family. In other
words, employment and family patterns are becoming less and less standard
whereby new social needs arise, which undermine the foundation for the ex-
isting social security systems (e.g. European Commission, 1993; Hatland,
2001).
Ageing
While it might be difﬁcult to forecast future developments in globalisation,
employment and family patterns, the development in age distribution is less
uncertain: within the next few decades the number of old people will signiﬁ-
cantly increase relative to the number of people of working age. For every
person above the age of 65 today within the oecd nations there are between
four and ﬁve people aged between 20 and 64 years. This ratio will on aver-
age nearly double in 2050 (oecd, 2001a). This development, which is
caused by increased life expectancy and low fertility rates, is costly in terms
of old age pensions, health care and social services. It is estimated that age-
related expenditures as a percentage of gdp will increase around 45 percent
between 2000 and 2050 (ibid., table 4). In other words, an increasing de-
pendency ratio will burden the welfare state.
Similar pressures – different problems
Although the pressures hit all modern nations, they may affect nations dif-
ferently. It is persuading argued that welfare states cluster into (three or
four) different regimes reﬂecting how the state, market and civil society in-
teract (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1996b; 1999; Rhodes, 1996).1 Within
each regime, welfare is produced, ﬁnanced and distributed differently and
exogenous pressures therefore crystallize into different problems.
Problems in the Liberal welfare state regime
In the Liberal welfare state regime, which comprises the Anglo-Saxon na-
tions, the state plays a relatively limited role. Social security programmes
14 diasability policies under pressure
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cover only a limited number of social risks and programmes are either uni-
versal with modest beneﬁts or means tested, targeted at the most needy peo-
ple. Instead coverage of social risks is very much left to market solutions in
terms of private insurance and occupational beneﬁt plans. The residual so-
cial security policy has its counterpart in a deregulated labour market with a
very differentiated wage structure.
These features seem to cause both strengths and weaknesses with respect
to the future challenges. On the one hand, the differentiated wage structure
means that many low wage jobs are created, especially in the service sector.
This seems to be good medicine for the malaise that may follow from in-
creased competition from low-wage nations and the expulsion caused by
changing labour market structures. Yet there are problems. The combina-
tion of low wages and the residual social security system means that a con-
siderable number of workers have an income below the poverty line, so
while the Liberal welfare state may avoid problems with too much inequali-
ty between people inside and outside the labour market, it may have prob-
lems with inequality between groups of wage earners within the labour
market.
Furthermore, the low wage level for unskilled workers and negative in-
come taxes make it more proﬁtable for employers to hire more workers than
to invest in capital and human resources. Consequently, the Liberal welfare
state tends to end up in a low wage/low skill equilibrium which, in turn,
makes the Liberal welfare state even more vulnerable to competition from
nations with low-wage and low-technology production.
The residual nature of the Liberal welfare state may also be problematic in
respect of changing family patterns. As day care is bought under market
conditions without public subsidies many single mothers cannot afford it.
Consequently, when the number of single mothers increases, poverty will
rise.
Problems in the Conservative welfare state regime
The Conservative or Continental European regime is characterised by poli-
cies that favour familialization and status segmentation. Family beneﬁts
such as day care provisions and maternity beneﬁts are limited in scope,
which makes the family the primary provider of care for children (and the
elderly) whilst also limiting female labour supply. The Conservative welfare
state therefore favours a single-income female-care family. The public cash
beneﬁt programmes foster status segmentation because many programmes
are organised according to occupation, and beneﬁts are dependent on con-
15similar pressures – different problems
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tributions. This is mirrored in a highly regulated labour market with a com-
pressed wage structure and high job security. As a consequence, the pre-
dominantly male insiders enjoy high wages, good income protection and
high job security, whereas the outsiders often have difﬁculty entering the
labour market.
The Conservative welfare states seem to be ill-equipped to meet the chal-
lenges that may arise from globalisation, changing risk structures and ageing
populations. The high wages for unskilled workers make it difﬁcult to create
jobs in the service sector. This seems to be fortiﬁed by the widespread single-
income female-care family that can produce service sector goods much more
cheaply than they can be bought under market conditions. Hence it follows
that globalisation and increased competition from low-wage nations may
put the Conservative welfare states under extreme pressure.
Changing labour market structures seem also to be a serious problem for
Conservative welfare states. The segregation between insiders and outsiders
makes it difﬁcult for weak groups to enter the labour market, and increasing
risk of unemployment may therefore cause extensive expulsion from the
labour market. In addition, increased female labour force participation may
give rise to problems because a limited supply of public day care arrange-
ments makes it difﬁcult to reconcile family and working life. This is reﬂect-
ed in a record low fertility rate of 1.45 compared to 1.70 in the Scandinavian
nations (own calculation based on table 1 in oecd, 2001a). The pressure of
ageing populations is therefore a more serious problem for Conservative
welfare states than it is for the Liberal and Social Democratic welfare states.
Problems in the Social Democratic welfare state regime
The Social Democratic welfare state regime that includes the Nordic nations
is characterised by publicly ﬁnanced and administered universal social secu-
rity schemes with quite generous beneﬁts. Beneﬁts in-kind in terms of exten-
sive public day care coverage promote female labour force participation.
High labour force participation rates for both women and men are also pro-
moted by an active labour market policy where the receipt of social beneﬁts
is conditional upon participation in supported job training or education. At
the same time a large part of the workforce, mainly unskilled female work-
ers, is employed in public service jobs.
The Social Democratic model also cannot easily solve the problems that
may follow from increased globalisation. Like the Continental European
nations, the Scandinavian nations are characterised by a ﬂat wage structure,
which, in combination with the comprehensive public service sector em-
16 diasability policies under pressure
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ployment, gives rise to problems. On the one hand, the tax burden of a com-
prehensive public sector hinders further expansion of public service sector
employment. On the other hand, a compressed wage structure excludes an
expansion of service jobs in the private sector.
The Scandinavian nations seem, however, to have the potential to allevi-
ate the negative consequences in terms of marginalization, that may follow
globalisation and changing labour market structures. The Scandinavian
policies promote a ﬂexible labour market, while workers hit by unemploy-
ment are covered by generous beneﬁts (Esping-Andersen, 1999). At the
same time, active labour market measures recycle redundant labour, thus
equalising the burden of unemployment. In addition, active labour market
policies, high day-care coverage, and female public sector employment
mean that the dual-income family is the norm, and this family group is less
harmed than the single-income family when one of the adults is hit by unem-
ployment.
The Scandinavian nations also seem to face less serious problems than
other nations with regard to changing family patterns and the increasing
risk of single motherhood. Comprehensive day care provision, active labour
market policies and frequent female public employment mean that the em-
ployment rate of single mothers is high and close to that of other groups.
And, if single mothers are affected by unemployment, generous unemploy-
ment beneﬁts prevent them from suffering from poverty.
The problem of ageing populations is related to too low fertility rates,
which in turn are related to how women manage to reconcile work and fam-
ily obligations. In the Scandinavian nations, public day care facilities and
generous maternity leave schemes imply that women can manage both.
In summary, problems in the Liberal welfare state are related to deregulat-
ed markets and a residual social security policy that creates a stratum of
working poor and underinvestment in skills. In the Conservative welfare
states exogenous pressures will fortify the problems associated with the sin-
gle-income family, the insider-outsider divide and a compressed wage distri-
bution. The latter also seems to be a central problem for the Social Democ-
ratic welfare state.
In other words, exogenous pressures and how they crystallize into differ-
ent loads on the welfare states depends on, and involves, the entire institu-
tional context of the welfare state and its policy areas. This book focuses on
one policy area, disability policy, and seeks to shed light on how different
policy responses to pressures within this area result in a different outcome in
terms of inclusion and exclusion from the labour market.
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Welfare states and disability programmes
Historical evidence tells us that disability policies are affected when welfare
states are under pressure. During the second half of the 1970s until the mid-
1990s the disability rolls kept growing in many western nations (Aarts,
Burkhauser and de Jong, 1996). This development has been linked to pres-
sures such as stagnating economic growth and an increasing supply of main-
ly female labour (Haveman, Halberstadt and Burkhauser, 1984; Aarts,
Burkhauser and de Jong, 1996). Apparently the consequences of these pres-
sures have varied across nations. For example, Germany experienced almost
no growth in the number of disability beneﬁciaries, whereas the Nether-
lands was hit by soaring disability rolls (Aarts, Burkhauser and de Jong,
1996). What are the mechanisms through which exogenous pressures trans-
late into an increasing number of disability beneﬁciaries? In what ways do
political strategies and institutional structures make a difference with re-
spect to the consequences of exogenous pressures? Before these questions
are addressed, it is fruitful to place disability programmes in the context of
welfare state policies.
Cash beneﬁt programmes may be considered as different pathways that
can be used to withdraw, temporarily or permanently, from the labour mar-
ket (Kohli and Rein, 1991; de Vroom and Naschold, 1993; Aarts, Burkhau-
ser and de Jong, 1996; Burkhauser, 1998). In a very simplistic way, the main
pathways are shown in Figure 1.1. The normal pathway out of the labour
force, the work pathway, is used when workers pass a certain age-limit and
thereby become entitled to old age pension. The other exit pathways all in-
volve receipt of social security beneﬁts.
The majority of workers experience shorter or longer periods of unem-
ployment (receiving either unemployment beneﬁt or social assistance) and
sickness absence during their working ages. In most cases they return to
work and thus remain on the work pathway. Some workers do however
leave the work force prematurely through one of the exit pathways. These
may be old workers who retire after being unemployment, or workers with
lasting health problems who after periods of sick leave enter the disability
beneﬁt scheme.
Active labour market policies aim to reverse the ﬂow of people out of the
labour force, cf. the dot-and-dash arrows in Figure 1.1. Active employment
policies concern the provision of active measures such as subsidised job
training programmes, subsidised education, job search courses and so forth.
In addition, other market interventions such as job protection legislation,
quota jobs and wage-subsidised jobs may limit the outﬂow from the labour
force.
18 diasability policies under pressure
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The model in Figure 1.1 suggests that the load on the different pathways de-
pends on the labour market on the one hand and the social security pro-
grammes on the other. Consequently, the analysis of exogenous pressures
and labour market exclusions through the disability pathway must take ac-
count of labour market conditions related to institutional settings, labour
market policies and disability policies.
The labour market and the disability pathway
Push factors
Pressures on the disability pathway caused by developments related to the
labour market are often referred to as ‘push factors’, ‘demand factors’, or
‘the exclusion model’ (e.g. Marklund, 1995; Rupp and Stapleton, 1998;
Stattin, 1998). Push factors include stagnating economic growth, rising un-
employment, poor working conditions, increasing demand for ﬂexible
workers and changing labour market structures, e.g. where some economic
sectors are declining while others are growing. Such conditions foster exclu-
sion from the labour market either because it involves a decrease in the de-
mand for certain groups of workers or because certain groups of workers
cannot meet the demands of the labour market. For instance, rising unem-
19the labour market and the disability pathway
Figure 1.1 Exit pathways from the labour force.
Source:adapted from Aarts,Burkhauser and de Jong (1996)
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ployment leads to marginalisation and exclusion from the labour market
and thus to a rise in disability applications and awards (e.g. Frick and Sad-
owski, 1996; Rupp and Stapleton, 1998). Similarly, structural changes
make the demand for workers in certain sectors decrease, and if redundant
workers cannot ﬁnd employment in other sectors, it is likely that they soon-
er or later will be excluded from the labour market. As a result, more work-
ers will leave the labour market through the disability pathway if it is avail-
able to them.
The consequences of exogenous pressures
The exogenous pressures of globalisation, new social risks and population
ageing and their likely consequences for the load on the disability pathway
can be understood in the light of the exclusion model.
Globalisation and the increasing competition from low-wage nations con-
stitute a structural change in that the demand for unskilled production
workers in particular will fall relative to the demand for other workers. The
workers made redundant in the resulting adaptation will probably result in
increased labour market exit and thus in pressure on the disability pathway.
Changing risks structures will probably also result in pressure on disabili-
ty programmes. When the labour market calls for more ﬂexible workers the
number of people that cannot meet these demands and eventual become
work disabled will increase. Changing family patterns and the rise in num-
bers of single earners and single parents may also raise the demand for dis-
ability beneﬁts. Single-income families are more vulnerable to job loss than
dual-income families, which in turn means that more people become at risk
of being marginalized or excluded from the labour market.
Ageing is a structural change that alters the supply of labour. However, its
effects may be contradictory. On the one hand, health problems and thus the
demand for sickness and disability beneﬁts increases with age, meaning that
the pressure on the disability pathway will increase as the labour force grows
older. On the other hand, when the number of working age people decreases,
the (relative) demand for workers will increase meaning that employment
prospects of older workers will improve. In other words, it is likely that the
future labour market will absorb more workers with health problems.
The exogenous pressures on welfare states consequently seem to cause
pressure towards more labour market exclusion and an increased use of the
disability pathway. Certainly, this pressure is not solely directed at the dis-
ability pathway, but towards exit pathways in general. Yet it seems plausi-
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ble that pressures from ageing populations and the demand for a ﬂexible
work force more than other exogenous pressures will be directed towards
the disability pathway. While age and too high job demands are known to
be associated with poor health and work absence (for job demands see
Karasek and Theorell, 1990), marginalization caused by changing family
patterns and unemployment in the production sector is not, at least in its
origin, related to health problems.
In summary, the exogenous pressures seem to create pressure towards
both exit and inclusion. Consequently, what are needed are responses that
can prevent exclusion caused by globalisation, new social risks and an age-
ing workforce and at the same time provide a sufﬁcient supply of labour. Be-
fore we turn to this question, we need to look at how conditions related to
the disability pathway may inﬂuence the extend to which exit pressures
translate into retirement via disability programmes.
Disability programmes and the disability pathway
Generous disability programmes have long been blamed for the growing
number of disability beneﬁciaries throughout the western world. It is said
that generous disability beneﬁts and wide eligibility criteria reduce peoples’
incentives to work; workers are pulled out of employment, so to speak. Yet
explanations have also been sought elsewhere. The organisation and ﬁnan-
cial structure of beneﬁt programmes and their impact on those who are not
workers, e.g. employers and supervisors, have been emphasised. In addition,
the problem of deﬁning and verifying ‘work disability’ may facilitate exces-
sive use of the disability pathway.
Pull factors
The assumption that people choose between work and cash transfers is at
the heart of the pull model: beneﬁt receipt is preferred to work when the util-
ity from beneﬁt receipt exceeds the utility from work.2 It follows that the
number of disability beneﬁciaries grows when beneﬁts are raised. Of course,
while advocates of the importance of pull factors claim that such factors in-
ﬂuence disability beneﬁt awards, they normally also acknowledge the im-
portance of other factors (e.g. Aarts and de Jong, 1992; Stapleton et al.,
1998).
Like generous beneﬁts, wide eligibility criteria may contribute to the use
of the disability pathway. Eligibility criteria may concern requirements
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about age, work record, and work disability. When these criteria are relaxed
the number applicants rises (e.g. Frick and Sadowski, 1996; Stapleton et al.,
1998).
While criteria such as age and work record are easy to verify, a concept
such as work disability, a crucial criterion in all disability programmes, is
much harder to determine as it involves a great deal of subjectivity. Normal-
ly, the work disability criterion involves both a medical and an occupational
aspect. In addition to a medical examination, the medical assessment must
often rely on subjective patient statements, for example about pain and
functional abilities. The occupational assessment is also not based on facts,
there are no objective answers to questions such as whether the impairment
leads to reduced work capacity, and if so, how much is the capacity for work
or the earnings potential reduced. Thus, not only do both steps of the assess-
ment involve discretion and subjectivity, they also involve several factors.
This opens up the door for several pressures.
One such pressure stems from the applicants. A person who considers
himself disabled will normally feel a legitimate right to disability beneﬁt.
There is a strong case, therefore, that applicants present their cases in the
contact with medical experts in a way that enhances the chance of being
awarded some form of beneﬁt. That is, symptoms and disabling conse-
quences will be emphasised more than conditions indicating work ability
(Stone, 1984).3 Secondly, the medical experts involved also exert pressure
because they are adverse to risk: if in doubt, they prefer to wrongly award
(or recommend) beneﬁt to an ineligible applicant rather than wrongly deny
beneﬁt to a deserving person (ibid.).
A third type of pressure stems from what is called the increasing medica-
tion of our society: more and more ‘events’ are related to medical circum-
stances such that the disability programmes tend to cover a wider spectrum
of events (Lindqvist, 1995). Whether or not this development is rooted in
technological progress in the medical sphere, an expansion of the medical
profession or the interplay between the medical sphere and other sectors in
society, it probably widens the concept of disability in the population,
adding to the push factors. This tendency will raise the claim for disability
beneﬁts.
Finally, it should be noted that the discretion involved in the application
procedure allows pressures from the economic and political context to show
through in the number of disability beneﬁt awards. For instance, in many
disability programmes, the applicant’s occupational earnings potential is
assessed by comparing the earnings potential of an imaginary person of the
same age and educational background, with the income that the applicant is
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expected to earn in his present condition. When unemployment rises, the
number of potential jobs available to the applicant decreases, and so do the
potential earnings, hence that the applicant is considered to be more dis-
abled. Consequently, the number of people eligible for beneﬁt increases (e.g.
Aarts and de Jong, 1996). In a similar vein, when discretion is present, gate-
keepers and administrative units may alter their award practice under inﬂu-
ence of the signals they receive from the political level (Berkowitz and
Burkhauser, 1996).
The financial and organisational structure of disability programmes
The vague boundaries of the category of disability make the inﬂow into dis-
ability programmes sensitive as to how they are organised and ﬁnanced. The
ﬁnancial aspects concern the ﬁnancial responsibility of beneﬁt payments,
while the organisation of programmes concerns those with whom the daily
and overall administrative responsibility rests.
Just as the level of beneﬁts may inﬂuence workers’ incentives to apply for
disability beneﬁt, the ﬁnancing of beneﬁts may inﬂuence how other actors
behave. For example, in the United States, state governments ﬁnance social
assistance whereas the federal government ﬁnances the disability pro-
gramme (ssi). Consequently, state governments have an incentive to pro-
mote enrolment in the disability beneﬁt programme rather than the social
assistance programme (Livermore, Stapleton and Zeuschner, 1998).
One important qualitative difference between pull and push factors
should be noted. Globalisation, changing social risks and ageing directly in-
ﬂuence the future need for disability beneﬁts, because they increase labour
market exclusion and, as concerns ageing, also reduce the supply of labour.
Being exogenous these pressures arise no matter what we do (but we can in-
ﬂuence their consequences). In contrast, push factors such as the beneﬁt lev-
el, eligibility criteria, the organisation and ﬁnancing of disability pro-
grammes and the vague category of disability have been in play for a long
time and therefore do not increase the pressure. Thus, maybe with the ex-
ception of the ‘medication of society’, which may increase in magnitude, the
pressure from these sources will not signiﬁcantly alter unless the policies
themselves are changed. Yet they exert pressure and hold the potential for
alleviating the negative consequences of the exogenous pressures.
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Disability policy responses
The exogenous pressures seem to call for a policy that at the same time lim-
its the inﬂow into disability programmes and increases the labour supply.
The above discussion suggests that two different strategies are at hand: a
labour market strategy and a disability beneﬁt strategy, and a combination
of these.
A disability beneﬁt strategy may limit exit through the disability pathway
in three ways. Firstly, disability programmes can be made less generous by
tightening eligibility criteria and reducing the level of beneﬁts. Secondly, the
organisational and ﬁnancial structure of disability programmes can be al-
tered, which may reduce the incentives of various actors involved in the pro-
gramme administration to award beneﬁts. A third possibility, related to the
two others, is to change the medical and occupational disability assessment
and thereby (try to) reduce subjectivity and discretion in the award proce-
dure. However, given the nature of the disability concept, it may be difﬁcult
to reduce subjectivity and discretion, at least without signiﬁcantly reducing
the justiﬁcation of the programmes. That is, standardized and objective
procedures will yield ‘incorrect’ or ‘unfair’ results when in reality no avail-
able instruments exist that can objectively determine ‘disability’ and ‘occu-
pation potential’.
All three elements in the disability strategy may reduce the inﬂow into dis-
ability programmes either because fewer people are allowed beneﬁt or be-
cause beneﬁts become less attractive. To a certain extent this may lead to an
increased supply of labour because some people with health problems, who
would otherwise enter the disability pathway, will return to or remain in
employment. However, many people will probably be unable to work and
use either another exit pathway or leave the labour force without beneﬁts.
This is the Achilles’ heel of the disability beneﬁt strategy because the work
potential of these people is left unused, and because it reﬂects a failure of the
welfare state as people in need are denied support.
In contrast to the disability beneﬁt strategy, the labour market strategy
aims to reduce the need for exit pathways in the ﬁrst place. This may happen
either by preventing work-related disability from occurring, for example, by
introducing measures that improve the work environment and reduce the
risk of work-related injuries, or by facilitating workers’ attachment to the
work pathway despite their health problems. The latter policy, which is the
focus of this book, involves two types of instruments. One type of instru-
ment provides jobs with reduced demands that can be met by people with a
reduced capacity for work. Workplace adaptations, wage subsidies, job-
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protection legislation and quota jobs are all examples of such measures. An-
other type of instrument seeks to improve the person’s work capacity
through measures such as job training and education and thereby increase
the chance of ﬁnding ordinary employment. Thus, the labour market strat-
egy may both limit the inﬂow into disability programmes and increase the
labour supply: when people with health problems are kept in the work path-
way, they are not a burden on disability programmes. In addition, the
labour market strategy may in part solve the welfare failure of the disability
beneﬁt strategy because it may help unﬁt workers, who are ineligible for dis-
ability beneﬁt, back to work.
The objective of this book
The Netherlands and Denmark are two prominent examples of nations that
have applied a labour market strategy to improve the attachment of disabled
people to the work pathway and reduce the inﬂow into disability pro-
grammes. Whilst these two nations have shared these goals, they have pur-
sued them by very different means. The Netherlands has followed a policy
that exhibits strong Conservative elements. Employers have considerable
obligations for the integration of disabled people into the labour market.
Employers’ dismissal of sick-listed workers is difﬁcult and costly, and indi-
vidual employers are obliged to ﬁnance sickness beneﬁts for up to a year and
disability beneﬁts for up to ﬁve years when a worker becomes disabled. With
this strategy, it is expected that employers prevent sickness absenteeism and
promote the reintegration of sick-listed workers.
Denmark, in contrast, has cultivated a typical Social Democratic ap-
proach with an extensive public responsibility. Public authorities have been
delegated greater responsibilities and incentives to use active instruments
such as vocational rehabilitation and subsidised employment in order to in-
crease the employment of disabled people. At the same time the responsibili-
ty of employers is limited. They do not contribute to the ﬁnancing of sick-
ness beneﬁts (except for the ﬁrst two weeks of sick leave) and disability bene-
ﬁts, and the dismissal of sick-listed workers is easy. What is more, the partic-
ipation of employers in the integration of disabled people is voluntary.
This book aims to shed light on the consequences of such crossnational
differences in the responsibility of employers and the public sector. How
does the division of responsibilities inﬂuence disabled peoples’ chances of
becoming and remaining attached to the labour market? What are the bene-
ﬁts and drawbacks of, respectively, a Social Democratic and a Conservative
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disability policy? And to what extent are these different strategies able to
meet increasing pressures towards disability exit? By putting forward an-
swers to these questions this book will hopefully be of inspiration in the
search for effective disability policy.
How to study the outcomes of disability policies
The study of how national disability policies affect the welfare of citizens
has so far received little attention. Despite a myriad of single-nation studies,
little is known about the importance of institutional structures. There are
two reasons for this. As we will see in Chapter 2, the majority of studies fo-
cus on how work-disabled peoples’ individual characteristics affect their
labour market attachment rather than focusing on the inﬂuence of institu-
tional conditions. In addition, as institutional conditions seldom vary with-
in nations, single-nation studies are often ill-equipped to shed light on how
institutional conditions inﬂuence citizens’ welfare. Crossnational studies,
on the other hand, are nearly always based on macro-level data and there-
fore run into problems related to overdetermination and the ‘black box
problem’ (see e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1993; Goldthorpe, 1997). Overdeter-
mination occurs when the number of potential explanatory variables is rela-
tively high for the number of cases, which often is the case when the ex-
planatory variable of interest is the ‘nation’ or ‘beneﬁt scheme’. In other
words, when the analytical unit consists of a handful of nations, very few
competing explanations can be simultaneously tested. The black box prob-
lem is present when a statistical signiﬁcant association between two vari-
ables does not in itself explain the mechanisms through which the explana-
tory variable affects the dependent variable. For example, a negative associ-
ation between public expenditure on active labour market measures and
disability beneﬁt awards says nothing about how active measures reduce
disability beneﬁt awards.
The analysis in the present study is based on a combined research strategy
where macro- and micro-level analyses are combined (Ragin, 1987, chapter
5). At the macro level an analysis of the Dutch and Danish disability policies
aims to uncover important crossnational institutional differences. The con-
sequences of these institutional differences are then studied using compara-
tive micro-level data on 900 Dutch and Danish long-term sick-listed work-
ers.4 With this research strategy it is possible to reduce some of the problems
that previous disability studies have encountered. That is, the choice of two
very different national disability policies should provide the institutional
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differences that many single-nation studies lack. With only two nations in-
cluded, it should also be possible to enlighten more of the black box problem
that prevails many of the comparative macro-level studies. The use of mi-
cro-level data solves the problem of overdetermination, in so far as impor-
tant institutional structures can be operationalised at the micro level. Final-
ly, the use of micro data allows for a rather detailed investigation of the
mechanisms that inﬂuence peoples’ attachment to the labour market path-
way. A spin-off effect, therefore, is that the book sheds light not only on the
importance of institutional conditions but also on other factors that may
determine the labour market attachment of people with health problems.
The structure of this book
How can we explain why different disability policies yield different out-
comes in terms of the integration of work-disabled people? In which ways
do institutional conditions inﬂuence whether a work-disabled person re-
mains attached to the work pathway or enters the disability pathway? To
answer these questions, Chapter 2 looks at four important research tradi-
tions to see how they explain the labour market integration of work-dis-
abled people and to what extent their theoretical assumptions are supported
by empirical ﬁndings. Although the medical, economical, public policy and
sociological research disciplines provide signiﬁcant insights and ﬁndings, I
argue that studies within these disciplines only integrate insights from other
approaches to a very limited degree. Chapter 3 seeks to reduce this gap by
proposing a model for labour market integration that draws on insights
from different theoretical traditions.
Chapter 4 uses macro indicators to put the development of Dutch and
Danish disability policies during the last few decades into a broader con-
text. Like other Western nations the Netherlands and Denmark were hit by
the economic recession during the 1970s and 1980s. In the Netherlands this
gave rise to a massive exit through the disability beneﬁt scheme, whereas in
Denmark the labour market exit was more limited and more evenly spread
among different exit routes. However, although Denmark, like the Nether-
lands, recovered well from the recession, the disability beneﬁt roll kept
growing during the 1990s. In other words, both nations have experienced
pressures on the disability pathway, and in both nations labour market exit
and the integration of work-disabled people have been on the political agen-
da.
Even though the political aims have been the same in the two nations, the
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political strategies have been very different. A comparison of the Dutch and
the Danish disability policies in Chapters 5 and 6 reveals that Denmark has
cultivated the existing policy. That is, while more emphasis has been put on
vocational rehabilitation, the responsibility for labour market integration
and the payment of sickness and disability beneﬁts remains predominantly a
public matter. In contrast, in the Netherlands these responsibilities have to a
large extent been transferred from the public domain and the social partners
to the individual employer.
The consequences that these differences have for the integration of work-
disabled people are analysed in Chapters 7 and 8. The central question is:
how does a policy that favours the responsibility of public authorities, re-
spectively the responsibility of employers, inﬂuence the labour market inte-
gration of work-disabled people? I argue that an extensive employer respon-
sibility makes it costly for Dutch employers to substitute sick-listed work-
ers, and, therefore, also relatively attractive to reintegrate sick-listed work-
ers. In contrast, in Denmark it is attractive for employers to substitute sick-
listed workers because the responsibility of the employers is limited. The
ﬁndings in Chapter 7 suggest that the institutional differences inﬂuence
how integration takes place. The Dutch policy seems to prevent dismissals
of long-term sick-listed workers, facilitate employers’ efforts of retaining
their sick-listed workers and thus advance reintegration with the old em-
ployer. In contrast, the Danish policy promotes integration with a new em-
ployer. The sick-listed workers are often dismissed, they often participate in
publicly provided vocational rehabilitation measures and they often return
to work with a new employer.
The institutional differences also appear to affect the outcomes of the in-
tegration process. The analysis in Chapter 8 indicates that the Dutch policy
is more effective in returning the long-term sick-listed workers to work than
the Danish policy. In Denmark the limited responsibility of employers leads
to many dismissals and thus to the marginalization of sick-listed workers,
who despite publicly provided reintegration instruments often remain with-
out work. In contrast, as Dutch employers cannot dismiss sick-listed work-
ers, employers have strong incentives to facilitate their return to work, even
though the capacity for work of these workers may be considerably reduced.
The drawback of the Dutch policy seems to be that it makes the labour
market integration of people without attachment to an employer difﬁcult as
it tends to create insider-outsider problems. Furthermore, even though the
Dutch policy is effective in returning the long-term sick-listed to work, the
Danish policy seems in the ﬁrst place to be more effective in reducing the
number of long-term sick-listed people. Accordingly, there are fewer long-
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term sick-listed workers that need to be integrated into the labour market. I
suggest that this may be related to the fact that the Danish disability policy
makes it less socially acceptable and more economically risky to be off work
because of health problems. Taken together the Dutch policy therefore
seems no more effective in integrating work-disabled people into the labour
market than the Danish policy. The two nations’ policies seem in other
words to be associated with different advantages and drawbacks that make
it difﬁcult to provide an overall ranking of the two policies.
The ﬁnal chapter, Chapter 9, looks at the Dutch and Danish policies from
another angle and addresses two questions. Did the policy changes during
1990s succeed in limiting entry into the disability beneﬁt schemes, and to
what extent will the two nations’ disability policies be able to alleviate fu-
ture welfare state pressures? The development in the number of disability
beneﬁt awards indicates that the Danish strategy of enhancing public au-
thorities’ incentives to apply active rather than passive measures has been
much more successful than the Dutch strategy of improving employers’ in-
centives to limit work disability. It is however likely that this conclusion un-
derestimates the effects of the Dutch reforms. These reforms probably pre-
vented further increases in the number of beneﬁt awards that would other-
wise have occurred because of an ageing population and increasing work
demands. It also seems likely that changes to the unemployment policy dur-
ing the 1990s reduced exit through the social assistance and unemployment
insurance pathways. This may have increased the load on the disability
pathway, such that the Dutch disability reforms would probably have had a
more visible effect without the changes to the unemployment policy.
Globalisation, changing social risk structures and ageing populations will
probably cause more work disability in the coming years. Given the institu-
tional differences between the Dutch and Danish disability policies, I argue
that the Danish policy is better able than the Dutch policy to deal with in-
creasing welfare state pressures. This is based on the assumption that the
limit of the Dutch employer cost strategy has been reached. Further increas-
es in employers’ costs that will follow from rising welfare state pressures
may therefore reduce the labour market integration of outsiders, as it will
become even more expensive for employers to employ people with a high
disability risk. At the same time increasing employer costs will not signiﬁ-
cantly counteract the increased marginalization of insiders that follows
from increasing welfare state pressures. This is because considerable incen-
tives for employers to retain sick-listed workers are already in place.
In Denmark an increased load on the disability pathway will not raise the
individual employers’ costs, and therefore not worsen the situation of out-
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siders. The increasing welfare state pressures may however increase the
marginalization of insiders because the limited employer costs limit their in-
centives to retain sick-listed workers. The negative consequences, however,
will to some extent be offset by a declining labour supply that follows from
the ageing of the population. Thus, even though both policies suffer from
drawbacks, future pressure towards policy changes will probably be more
pronounced in the Netherlands than in Denmark.
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2 The Integration of Disabled People:
What Do We Know?1
In order to better understand how disability policies inﬂuence citizens’ at-
tachment to the labour market, we need to identify the conditions and
mechanisms that determine why some people with health problems remain
in the labour force whereas others enter a disability programme. The pur-
pose of this and the next chapter is, therefore, to put forward a theoretical
framework that can guide an analysis of the consequences of Dutch and
Danish disability policies. This chapter reviews some of the literature within
the area of the labour market integration of sick-listed workers. Against the
background of this review the following chapter presents a theoretical mod-
el of labour market integration.
Labour market reintegration of sick-listed workers has been the subject of
research in several research disciplines. This review includes contributions
from four major disciplines: 1) clinical studies; 2) economics; 3) public poli-
cy; and 4) sociological studies. Including research from several different dis-
ciplines makes it possible to propose a theoretical model for labour market
integration based on a broad range of insights; as will be shown in the fol-
lowing sections, a multidisciplinary research strategy is necessary in order
to illuminate the question of which factors affect the labour market integra-
tion of work-disabled people. One problem with this approach, however, is
that the quantity of literature on work disability and labour market attach-
ment is overwhelming. Therefore this review focuses mainly on studies with
populations (workers sick-listed for more than 13 weeks) and outcome mea-
sures (return to work) that are close to those used in the analyses in this
book.2
Clinical studies
One important aspect of the clinical approach to research on work disabili-
ty concerns the relationship between pathology, impairment, functional
limitations and work disability. Activation of the body’s defence and coping
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mechanisms may be caused by an injury or a disease. This ‘stage of active
pathology’ will result in an impairment, that is, a physiological or anatomi-
cal loss or other abnormality, which in turn can lead to functional limita-
tions (Nagi, 1965; Nagi, 1969; Waddell, 1987; Aarts and de Jong, 1992).
Functional limitations can be classiﬁed at different levels, e.g. at the level of
organs and systems or at the level of activities and tasks. Work disability ex-
ists when the inability to perform certain activities or tasks interferes with
the demands of the job, that is, activities or tasks that have to be carried out
in order to perform a certain job.
In the area of low back pain, this so-called clinical pathology approach
has focused on the physical as well as psychological dimensions of work dis-
ability. On the physical side, severe physical damage in the lower back is as-
sumed to cause work disability. On the psychological side, work disability is
thought to arise because of clear secondary psychopathological complica-
tions, such as depression or a number of psychosomatic disorders often la-
belled “compensation neurosis” (Frank et al., 1995).
Another important aspect of clinical research on this subject concerns the
psychosocial and behavioural aspects of low back pain (see, e.g. Frank et al.,
1995). This approach recognises that the clinical pathology approach,
where physical or psychological abnormalities are assumed to cause work
disability, is too narrow. Rather, it stresses the interplay between disease,
psychological factors and social conditions that may cause individual dif-
ferences in perceptions and responses to diseases (Waddell, 1987). This ap-
proach overlaps to some extent with the micro-sociological approach, dis-
cussed below, where the emphasis is on the costs and beneﬁts associated
with the role of being disabled versus the role of worker.
Return to work of chronic low back pain patients
A number of clinical studies have investigated how different variables inﬂu-
ence the resumption of work of long-term sick-listed workers with chronic
low back pain (Hildebrandt et al., 1997; Hazard, Bendix and Fenwick,
1991; Gatchel, Polatin and Mayer, 1994; Lacroix et al., 1990; Kummel,
1996; Sandström, 1986; Sandström and Esbjörnsson, 1986; Werneke, Har-
ris and Lichter, 1993; Veerman and Palmer, 2001).3 They all used the return
to work as the outcome variable, but varied in several other dimensions, for
instance, with regard to the duration of sick leave on admission to the study,
the duration of the followup period and whether or not the subjects partici-
pated in a rehabilitation programme.
Each of these studies illustrates the importance of returning to work of
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one or more of the following groups of variables: socio-demographic vari-
ables, e.g. sex, age, education, and marital status; medical variables, e.g.
muscle strength, lifting capacity, pain conditions; and psychological vari-
ables such as personality disorders, e.g. symptoms of depression or schizo-
phrenia, and coping strategies. Furthermore, a few studies also include job-
related variables, e.g. occupation, exposure to stress and physical job de-
mands; and lifestyle variables, e.g. smoking habits. The ﬁndings of these
studies are summarised in Table 2.1.
These studies provide mixed evidence. Several studies ﬁnd that psycholog-
ical conditions have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the probability of returning to
work (Hazard, Bendix and Fenwick, 1991; Kummel, 1996; Sandström,
1986; Sandström and Esbjörnsson, 1986; Werneke, Harris and Lichter,
1993). For example, the patient’s expectation about the possibility for re-
suming work as well as the patient’s understanding of his or her medical
condition appears to affect the probability of their returning to work. How-
ever, other studies ﬁnd that psychological variables are insigniﬁcant
(Lacroix et al., 1990; Veerman and Palmer, 2001).
An almost similar picture applies to the importance of medical, socio-de-
mographic, job-related and lifestyle conditions. These variables are found
to be signiﬁcant in a few of the studies, but in several cases this is not sup-
ported by ﬁndings from other studies. It is worth noting, however, that the
ﬁndings of the highest quality study (in terms of the number of cases, the
number of variables and the statistical method) by Veerman and Palmer
(2001) provides strong support for the importance of socio-demographic
variables (age), medical variables (e.g. pain intensity) and job-related vari-
ables (e.g. physical job demands). The study gives no support for the inﬂu-
ence of lifestyle variables (smoking).
That socio-demographic, medical and job-related variables may be of im-
portance for the return to work of people with health problems is supported
by studies from the other reviewed disciplines and studies of populations
other than long-term sick-listed workers with low back pain. Firstly, most of
the reviewed studies from other research disciplines support the importance
of age, with older people having a below-average chance of returning to
work (e.g. Aarts and de Jong, 1992; Marklund, 1995; Oleinick, Gluck and
Guire, 1996; Johnson, Baldwin and Butler, 1998). In general, neither mari-
tal status nor gender is found to be of importance. Secondly, some of the re-
viewed studies from other research disciplines also support the inﬂuence of
health conditions (e.g. Aarts and de Jong, 1992). Thirdly, in a review of
work disability and return to work, Krause and Lund (2002) conclude that
workplace characteristics such as physical and psychological job demands
33clinical studies
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Table 2.1 Selected clinical studies concerning the importance of socio-demographic,medical,
psychological, job-related and lifestyle variables.
Study Cohort Multi- Findings related to the type of variables (direction of effect)
size variate
analysis
Hildebrandt et al. 70 Yes Socio-demographic:type of occupation (unskilled workers
(1997) have a low rtw rate)
Hazard,Bendix 258 No Medical: physical endurance significant at 1-year but not at
and Fenwick (1991) 2-year followup (people with high physical endurance have a
high rtw rate)
Psychological: schizophrenia index and intelligent index sig-
nificant at 1-year but not at 2-year followup
Life style: Cigarette smoking significant at 1-year but not at 2-
year followup (smokers have a low rtw rate) 
Gatchel,Polatin 152 Yes Psychological:no positive findings:diagnosed psycho-
and Mayer (1994) pathology (axis I clinical disorders and axis II personality dis-
orders) had no influence on the rtw
Sandström (1986) 52 No Medical:previous back pain (low rtw rate) and the consump-
tion of analgesics (low rtw rate)
Psychological: Reported fatigue at the end of the working day
(low rtw rate)
Sandström and 52 Yes Psychological:patient’s attitude towards possibility
Esbjörnsson (1986) for work resumption (people not expecting work resumption
have low rtw rate)
Lacroix et al. 100 No Psychological: non-organic signs had no influence on
(1990) the rtw. Patient’s understanding of their medical condition
(people with a good understanding have a high rtw rate) 
Kummel 717 No Psychological: non-organic signs (people with 
(1996) non-organic signs have a low rtw rate)
Werneke,Harris 183 No Psychological: non-organic signs (people with non-
and Lichter (1993) organic signs have a low rtw rate)
Veerman and 2,106 Yes Socio-demographic: age (older people have a low 
Palmer (2001) (from rtw rate)
six Medical: self-perceived work ability and pain intensity 
nations) significant in five nations (low pain intensity,high work abili-
ty increases the rtw rate)
Psychological: mental health index had no influence on the
rtw
Job-related variables: workers with low physical job demands
and workers not separated from their employer during the
first 4 months after reporting sick had a high rtw rate in three
nations
Lifestyle: smoking has no influence on the rtw
Note:rtw is an acronym for return to work.
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and company culture and organisation are of great importance in the return
to work rate and the duration of work disability.
The effects of interventions
Apart from research on predictors for the resumption of work for long-term
sick-listed workers, a considerable number of studies have been published
concerning the effectiveness of clinical interventions aimed at the return to
work.
Weide, Verbeek and Tulder (1997) produced a very comprehensive litera-
ture review of the vocational outcomes of clinical interventions for low back
pain patients. The review was limited to randomised clinical trial studies
with the return to work or other vocational status measures as the outcome
variable. With regard to chronic low back pain (work incapacity lasting
more than 12 weeks), the authors considered the following interventions:
antidepressants, non-steroidal anti-inﬂammatory drugs, spinal manipula-
tion, back school or back exercises, behavioural therapy and case manage-
ment methods. A number of interventions were not considered because no
positive evidence of efﬁcacy on the functional ability of patients with low
back pain was found in the literature. Thus, studies on the use of analgesics,
muscles relaxants, epidural and intra-articular injections, traction, or-
thoses, biofeedback, acupuncture and transcutaneous nerve stimulation
were excluded. The authors only found limited evidence of efﬁcacy for one
type of intervention: the use of antidepressants. No randomised clinical tri-
als were found on case management, and no evidence was found for the efﬁ-
cacy of other interventions. 
These rather limited ﬁndings do not necessarily imply that various types
of clinical interventions do not have an effect. The lack of evidence may re-
sult from a lack of studies fulﬁlling the scientiﬁc criteria used by the au-
thors. As note above, no case management studies performed as a ran-
domised clinical trial were found. Furthermore, although one study with
positive results concerning the use of non-steroidal anti-inﬂammatory
drugs and one study with positive outcomes of spinal manipulation were
found, these studies were considered to be of low quality and it was there-
fore concluded that there was ‘no evidence’. Accordingly, if the scientiﬁc cri-
teria are relaxed, it could be concluded that non-steroidal anti-inﬂammato-
ry drugs and spinal manipulation may have a positive effect.
Weide, Verbeek and Tulder did not consider vocational interventions oth-
er than case management. Two other literature reviews by Battie (1992) and
Frank et al. (1996) considered so-called workplace-based interventions,
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such as modiﬁed work, light duties and changes in working hours. Frank et
al., (1996) noted that ‘there are no rigorously controlled studies showing re-
ductions in long-term or recurrent occupational low back pain disability
that can be unequivocally attributed to speciﬁc workplace interventions’.
However, they mention several ‘before-and-after’ studies showing positive
effects of workplace-based interventions. Most of these studies concern ear-
ly interventions for low back pain patients after a relatively short period of
work disability (only one study concerns patients with chronic low back
pain: Crook, 1994). The positive effect of modiﬁed work is generally sup-
ported by the ﬁndings of other studies concerning other diagnosis groups
(for an overview see, Krause, Dasinger and Neuhauser, 1998; Krause and
Lund, 2002.)
To sum up, the clinical studies of long-term sick-listed workers with low
back pain that have been reviewed here provide mixed evidence about the ef-
fects of psychological, medical, socio-demographic, job-related and
lifestyle conditions. Studies from other research areas and studies of other
populations, however, suggest that these variables may be inﬂuential. Only
modest evidence of the effect of clinical interventions on the rate of return to
work for patients with chronic low back pain has been established. Evidence
suggests that workplace-based interventions may have a positive effect on
the return to work.
Economic studies
The observation of a simultaneous decline in male labour force participa-
tion and the growth in the number of people entering the disability pro-
grammes led economists to enter the area of integration of disabled people
(Berkowitz and Johnson, 1974; Parsons, 1980; 1984; Haveman and Wolfe,
1984a, 1984b; Emanuel, de Gier and Konijn, 1987; Wolfe and Haveman,
1990; Aarts and de Jong, 1992). These studies were closely related to tradi-
tional labour supply models, where a micro-economic theoretical frame-
work is applied. This approach has been used in most studies following
Berkowitz and Johnson (1974).
The basic assumption of most micro-economic models is that a work-dis-
abled person can choose between two options, work and transfer income,
e.g. disability beneﬁt. Thus, given the health status of the work-disabled, the
outcome will depend on the utility derived from each of the two options. If
utility in the work option exceeds utility in the beneﬁt option, the work-dis-
abled person will resume work and vice versa. The utility derived from the
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beneﬁt option may depend on a number of factors, e.g. the disability beneﬁt
amount, health status, attitudes, etc., and the utility in the work option may
depend on wages, health status, education and age, etc.
In addition to economic incentives, economists have also been interested
in the economic cost and beneﬁts of various programmes. Within this area
of research, the effects of various vocational rehabilitation programmes
have been investigated. Participation in vocational rehabilitation may in-
crease the likelihood of the return to work of sick-listed workers in two dif-
ferent ways. Firstly, it may increase functional ability and work capacity
and thereby increase employment opportunities. In economic terms, voca-
tional rehabilitation can be said to increase the human capital of the afﬂict-
ed person. This type of vocational rehabilitation may be job training, differ-
ent types of courses and education. Secondly, certain other types of voca-
tional rehabilitation instruments, such as wage subsidies, workplace adop-
tions and job placement, may create job opportunities for people with re-
duced work capacity. 
Economic incentives and the return to work
Several economic studies have analysed the return to work of work-disabled
people (de Jong, 1987; Aarts and de Jong, 1992; Butler and Worrall, 1985;
Meyer and Viscusi, 1995; Oleinick, Gluck and Guire, 1996; Johnson, Bald-
win and Butler, 1998). All of these studies applied multivariate statistical
techniques, and some of them corrected for unobserved heterogeneity. The
studies differed in respect to study populations. De Jong (1987) and Aarts
and de Jong (1992) concerned long-term sick-listed workers, whereas the
other studies concerned worker injury compensation beneﬁciaries. In those
studies, sick leave was caused by job-related circumstances, and in most
cases they included cases of short-term sick leave. In addition to these differ-
ences, the studies also differed in other important aspects; such as outcome
measurement and how economic incentives were measured. The ﬁndings of
the studies are summarised in Table 2.2.
These studies provide mixed evidence. On one hand, the studies of de Jong
(1987) and Aarts and de Jong (1992) give no, or only very limited, support
for the effect of economic incentives. Thus, they ﬁnd no effect of variables
directly related to different income streams associated with work relative to
the disability beneﬁt option. Aarts and de Jong (1992), however, found that
‘other household income’ affects self-rated work capacity, which in turn af-
fects the probability of a return to work. On the other hand, the workers’
compensation studies suggest in general that economic incentives do have
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Table 2.2 Selected economic studies concerning the importance of economic incentives.
Study Population Outcome Incentives Effect of eco-
measure measured as nomic incentives 
De Jong 2,418 sickness rtw versus Disability benefit No1
(1987) beneficiaries disability  amount divided 
incapacitated benefit by foregone 
for 17 weeks award earnings
Aarts and  2,534 sickness rtw versus Three measures: No effect of 
de Jong (1992) beneficiaries  disability expected income income loss and
incapacitated benefit loss and expected leisure gain.1
for 17 weeks award leisure gain of Other household
disability benefit income reduces
award,and other rtw1
household income
Butler and  Temporary Duration of Benefit level and No significant
Worall (1985) total worker’s benefit claim pre-injury wage effect (but tendency 
beneficiaries  of higher benefit
with low back levels and lower
injuries2 wages increases the
duration of benefit
claim)
Meyer and 6,822 Temporary Duration of Benefit level Higher benefit
Viscusi (1995) total worker’s benefit claim levels significantly   
beneficiaries increase the dura-
tion of benefit claim
Oleinick, 2,184 worker’s Time to first Weekly compen- Results interpreted   
Gluck and compensation return to  sation amount as relatively low 
Guire (1996) beneficiaries, work replacement rates
back injuries, promote rtw
incapacitated
more than 8 weeks
Johnson, 3,731 permanent rtw Replacement rate Relatively low replace-
Baldwin and partial worker’s ment rates  increase
Butler (1998) compensation the rtw
beneficiaries
Note:rtw is an acronym for return to work.
1 Estimated in a structural model where economic incentives may affect self-perceived work inca-
pacity that affects the rtw
2 No information on cohort size
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an effect. This includes the study of back beneﬁciaries who were work dis-
abled for more than 8 weeks (Oleinick, Gluck and Guire, 1996). Krueger
(1990), who also studied workers’ compensation beneﬁciaries also found
support for an effect of economic incentives (referred from Loeser and
Hernserlite, 1995).
These differences in ﬁndings may be associated with institutional differ-
ences. Thus, the lack of an incentive effect in the Dutch study may be caused
by the fact that almost all beneﬁciaries are entitled to full wages. It has been
estimated that in 1990, 95 percent of all workers were entitled to full wages
during sick leave (Aarts and de Jong, 1992). In contrast, replacement rates
are generally considerably lower in the United States. In the study by John-
son, Baldwin and Butler (1998), beneﬁciaries had an average replacement
rate of 69 percent. 
The effects of vocational rehabilitation
In the United States, there is a long-standing tradition of applying cost-bene-
ﬁt analysis to public-funded programmes, including vocational rehabilita-
tion programmes. This tradition is rooted in a need to justify the cost effec-
tiveness of programmes – that generated beneﬁts exceed programme costs –
and economic analysis was applied as early as the 1920s to evaluate voca-
tional rehabilitation programmes (Lewis et al., 1992).
In general, vocational rehabilitation is found to yield positive net future
earnings (see e.g. Lewis et al., 1992; Dean and Dolan, 1991; for an overview
see Berkowitz et al., 1988). It may be problematic, however, to generalize
ﬁndings in cost-beneﬁt studies to the question of the return to work of sick-
listed workers. Positive net beneﬁts in terms of increased earnings for partic-
ipants may not necessarily reﬂect that these people return to work more of-
ten than nonparticipants. Instead, increased earnings among those who re-
sume work could be the cause. 
Some studies have considered the effect of vocational rehabilitation on the
resumption of work or the likelihood of reporting ﬁt for duty (Bergendorff
et al., 1997; Hennessey and Muller, 1995; Veerman and Palmer, 2001;
Heshmati and Engström, 2001; Frölich, Heshmati and Lechner, 2000;
Høgelund and Holm, 2002). The ﬁndings of these studies are summarized
in Table 2.3.
Apparently the evidence of these studies is mixed. Thus, in some studies
(Bergendorff et al., 1997; Veerman and Palmer, 2001; Høgelund and Holm,
2002) vocational rehabilitation measures have no or a negative effect,
whereas in others they have a positive effect (Heshmati and Engström,
39economic studies
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Table 2.3 Selected economic studies concerning the importance of vocational rehabilitation
(VR).
Study Population Outcome Analytical method Effect of vr
measure
Bergendorff 60,000 people Reporting Simple logistic vrmeasures includ- 
et al. (1997) sick-listed for fit for work regression ing education and
60 days or more job training:
negative rtweffect
Hennessey 4,400 people Time to rtw Competing risk Job or vocational 
and Muller entitled to disa- and time to (Cox) survival model training and general
(1995) bility benefit in medical education,respec-
1980/81 recovery, tively,have a positive
respectively effect on the rtw1
Veerman 2,106 workers rtwafter 1 Simple logistic Education and train-
and Palmer from six nations and 2 years, regression ing:no or a negative 
(2001) sick-listed for respectively effect after 1 year and
13 weeks or  a positive effect in one
more nation after 2 years.1
Heshmati 8,839 people rtw status Estimation of simul- vrmeasures inclu-
and sick-listed for at end of sick taneous probit model ding job training and
Engström 60 days or more leave of participation in vr education:positive 
(2001) and probability of rtweffect
rtw.Correction for
unobserved hetero-
geneity
Frölich, 6,287 people Employment Matching of vr In general vrhas no 
Heshmati sick-listed for status at end participants with positive employment
and Lechner 60 days or more of sick leave otherwise similar effect.Education and 
(2000) non-participants passive measures (e.g.
test of work capacity)
have a negative effect.
Workplace-based vr
(e.g. job training) has
the largest employ-
ment effect among the
considered measures,
but the effect is insig-
nificant compared to
no rehabilitation
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2001; Hennessey and Muller, 1995). This divergence persists if we look
only at the highest quality studies, where problems of unobserved differ-
ences between vocational rehabilitation participants and non-participants
are encountered. It should nevertheless be noted that the contents of ‘voca-
tional rehabilitation’ differs in these studies, resulting in the fact that in
some studies a positive effect of one measure, e.g. job training, may be
mixed with the negative effects of other measures, e.g. education. 
In summary, the reviewed literature provides no clear answers with regard
to whether or not vocational rehabilitation has a positive employment ef-
fect among sick-listed workers. Thus, the ﬁndings suggest that certain mea-
sures may have a positive effect whereas other measures such as education
on average may have no or even a negative effect.
Public policy studies
This section considers research related to how social security schemes affect
the labour market attachment of disabled people. These studies consider the
importance of the legal and formal characteristics of relevant schemes, as
well as how they are administered.
Different dimensions may affect the attractiveness of social security
schemes and how they are used, including how such schemes are organised,
how they are ﬁnanced and how the beneﬁts are provided (see Kvist, 1999).
The organisational dimension concerns how schemes are administered.
Questions such as who has the overall administrative responsibility and
41public policy studies
Høgelund 443 workers Time to Piecewise constant Education:insignif-
and Holm sick-listed for 13 rtwwith hazard model. icant net rtweffect
(2002) weeks or more the old and Simultaneous est-
with low back with a new imation of dura-
pain employer, tion until parti-
respectively cipation in vr
and duration 
until rtw.Cor-
rection for unob-
served heterogeneity
Note: rtw and vr are acronym for return to work and vocational rehabilitation, respectively.
Measures without vocational elements, e.g. medical and social rehabilitation, are not consid-
ered.
1 Findings regarding vocational rehabilitation measures that are logically tied to the rtw are
not referred.
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who has the daily responsibility are addressed. From this perspective, the
actors involved, their interests, and their power becomes crucial because ac-
tors involved in the administrative process are assumed to pursue their own
interest through their administration policy. 
Beneﬁt schemes may be ﬁnanced in different ways, including public (tax)
funds, employer contributions, worker contributions, and by private insur-
ance funds. The ﬁnancial structure will provide different economic incen-
tives for those involved, which in turn may lead to differences in how the
schemes are used.
The main issues related to the provision of beneﬁts are eligibility criteria
and beneﬁt formulae. Eligibility criteria regulate the group of people cov-
ered by the scheme, e.g. all citizens or only workers, and the conditions
which must be fulﬁlled in order to be eligible for the beneﬁt, e.g. a 50 percent
reduction of the earnings capacity. The beneﬁt formulae specify how the
beneﬁt is calculated, i.e. the amount of beneﬁt and the duration of beneﬁt
payments (Kvist, 1999). In addition, the administration of eligibility crite-
ria and beneﬁt formulae may have an important inﬂuence on access to bene-
ﬁt programmes.
These various aspects of organisation, ﬁnancing, and administration may
inﬂuence whether sick-listed workers stay out of work, and may thereby af-
fect whether (or when) they return to work. Thus, in contrast to conditions
such as health status and the level of unemployment that may inﬂuence the
opportunity and possibility to enter and stay on the work pathway, the or-
ganisational and administrative characteristics of social security schemes
affect the opportunity and possibility to enter and stay on the disability
pathway.
The importance of benefit schemes 
These social policy dimensions have been studied frequently, and in general
it is found that they have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on how sickness beneﬁt, re-
habilitation and disability schemes are used. Compared to clinical and eco-
nomic studies, however, those within the public policy sphere are often
faced with methodological problems due to the fact that the organisational
and ﬁnancial structures and the beneﬁt provisions often are the same within
a nation. Consequently, researchers often have to rely on within-nation
time series or crossnational comparisons, and therefore conclusions are of-
ten based on a combination of data and contextual interpretations. There
are, however, some studies concerning within-nation differences in the ad-
ministration of beneﬁt provisions based to some extent on multivariate
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quantitative analyses. Selected public policy research ﬁndings are summa-
rized below in Table 2.4.
Some of the ﬁndings may need some additional comments. The study by
Hetzler and Eriksson (1981) illustrates the inﬂuence that the organisational
structure may have for the use of disability schemes. In Sweden, the insur-
ance funds, which are part of the public sector, can apply for disability bene-
ﬁt on behalf of their clients. In the 1970s, the number of awarded disability
beneﬁts initiated by insurance funds increased, whereas the number of
awarded beneﬁts initiated by beneﬁciaries decreased. The authors stress that
this development was facilitated by the institutional structure. The fact that
the supervisory body for the sickness and disability beneﬁt schemes, Riks-
försäkringsverket, was also the supervisory body for the insurance funds
made it possible for the Riksförsäkringsverket to use insurance funds appli-
cations as a strategy to stop the growth in the level of sickness absenteeism.
Aarts and de Jong (1998) stress that the ﬁnancial structure of social securi-
ty schemes may have contributed to the high number of disability beneﬁcia-
ries in the Netherlands. The fact that the sickness and disability schemes
used to be funded by national pay-as-you-go contributions implied that
those in charge of the administration – employers and workers – did not di-
rectly bear the economic costs of an increase in the use of the sickness and
disability schemes. Aarts and de Jong also found the incentive structure and
administrative practices to be the reason why public vocational rehabilita-
tion has been almost completely absent in the Netherlands. In 1993, on a
per-capita basis, Germany spent 42 times more on vocational rehabilitation
than the Netherlands (ibid.).
Findings concerning the provision of beneﬁts primarily relate to four is-
sues: disqualiﬁcation for continued sickness beneﬁts, eligibility for disabili-
ty beneﬁt, differences in the daily administration of beneﬁt schemes and dif-
ferent schemes serving the same purpose.
Disqualiﬁcation for sickness beneﬁt seems to be a rarely studied topic. De
Jong (1987) included the number of medical check-ups performed during
the ﬁrst 5 months of the sick leave as a proxy for the rigidity of the work in-
capacity check. The variable had no signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood of
return to work among long-term sick-listed workers. Closely related to reg-
ulations concerning disqualiﬁcation for beneﬁts are regulations of ‘follow-
up’ procedures. Followup procedures include the administrative evaluation
of how the case should be treated in order to facilitate a return to work, such
as an assessment of the need for various vocational rehabilitation instru-
ments. Palmer (1990) describes an experiment with an early followup in a
large Swedish production company. The results suggest that there may be a
positive return-to-work effect of early screening.
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Table 2.4 Selected public policy studies concerning the importance of how benefit schemes
are organised and financed and how benefits provisions are stipulated and administered.
Dimension Type of analysis Finding
and study
Organisation
Hetzler and Time series, Organisational structure allowed central authorities in
Eriksson (1981) contextual Sweden to use the disability benefit scheme to reduce
long-term sickness absenteeism
Aarts and Contextual Organisational structure with social partners in charge
de Jong (1996a) of daily administration allowed Dutch employers to use
the disability scheme to shed labour
Aarts and
de Jong (1996b) Contextual
Wadensjö and Contextual
Palmer (1996)
Financing
Aarts and Contextual Pay-as-you-go financing of Dutch sickness and disability
de Jong (1998) benefits gave limited incentives to limit benefit awards at
the administrative level
Benefit provision and program administration
De Jong (1987) Quantitative, Proxy for the harshness in the Dutch assessment of 
multivariate disqualification for continued sickness benefit receipt
was insignificant for rtw
Palmer (1990) Case study Experiment in large Swedish company suggests that
early followup in cases of sick leave may enhance the
rtw
Jacobs,Kohli Time series, A significant drop in disability benefit awards followed
and Rein (1991) contextual tightening of German eligibility criteria
Frick and Time series,
Sadowski contextual
(1996)
Aarts and Quantitative Disability benefit applicants’unemployment problems
de Jong (1992) were taken into consideration in the Dutch disability
benefit assessment. It is estimated that in 1980 29 to 
48 percent of the new beneficiaries were able to perform
a suitable job
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The studies of eligibility criteria for disability beneﬁts suggest that these cri-
teria play a crucial role for the number of beneﬁts that are awarded (Jacobs,
Kohli and Rein, 1991; Frick and Sadowski, 1996; Aarts and de Jong, 1992).
Several ﬁndings support the fact that administrative practices inﬂuence
the number of awarded beneﬁts. Thus, identical ofﬁcial rules yield different
outcomes because of differences in the administration. This problem has
also been shown to exist when one compares different regions in the same
country (Berkowitz and Burkhauser, 1996; Bengtsson, 1987), in compar-
isons between gatekeepers in the same administration (van der Veen, 1990),
and in comparisons of the same scheme over time (Berkowitz and
Burkhauser, 1996).
Finally, it should be noted that the study by Einerhand et al. (1995) con-
cludes that the high work incapacity rate in the Netherlands compared to
Belgium merely reﬂects differences in the use of exit routes, i.e. disability
beneﬁt in the Netherlands and early retirement in Belgium. In relation to the
analysis of the consequences of national disability policies, this aspect has
farreaching consequences: not only should the functioning of the sickness
and disability beneﬁt schemes be taken into consideration, but also the ef-
fects of different possible exit schemes.
In conclusion, research suggests that legal-formal characteristics of sick-
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Koitz,Kollman Quantitative Administration of the U.S.government disability benefit
and Neisner scheme differed across states
(1992) 1
Bengtsson Quantitative, Significant differences in the regional administration of
(1987) multivariate the public disability benefit scheme when account was 
taken for various differences between regions
Van der Veen Qualitative Dutch disability benefit gatekeepers applied own infor-
(1990) 2 (interview with mal rules reducing the effect of changes in formal rules
gate keepers)
Berkowitz and Time series, Significant drop between 1977 and 1980 in the number of
Burkhauser contextual disability benefit award was probably causes by informal 
(1996) political pressure on gatekeepers 
Einerhand Crossnational, Suggest that the high disability rate in the Netherlands 
et al. (1995) contextual compared to Belgium merely reflect differences in the
use of different benefit schemes
Note:rtw is acronym for return to work.
1 Referred from Berkowitz and Burkhauser (1996).
2 Referred from Aarts and de Jong (1996b).
Effective Disability Policy def  29-09-2003  12:03  Pagina 45
ness beneﬁt and disability beneﬁt schemes and how they are administered
inﬂuence how these schemes are used. This may in turn affect the labour
market attachment of work-disabled people. For some issues, such as eligi-
bility criteria, evidence seems to be relatively clear: these conditions have an
effect. However, in most other aspects the picture is rather blurred. It seems
likely that ﬁnancial and organisational conditions are very important, but
their possible effects are difﬁcult to measure. The same seems to be true
when it comes to the impact of other social security schemes and other insti-
tutional conditions.
Sociological studies
Sociological research related to work disability and work resumption can be
divided between studied based on a micro approach and those based on a
macro approach. The micro, or behavioural, approach emphasises that fac-
tors related to the behaviour of the individual and the surroundings of the
individual, apart from the impairment, will affect whether a sick person
will become disabled. The macro perspective looks to societal conditions in
terms of push factors, e.g. poor working conditions and unemployment, in
order to explain the level of work disability.
The micro approach
Several behavioural characteristics may inﬂuence whether a work-disabled
person with an injury or disease will return to work or end up in the disabili-
ty beneﬁt system. Consequently, people may perceive symptoms of the same
impairment differently and act differently. Some people may ﬁnd the inca-
pacitating effects of a symptom to be modest, whereas others may ﬁnd them
severe. As a result, the extent of functional limitations may vary consider-
ably from person to person, and thereby also the extent of work disability.
Similarly, people may have different perceptions of the social, psychological
and economics consequences of being ‘disabled’.
The choice between work and disability can be understood as a choice be-
tween two different roles, a worker role and an illness, or disability, role.
These roles are associated with different expectations as to how the ‘sick’ or
the ‘disabled’, worker should behave (see Mechanic, 1962; Nagi, 1965;
Lindqvist, 1995). The sick or disabled person is exempted from the normal
roles associated with work. However, other expectations are associated
with the disabled role, seeking competent help, cooperating with such help,
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and resuming usual activities as soon as the condition permits (Nagi, 1965;
1969). Whether or not a work-disabled person will adapt to the disability
role depends on, among other things, the severity of the illness, the individ-
ual’s reaction to and perception of the situation, and the reactions to the in-
dividual of others.
A related approach stresses that health status may be affected by an indi-
vidual’s social network, including family members, close friends or col-
leagues, and social support, e.g. emotional, informative and practical sup-
port systems (Lindqvist, 1995; Höög and Stattin, 1995; Stattin, 1998; Han-
son 1990). A social network and social support can be seen as resources that
enable a work-disabled person to cope better with stress and demands,
thereby increasing the potential for work resumption.
Disabled role,social support and return to work 
Five empirical studies applying a micro-sociological approach were found.
Four of the studies address the importance of the ‘disability role’ relative to
long-term sick-listed workers and use return to work as the outcome vari-
able (de Jong, 1987; Aarts and de Jong, 1992; Marklund, 1995; Veerman
and Palmer, 2001). The ﬁfth study, which addresses the importance of so-
cial support, concerns a different population (people living in the country)
and outcome variable (disability beneﬁt award) (Höög and Stattin, 1995).
The ﬁndings of these studies are summarized in Table 2.5.
The studies support to a large extent the importance of ‘the disability role’
relative to the resumption of work. In general terms, de Jong (1987) and
Aarts and de Jong (1992) found that people who are relatively strong orient-
ed towards ‘work’ have a high probability of work resumption. Marklund
(1995) found in a similar manner some evidence supporting that sick-listed
workers may be socialised into the disabled role through their wives. The in-
ﬂuence of ‘work orientation’ is not supported by Veerman and Palmer
(2001).
The two studies of social support give only limited support to its impor-
tance. Veerman and Palmer (2001) found that the social support of long-
term sick-listed workers’ in their old job increases the return to work rate in
only one out of the six nations included in the study. The authors also found
that social support from other sources such as family member does not in-
crease the probability of returning to work. The study by Höög and Stattin
(1995) found indications that a reduction in social networks and social sup-
port may have a positive effect on the probability of citizens becoming en-
rolled in the disability beneﬁt scheme (this effect was however only persis-
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Table 2.5 Selected sociological studies concerning the importance of social support and 
socialisation into the role as a disabled person.
Study Population Outcome Measure of ‘role as Findings
measure disabled’
(social support)
De Jong (1987) 2,534 sickness rtwversus Psychological Low job satisfac-
beneficiaries disability inclination to tion and easy adop-
incapacitated for benefit postpone rtw tion to workless 
17 weeks award measured as job situation reduces 
satisfaction and the rtw1
how easily adop- 
tion to a workless 
situation has 
happened
Aarts and 2,534 sickness rtwversus Job satisfaction Weak work ethics
de Jong (1992) beneficiaries disability and work ethics and low job satis-
incapacitated for benefit measured as vari- faction reduces 
17 weeks award ous aspects of atti- the rtw1
tudes towards work
Marklund 2,030 sickness rtw2 Having a spouse Spouse who recei-
(1995) beneficiaries versus  who receives dis- ves disability bene-
incapacitated for disability ability benefit fit reduces the prob-
at least 60 days benefit ability of rtw
award
Höög 52,000 (61,000) Disability Change of family Evidence support-
and Stattin people awarded benefit award status from coha- ing that a reduction
(1995) disability benefit versus no biting to single in social support
in 1988 (1993) benefit award prior to benefit increases the proba-
and a random application is as- bility of a disability
sample of citizens sumed to indicate benefit award (in 
in 1988 (1993) a reduction in the 1988 data but not
social network and in 1993 data)
social support
Veerman and 2,106 workers rtwafter Social support in Social support in
Palmer (2001) from six nations 1 and 2 years, old job and support old job increases 
sick-listed for 13 respectively from other sources  the rtw in one 
weeks or more (including family nation (no effect in 
members). the other nations)
Attitudes toward No positive effects
work of social support
from other sources 
and attitudes to-
ward work
Note:rtw is an acronym for return to work.
1 Estimated in a structural model where measures of ‘disabled role’affect self-perceived work
incapacity,which affects rtw
2 This is an approximation.Marklund (1995) calls this group ‘rehabilitated’,and it consists of 85
percent who returned to work and 15 percent with another status,e.g.under education or out-
side the labour force.
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tent in one of the two studied cohorts, see Table 2.5). In sum, there is evi-
dence suggesting that return to work may be affected by variables related to
the micro-sociological approach, especially variables concerning the dis-
ability role.
The macro approach
The push perspective, or the ‘exclusion model’ (see, e.g. Kolberg, 1991;
Marklund, 1995; Stattin, 1998), stresses that work related factors and
labour market conditions may push people out of the labour market and
into work disability.
Push factors may be related to working conditions (and thus overlap with
medical studies). For example, strenuous work and a poor work environ-
ment are often assumed to contribute to sickness and work disability. In a
similar vein, an increasing level of job demands (e.g. demand for skills and
ﬂexibility) produces more work-disabled people because more people are
unable to meet the stricter work demands.
Labour market conditions are also assumed to affect the level of work dis-
ability. It is often assumed that the level of unemployment affects the level of
exit from the labour market and, correspondingly, the number of disability
beneﬁt recipients (see, e.g. Kohli and Rein, 1991; Marklund, 1995; Höög
and Stattin, 1995; Stattin, 1998). In relation to the labour market attach-
ment of disabled people, a high level of unemployment is assumed to reduce
the employment opportunities of people with a reduced capacity for work,
and thereby reduce their labour market attachment.
Most studies applying a macro-sociological approach have investigated
the inﬂuence of push factors, primary in terms of the level of unemploy-
ment, on the disability incidence rate among people in the labour force (see,
e.g. Kolberg, 1991; Piachaud, 1986; Bengtsson, 1987; Disney and Webb,
1990; Holmes, Lynch and Molho, 1991; Frick and Sadowski, 1996; Höög
and Stattin, 1995). In general these studies provide strong support for the
importance of push factors. The importance of push factors in relation to
sick-listed workers has been investigated in several studies (Aarts and de
Jong, 1992; Johnson, Baldwin and Butler, 1998; Johnson and Ondrich,
1990; Veerman and Palmer, 2001). These studies use multivariate analyses
and use the return to work or the duration of absence from work as the out-
come variable. Table 2.6 summarises the ﬁndings of these studies concern-
ing labour market conditions and working conditions (the ﬁndings of Veer-
man and Palmer, 2001 are described in Table 2.1).
Based on these few studies, there seems to be some evidence that working
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Table 2.6 Selected studies concerning the importance of working conditions and labour mar-
ket conditions for return to work among long-term sick-listed workers.
Study Population Outcome Measure of working Findings
measure conditions/labour 
market conditions
Working Conditions 
Aarts and 2,534 sickness rtw Firm specific Workers from com-
de Jong beneficiaries versus  disability benefit panies with a high dis-
(1992) incapacitated disability incidence rate ability benefit inci-
for 17 weeks benefit dence rate have a rela-
award tively low probability
of rtw
Johnson, Permanent rtw Occupational sector Males employed in 
Baldwin partial worker’s is a proxy for physical sector with physical
and Butler compensation demanding jobs demanding jobs have a  
(1998) beneficiaries relatively low
with back pain probability of rtw
(3,731 people) 
and other 
diagnoses 
(5,900 people) 
Johnson and 1,040 Duration Occupational sector Weak evidence 
Ondrich permanent of absence  is a proxy for physical suggesting that
(1990) partial worker’s from work demanding jobs physical demanding
compensation jobs increase dur-
beneficiaries ation of work absences
Labour market conditions
Aarts and Cf.above Cf.above Individual estimates No effect
de Jong of the probability of 
(1992) becoming unem-
ployed respectively 
the probability of 
re-employment
Johnson, Cf.above Cf.above Geographic region is A high level of unem-
Baldwin and a proxy for the  ployment reduces the 
and Butler unemployment rtw for non-back 
(1998) level diagnoses (effect is 
insignificant for back 
diagnoses)
Note:rtw is an acronym for return to work.
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conditions have a signiﬁcant effect on the rate of return to work among the
sick-listed workers, which is in accordance with the ﬁndings of clinical stud-
ies (cf. above). This is supported by studies ﬁnding that workers with good
working conditions are more likely to remain employed than those with
poor working conditions (Lund and Borg, 1999; Boll, 2001). Surprisingly,
the evidence about the importance of unemployment is mixed. On the one
hand, studies suggest that unemployment affects the disability incidence
rate among people in the labour force. On the other hand unemployment
does not seems to inﬂuence whether or not sick-listed workers return to
work. In other words, it appears that unemployment conditions affect
whether people become work disabled in the ﬁrst place, but once being work
disabled the effect decreases.4
Summary and conclusions
Literature from four major research disciplines, clinical studies, economics,
public policy and sociological studies have been reviewed in this chapter in
order to provide an overview of how various factors affect the labour market
integration of disabled people.
It is striking that the review does not offer clear answers to the question
under study. Taken alone, none of the research disciplines seems able to of-
fer a convincing explanation of why some people remain ﬁrmly attached to
the labour market whilst others are not. Neither has the review revealed a
handful of variables that beyond doubt are important factors. Each of the
four described theoretical disciplines seems to contribute to an explanation
of the phenomenon and several variables may be of importance; however,
the review does not allow one to draw ﬁrm conclusions about the relative
importance of various variables. Furthermore, in many cases variables that
are found to be important in some studies are found to be insigniﬁcant in
other studies. 
There are a number of reasons why this current state of affairs is not as
surprising as it might seem. Firstly, studies concerning factors related to one
research approach seldom involve factors related to other approaches. This
may imply that the effect of some or all of the factors found to be signiﬁcant
in one study would be altered if variables from other disciplines had been in-
cluded. Secondly, most of the reviewed studies have been designed different-
ly, making a comparison of ﬁndings doubtful or impossible. The major dif-
ferences are: 1) the population under study; 2) the length of the observation
period; and 3) the deﬁnition of the outcome variable. Thirdly, different re-
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search approaches can, to some extent, demand different research strate-
gies. Thus, as institutional characteristics, e.g. the organisational structure
of social security schemes, are normally the same within a nation, a crossna-
tional or study design over time would be needed. Finally, different method-
ological research strategies yield different types of evidence. National stud-
ies using survey and/or register data with a relatively high number of cases
are able to produce ‘ﬁrm’ scientiﬁc evidence in the sense that the data can be
analysed with multivariate techniques. Several independent competing vari-
ables might be tested against each other. This is often not possible or at least
not possible to the same extent, in crossnational studies where ‘nations’ or
‘social security systems’ are treated as observations. As a consequence, re-
search ﬁndings tend to be less conclusive.
While this analysis may suggest that it is impossible to be certain about
signiﬁcant effects of speciﬁc variables, it can instead be concluded that cer-
tain groups of variables seem to have an effect, and that the different theo-
retical approaches should be considered as complementary rather than com-
peting. In other words, to understand better how disability policies affect
the labour market attachment of disabled people, we need to unite the in-
sights of the different theoretical views.
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3 Bringing the Pieces Together:
A Multidisciplinary Approach to Work Disability
This chapter seeks to bring together the different insights of the clinical,
economical, public policy and sociological approaches to work disability.
This should help to improve our understanding of how conditions both at
the individual level and at a structural level inﬂuence the labour market at-
tachment of disabled people. That is, how do disabled people’s individual
characteristics and family relations lead to different outcomes? How do
labour market conditions affect the labour market situation of work-dis-
abled people? Which policy instruments may be of importance, and how do
they interact with individual characteristics to produce diverse labour mar-
ket outcomes? 
Choosing the approach
Why do some individuals with health problems remain ﬁrmly attached to
the labour market whilst of working age while others remain non-working
for most or all of their adult years? In order to develop a framework that can
shed light on this question, several issues and choices have to be dealt with.
One issue concerns the type of model we should construct. What types of
explanatory factors should be included? How should they be allowed to in-
teract? And how should we deﬁne the outcome, ‘labour market attach-
ment’?
The literature review revealed that each of the four theoretical disciplines,
the medical, economical, public policy, and sociological, may contribute to
explain why the labour market attachment of people with health problems
differs. The review also showed that studies in this ﬁeld integrate insights
and variables from other approaches only to a limited degree. This may lead
to erroneous conclusions as important variables are omitted from the analy-
sis. We should therefore demand that a labour market attachment model is
eclectic; it should integrate insights from the four different research ap-
proaches by regarding them as complementary rather than competing.
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The analytical level applied in the different theoretical disciplines differs.
Whereas medical and economic studies concentrate on the importance of
individual level factors such as health status and replacement rates, public
policy studies focus on the importance of macro-level conditions such as
policy instruments. A comprehensive model must reﬂect variables at both
levels. I will assume that macro-level conditions either directly or through
various actors affect disabled individuals, which in turn determines their
labour market attachment (this approach is called methodological individu-
alism, see Elster, 1985 and Colbjørnsen, 1986). Therefore, I assume that the
disabled person is someone making a choice between work and non-work.
This choice will depend on the individual’s resources such as health status
and human capital, as well as resources and constraints imposed upon the
individual by other people and structural conditions at the macro level.1 For
example, the provision of cash beneﬁts directly affects disabled people,
while quota jobs affect disabled people through employers’ obligations to
employ disabled people.
Having chosen to focus on disability policies and their impact on the
labour market attachment of disabled people, it is necessary to specify how
and through which mechanisms disability policies may affect actors in the
disability area. To this end, I assume policies to be (combinations of) policy
instruments, which may be deﬁned as: ‘... the set of techniques by which gov-
ernmental authorities wield their power in attempting to insure support and
effect or prevent social change’ (Vedung, 1998:21). For instance, to achieve
the goal of providing income protection to disabled people, the parliament
may enforce an act stipulating that work-disabled people under certain con-
ditions are eligible to a disability beneﬁt ﬁnanced through general taxes.
Building on Vedung (1998) and Elmore (1987) I distinguish between four
different types of policy instruments. Regulation consists of formulated
rules and directives that demand receivers to act in accordance with the stip-
ulations of the rules and directives. With economic means the government
seeks to obtain a desired outcome by either handing out or taking away ma-
terial resources in terms of cash or in-kind. Capacity-building instruments
transfer money to individuals or agencies for the purpose of investment in
future material, intellectually, and human resources. Information or moral
suasion aims to make people act in a desired way through the transfer of
knowledge, communication of reasoned argument, and persuasion.
Policy instruments differ in respect to the degree of constrain they involve
(Vedung, 1998). Regulation is more constraining for receivers than eco-
nomic means and capacity-building instruments, which again are more con-
straining than information or moral suasion. For instance, quota regula-
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tions are more constraining than wage subsidies offered to employers em-
ploying disabled people, which are more constraining than campaigns with
the aim of convincing employers to hire more disabled people. A principle
advantage of regulation is that all actors independent of capacities and re-
sources must comply. However, Elmore (1987) argues that in practice regu-
lations are often characterised by incomplete compliance because avoidance
of the regulation is associated with beneﬁts. Economic means instruments
do not suffer from these problems, but are instead burdened with problems
of variation, i.e., as recipients differ in capacities, preferences and objec-
tives, variations will exist in the degree to which policy goals are met. Clear-
ly, this is also a problem for information and moral suasion. As capacity-
building instruments involves investment, the problem is that it is uncertain
if and when investment will yield returns.
Finally, before proposing a model, we need to specify more precisely what
the model should explain. To be helpful the model must help us to under-
stand why some individuals with health problems enter employment and re-
main employed during (most of) their working life, while others do not.2
Formulated in this way, the question can be split in two: what determines
whether a non-working person with health problems resumes or starts to
work? And what inﬂuences whether a working person with a limiting health
condition continues to work? Even though the two questions are similar in
the sense that they both concern the causes of ‘work and non-work’ they dif-
fer with respect to context. The ﬁrst question concerns non-working peo-
ple, whereas the second question concerns working people. In other words,
the people in question are facing the world from two different positions,
making their choices in different contexts. Consequently, the two outcomes
may to a certain extent be determined by different conditions. The limited
empirical evidence to hand supports this. Johnson, Baldwin and Butler
(1998), who studied workers’ compensation beneﬁciaries, found that some
variables both affect whether or not the workers return to work and the
labour market attachment after returning to work, whereas other variables
only inﬂuence one of the two outcomes.
A model for the labour market integration of disabled people 
Whether or not a non-working person with a limiting health condition
starts working is assumed to depend on conditions related to three spheres:
1) the disabled individual; 2) the employment conditions; and 3) the exit
conditions (Figure 3.1).
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The individual possesses resources that directly inﬂuence whether the dis-
abled person will begin to work. Resources comprise the disabled person’s
health condition and other personal and occupational skills. In addition to
resources, the individual may perceive the situation of being work-disabled
as more or less socially and psychologically costly, which will inﬂuence the
inclination to work. A disabled person with relatively good health, good
personal and occupational skills and who perceives it socially and psycho-
logically costly to be disabled, is likely to become integrated into the labour
market.
Independent of individual resources and perceptions, structural condi-
tions in terms of employment and exit conditions may either facilitate or
limit the possibility of starting working. Employment conditions make it
more or less easy to a ﬁnd job. It is possible to distinguish between employ-
ment opportunities in the ordinary labour market, in special jobs created for
disabled people and, in the case of sick leave, in the same workplace as prior
to becoming sick. Exit conditions deal with the economic possibility of stay-
ing out of work. This concerns the chance of entering and staying on various
cash beneﬁt schemes and the possibility of being supported by other family
members. When employment conditions are good and exit conditions are
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poor, there is a high probability that a disabled person will start to work,
and vice versa.
The effect of variables in the three groups of factors may be interrelated.
For instance, it is possible that the state of health interacts with exit and em-
ployment conditions. If the health condition is poor it can be argued that the
effect of other variables diminishes, whereas their effect may be consider-
able when the health condition is good. Similarly, individually perceived so-
cial and psychological costs of disability may interact with the exit condi-
tions so exit opportunities only matter little if the disabled person attaches
importance to work. The existence of such interaction effects are for some
reason rarely investigated (or at least have virtually not been found in the lit-
erature reviewed in Chapter 2). The model is discussed in more detail below.
Individual characteristics
A person’s health condition, viewed as functional capacities, is supposed to
affect a disabled person’s labour market integration in the following way.
The pathological processes of an injury or disease will by deﬁnition involve
an impairment, that is, a physiological or anatomical loss or other abnor-
mality (e.g. Nagi, 1969:10). An impairment will to varying degrees alter the
ability to function. As a consequence the severity and development of an in-
jury or disease becomes crucial for the level of the functional capacity,
which in turn inﬂuences the ability to work. 
In some cases the pathological process resulting from an injury or disease
may develop over time and therefore the functional capacity and the possi-
bility to start working may change as time elapses. The state of health may
either directly affect the possibility of starting working because it reduces
the ability to perform various job tasks or indirectly because it reduces the
chance of participating in capacity-building measures such as vocational re-
habilitation.
The health care system is an important structural condition that may af-
fect the health status and thus indirectly inﬂuence whether or not a disabled
person will begin to work. The availability of various medical treatments
may improve the functional capacity directly (e.g. physical exercise) or
through the pathological process (e.g. surgery), which in turn may affect the
functional consequences of an impairment.
Human resources (in addition to health) determine the individual’s value
at the ordinary labour market, thereby affecting his or her employment op-
portunities. Following the human capital theory, formal educational attain-
ment and skills acquired on the job are two important variables that inﬂu-
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ence a person’s productivity. Other important variables may relate to skills
such as ﬂexibility, responsibility and self-dependency. In the short run these
resources will not change, but they may in the long run. Human resources
may deteriorate. For instance, on-the-job skills tend to decrease with the
time a disabled person has been out of work. At the same time, human re-
sources may increase, e.g. a non-working person may improve his or her hu-
man resources through participation in capacity-building measures such as
vocational rehabilitation. This suggests that access to measures such as
adult education and vocational rehabilitation are important structural con-
ditions.
At any point in time a non-working disabled person is assumed to choose
between the role of ‘worker’ and ‘disabled’. The two roles are associated
with different expectations as to how the disabled person should behave
(see, Mechanic, 1962; Nagi, 1965; Lindqvist, 1995). The disabled person is
exempted from expectations associated with the worker role but is instead
expected to act as disabled, e.g. to seek competent help in order to improve
their health. In other words, the disabled role is associated with social and
psychological costs, and the higher these costs, the higher the chance that a
disabled person starts to work. These costs are assumed to reﬂect the indi-
vidual’s attitudes toward work and disability. The perceived psychological
and social costs of the disabled role are expected to be high when the dis-
abled person attaches importance to work-related values (cf. Aarts and de
Jong, 1992).
In addition, a disabled person’s perception of the costs of the disabled role
relatively to the worker role is expected to depend on the reaction of signiﬁ-
cant others, e.g. their spouse, other family members and friends. If they ac-
cept that the individual is ‘disabled’, the social and psychological costs will
be limited and so will the disabled person’s inclination to work.
This suggests that the social and psychological costs of disability may also
depend on the afﬂicted person’s labour market attachment. Thus, we may
expect that a sick-listed worker and his or her social network will adapt
gradually to the workless situation concurrently with the duration of the
sick leave. In other words, the sick-listed worker is socialized into the dis-
abled role. Consequently, the social and psychological costs of disability
and the likelihood that the worker will resume work decreases as time elaps-
es. Following this argument, we should expect that the social and psycho-
logical costs of disability are very limited for disabled people with little or
no prior labour market attachment.
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Employment opportunities
Employment conditions involve two dimensions: the availability of jobs and
the characteristics of vacant jobs. To put it very simply, if there are no vacant
jobs or if the vacant jobs do not match to the disabled person’s capabilities it
is unlikely that the disabled person will begin to work. It is possible to dis-
tinguish between job opportunities in three distinct spheres: 1) in the ordi-
nary labour market; 2) in connection with special jobs for disabled people;
and, in case of previous labour market attachment, also 3) the old employer.
Disabled people without the possibility of returning to work with a previ-
ous employer are forced to look for a job in the ordinary labour market or a
special job for disabled people. In the ordinary labour market, the possibili-
ty of ﬁnding a job will depend on the characteristics of the afﬂicted person
(cf. above) and on the supply and demand for labour. The supply and de-
mand of labour is a structural condition that constrains the individual’s op-
portunity to become employed. Thus, independent of individual resources,
the possibility of ﬁnding a job is low when labour supply exceeds demand
and vice versa.
In an ideal world, an individual’s health would be a resource that employ-
ers compare to other resources such as educational attainment. In practice,
however, it is possible that employers discriminate against disabled people,
i.e. otherwise qualiﬁed applicants may be disregarded simply because of
their health status. Discrimination may, for instance, take place as ‘statisti-
cal discrimination’, that is, when employers recruit new workers they use
‘disability’ as a criterion to sort out workers they expect have a relatively
low economic value (Sattinger, 1998). Statistical discrimination will be es-
pecially prevalent in times with an excessive supply of labour. Discrimina-
tion should be considered as a structural condition that limits some disabled
people’s chance of ﬁnding employment.
Employment possibilities are also assumed to depend on the availability
of special jobs for work-disabled people where job demands are adjusted to
meet the work capacities of disabled people. Such jobs may comprise wage-
subsidised jobs where employers in the open labour market are economical-
ly compensated for the relatively low productivity of the disabled people,
quota jobs where employers are obliged to employ a certain number of dis-
abled people, and sheltered or protected jobs in a protected environment not
exposed to competition from the ordinary labour market (see Bergeskog,
2001 pp. 15-20 for a detailed description).
Sick-listed workers may return to their old employer either in the same job
or in another job, and their tasks may be the same as prior to the sick leave or
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they may be less demanding. The possibility for work resumption will de-
pend on the employer and on ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. If the sick-listed
worker is unable to return to his old job, work resumption may only be fea-
sible if the workplace is adapted or the worker is offered another job. The
employer’s willingness and ability to meet these conditions may vary. In cer-
tain cases, the employer may be willing to establish the necessary condi-
tions, but may lack the possibilities to do so because no suitable job is avail-
able within the company. For example, all the jobs in the company may be
too demanding and/or necessary job adaptations may be impossible to es-
tablish. In other cases, the employer may be reluctant to adapt working con-
ditions or to offer the worker a new job even though it would be feasible.
The employer may prefer another worker without (previous) health prob-
lems, e.g. a newly recruited substitute for the sick-listed worker. This choice
may depend on the personal relationship between the employer and the sick-
listed worker and on economic considerations. The latter may involve the
employers’ expectations about: when the sick-listed worker will return to
work, how costly the waiting time will be in terms of e.g. payments of sick-
ness beneﬁt, how productive the sick-listed worker will be after returning to
work, the productivity of a substitute, the costs of recruitment and on-the-
job training of a substitute and how costly it is to dismiss the sick-listed
worker.
Social and labour market policies make up structural conditions that in-
ﬂuence disabled peoples’ employment opportunities. The social policy may
to varying degrees provide special jobs for disabled people through either
regulations of quota jobs and sheltered jobs or economic means for employ-
ers hiring disabled people. In a similar manner, anti-discrimination regula-
tions may, together with information and moral suasion, inﬂuence employ-
ers in the ordinary labour market to employ more disabled people. Regula-
tions for the job protection of sick-listed workers, employers’ obligations to
e.g. adapt the workplace to help sick-listed workers return to work, and em-
ployers responsibilities for the ﬁnancing of exit schemes may inﬂuence the
extent to which they will retain sick-listed workers. Although these kinds of
regulation may enhance the labour market attachment of sick-listed work-
ers, they may also reduce the labour market integration of people with
health problems without recent labour market attachment. As sick absen-
teeism is more costly, employers will be reluctant to recruit people with an
above-average risk of falling ill, and as a consequence statistical discrimina-
tion may become more prevalent (see Chapter 8). While this behaviour may
be rational at an aggregate level because disabled people are on average sick-
listed more often than non-disabled people, it will at an individual level re-
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sult in discrimination against disabled people with little absenteeism due to
sickness. 
Exit conditions
Exit conditions refer to the availability of ﬁnancial resources outside the
labour market. When exit conditions are good, that is, when disabled peo-
ple have easy access to ﬁnancial resources, the likelihood of labour market
integration is assumed to be low. Financial resources may stem from various
sources such as accumulated capital, other family members’ income and so-
cial security beneﬁts.
Clearly, social security schemes make up structural conditions that affect
disabled people. But in contrast to, for example, vocational rehabilitation
and special jobs for disabled people that provide opportunities and re-
sources that may promote labour market integration, exit schemes enable
disabled people to stay outside the labour market, which may hamper their
integration in the labour market.
To what extent social security schemes provide good exit conditions de-
pends on the existence of cash beneﬁt schemes, the possibility of entering
and staying on these schemes and the amount of beneﬁt received. This in-
volves both legal formal aspects in terms of conditions that should be ful-
ﬁlled to become eligible, how long the beneﬁt can be received (criteria for en-
titlement and disqualiﬁcation), the size of the beneﬁt, and administrative as-
pects in terms of who are involved in the administration of the beneﬁt
scheme and how is it ﬁnanced (see Chapter 2). When eligibility criteria are
broad, beneﬁts can be received for a long time, the amounts are high and the
administrative policy is lenient, exit conditions are good.
The model’s assumptions about how policies inﬂuence the labour market
integration of disabled people can be summarised in the following way.
Some policy instruments aim to increase the capacities of disabled people,
which in turn may improve their employment prospects. Examples of such
instruments are vocational rehabilitation and medical treatment. Other
policy instruments regulate the supply of jobs for disabled people. In addi-
tion to sheltered jobs outside the ordinary labour market, these instruments
inﬂuence employers’ creation of jobs for disabled people. This may take
place in regulations, e.g. quota jobs and job protection of sick-listed work-
ers, by economic means, e.g. wage subsidies and grants for workplace adap-
tations, and through moral suasion, e.g. campaigns persuading employers
to recruit disabled people. Finally, some instruments such as cash beneﬁt
schemes affect to what extent disabled people ﬁnancially can afford to stay
outside the labour market.
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The labour market attachment of workers with health problems 
The mechanisms that determine whether a disabled person starts working
and the mechanisms that determine whether a working person with health
problems remains working may differ, but only to a certain degree. The for-
mer mechanisms concern non-working people, whereas the latter concern
working people. This means that the individuals are located in different
contexts, which may inﬂuence their choices. On the other hand, the mecha-
nisms that determine the outcome of the two situations may share impor-
tant aspects because both situations have the same outcome: work or non-
work. Consequently, we may expect similarities as well as differences.
It is reasonable to assume that individual characteristics (health status,
human resources and the social and psychological costs of disability) also
affect whether a worker with health problems continues to work. Workers
with a relatively good health status and many human resources who consid-
er the social and psychological costs of disability to be high are expected to
have a high chance of remaining in work.
In the model for non-working disabled people (see Figure 3.1) employ-
ment conditions are related to three spheres: 1) the ordinary labour market;
2) special jobs for disabled people; and 3) the former employer. In contrast
to this, circumstances related to the present employer seem to be especially
important for a working person because these circumstances have an imme-
diate impact on the well being of the disabled person. This is not the case for
conditions related to the ordinary labour market and special jobs for dis-
abled people. For the same reason, exit conditions may also play a less domi-
nant role. For example, job demands and possibilities for continued employ-
ment with the present employer affect the worker more directly than poten-
tial possibilities for economic support in an eventual case of unemployment.
This is not to say that exit conditions do not matter, but stresses that we may
expect them to be less important. 
Discussion and critique
The model involves the simpliﬁcation of a complex reality and important as-
pects may therefore be downplayed or overlooked. The discussion below
seeks to repair this problem.
According to the micro-sociological approach to work disability, the
choice between work and disability can be understood as a choice between
the role as a worker and the role as a disabled person. In both stages of the
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model, this choice is affected by the disabled person’s attitudes toward work
and disability and the interplay between the disabled person and signiﬁcant
others such as family members and friends. However, other actors may also
affect the psychological and social costs of choosing the role as disabled. In
the non-working stage, for example, the reaction of actors within the health
care system, e.g. the general practitioner and medical specialists, and the so-
cial security system, e.g. social security ofﬁcers and vocational rehabilita-
tion staffs, may reinforce or conﬁrm the work-disabled person in the role as
disabled and thereby reduce the likelihood of resuming work. For example,
the emphasis on medical clariﬁcation and the resultant diagnosis may add to
the perception of being disabled (Gerhardt, 1989, Lindqvist, 1995). In con-
trast to the assumptions made in the model above, the net effects of medical
treatment and vocational rehabilitation do not, therefore, need to be posi-
tive. In the working stage, actors other than family members may affect the
individual. For instance, the employer and colleagues may through their at-
titudes toward work and sick leave affect the disabled person’s decision
about whether or not to continue to work.
The ‘medical’ and ‘social’ system not only affects work-disabled people.
Thus, a more general view would stress that individual norms and attitudes
of all citizens are formed within the context of societal institutions. Dis-
abled people, employers, medical staff and signiﬁcant others are all affected
by the social and cultural context in which they live. Similarly, the national
economic situation will have an impact on all those involved through the
context in which they act. More effects leading from societal variables to
the individual’s perception of the social and psychological costs of disabili-
ty, and more societal variables and actors should be represented in the mod-
el shown in Figure 3.1.
Another type of critique relates to the use of methodological individual-
ism as an underlying assumption of the model. It is assumed that structural
conditions inﬂuence the outcome by imposing constraints upon actors, and
providing them with certain opportunities, which inﬂuence their scope of
choice. It also seems relevant, however, to include reverse effects, from mi-
cro-level actors to actors at the structural level, because such feedback
mechanisms may help to explain the way welfare state policies change. If,
for example, the exit conditions were extremely good, as would be the case
if disability beneﬁt amounts were equal to the applicant’s previous wage
and beneﬁts were awarded to all applicants, the number of beneﬁciaries
would probably swell. This would have damaging consequences for the sup-
ply of labour and the scope of ﬁnancial resources allocated to the disability
programme, which in turn would put pressure towards policy changes. As a
63discussion and critique
Effective Disability Policy def  29-09-2003  12:03  Pagina 63
consequence, politicians and other important actors involved in the policy
area could choose to alter the disability policy, in this case by limiting access
to the disability beneﬁt scheme. Correspondingly, labour market conditions
may lead to changes in the exit conditions. In times of sluggish labour mar-
kets, politicians and actors involved in the administration of exit schemes
may adjust eligibility criteria to ease the social consequences associated
with an excessive labour supply (Höög and Stattin, 1995).
To sum up, in contrast to the often-fragmented theoretical understanding
of disabled peoples’ labour market integration that dominates the literature,
the model proposed in this chapter seeks to incorporate different theoretical
views and explanations of labour market integration. This should facilitate
a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms that
may determine the labour market attachment of people with health prob-
lems. The model operates with two stages in the integration process, there-
by recognizing that factors important in one stage may be of less importance
in another. The model suggests that individual resources, labour market
conditions and exit conditions determine the labour market attachment of
disabled people. Consequently, policies in various areas affect disabled peo-
ples’ situation in the labour market. Furthermore, within one policy area
identical goals can be pursued with different policy instruments. In the fol-
lowing chapters I argue that this is in fact true with respect to the Dutch and
Danish disability policies.
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4 Economic Miracles Bypassing Disabled People
During the 1960s and 1970s the social security systems of advanced nations
matured. Social insurance programmes covered more social risks and more
people became eligible to still better beneﬁts. When the economic downturn
and an increasing supply of labour appeared in the 1970s and 1980s, the
consequences were harsh. The number of people who temporarily or per-
manently left the labour market soared, and so did social security expendi-
ture. The response to and consequences of this pressure varied across na-
tions. This chapter uses national macro indicators to give a brief overview of
the development of the Dutch and Danish welfare states over the last thirty
years. Did the Netherlands and Denmark manage the economic crisis better
than other European nations? To what extent were passive beneﬁt awards
and active labour market instruments used to manage the crisis? And to
what extent have the Dutch and Danish ‘miracle economies’ during the
1990s succeeded in reducing the size of the disability beneﬁt rolls? 
From economic growth to crisis
During the 1960s the Netherlands and Denmark experienced like most
western nations a ‘golden age’. Within the European Union nations the gdp
per capita grew on average at an annual rate of 3.7 percent between 1960
and 1968, and by 4.2 percent between 1968 and 1973 (Table 4.1). During
this period, the growth rates in the Netherlands and Denmark were close to
the European Union average.
The growth was accompanied by record low unemployment rates, which
in the Netherlands and Denmark were well below the European Union aver-
age of 2.1 percent in 1960-68 and 2.7 percent in 1968-73 (Table 4.2). How-
ever, this economic growth in the Netherlands and Denmark reﬂected some-
what different developments. In Denmark economic growth was obtained
against the background of a high and increasing employment. During 1960
to 1967, 71.4 percent of the population aged between 15 and 64 was em-
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ployed and this ﬁgure increased to 74.5 percent between 1968 and 1973. In
contrast, economic growth in the Netherlands was obtained with a relative-
ly low and decreasing employment rate, that is, 60.5 percent during 1960 to
1967 and 58.0 percent between 1968 and 1973. This crossnational differ-
ence relates to the female labour force participation. While the Dutch fe-
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Table 4.1 Real GDP growth per capita 1960-2000 (average annual change as a percentage)
1960-68 1968-73 1973-79 1979-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-2000
The Netherlands 3.5 3.7 1.9 0.2 2.5 1.4 3.1
Denmark 3.8 3.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 2.2 2.2
EU-15 3.7 4.2 2.0 1.0 2.8 1.0 2.4
Source:1960-85:OECD (1987),1985-95:OECD (1999),1995-2000:OECD (2002).
Table 4.2 Labour market indicators 1960-2000
1960-67 1968-73 1974-79 1980-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000
Unemployment rate
The Netherlands 0.7 1.5 4.9 11.1 9.0 6.8 4.6
Denmark 1.6 1.0 6.1 9.2 6.8 8.8 5.8
EU-15 2.1 2.7 4.8 9.4 9.9 10.2 9.9
Employment - population ratio
The Netherlands 60.5 58.0 54.0 52.8 58.3 63.8 69.5
Denmark 71.4 74.5 73.1 73.1 77.6 74.5 74.7
EU-15 65.5 64.0 62.4 58.8 59.6 60.9 61.3
Male labour force participation rate
The Netherlands 95.4 89.1 81.4 79.5 78.6 80.0 82.2
Denmark 97.3 91.4 90.3 87.8 89.1 86.6 83.5
EU-15 94.1 90.5 86.1 82.3 80.2 79.0 77.2
Female labour force participation rate
The Netherlands 26.6 28.3 31.7 38.8 48.9 56.4 63.1
Denmark 48.1 58.9 65.1 73.0 77.3 76.7 75.0
EU-15 41.1 41.9 45.6 47.9 52.1 56.7 58.9
Source:OECD (1987),OECD (1992b),OECD (1999),OECD (2001c).
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male labour force only increased by 2.5 percentage points between 1960
and 1974, it increased by 11.9 percentage points in Denmark (oecd,
1987).
Starting with the oil crisis in 1973, western nations were hit by an eco-
nomic downturn. Economic growth stopped while unemployment in-
creased. Denmark and especially the Netherlands were also hit by the crisis.
In Denmark the annual growth rate in gdp per capita fell to an average of
1.6 percent between 1973 and 1979 and 1.9 percent between 1980 and
1985 (Table 4.1). In the Netherlands it fell even further, to an average of 1.9
percent between 1973 and 1979 and to a record low of 0.2 percent between
1980 and 1985. In Denmark unemployment rose from 1 percent of the
labour force during the golden age to an average of 6.1 between 1974 and
1979, and 9.2 percent between 1980 and 1985 (Table 4.2). An even more
dramatic development took place in the Netherlands where unemployment
rose from 1.5 percent of the labour force to an average of 4.9 percent be-
tween 1974 and 1979 and further to 11.1 percent between 1980 and 1985.
As during the economic upturn, the employment situation was better in
Denmark during the crisis than in the Netherlands and in most other Euro-
pean Union nations. While the employment rate only fell by about 1 per-
centage point in Denmark, it decreased about 5 percentage points in the
Netherlands and in the average European Union nation. With only small
differences in the unemployment rates, the different employment trajecto-
ries mainly mirrored a faster growing labour force in Denmark than in the
Netherlands. That is, the Danish male labour force decreased more slowly
than the Dutch and more Danish women entered the labour market com-
pared to their Dutch counterparts. In other words, the Dutch and Danish
developments during the economic upturn and downturn were quite similar
in terms of gdp and unemployment growth, but the underlying labour mar-
ket structures were different. Both the Danish labour force and employment
were larger in scope, and grew faster than the Dutch.
Crisis management: paid exit and active labour market measures
The explosion in social security transfers
During the golden area and until the beginning of the 1980s social security
programmes were extended. More social risks were insured, eligibility crite-
ria in existing programmes were broadened and beneﬁt levels were raised. In
the Netherlands, for example, a disability scheme for private sector wage
earners was enacted in 1967, and in 1976 a universal disability scheme was
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implemented. As we will see in Chapter 5, these schemes had wide eligibility
criteria and high beneﬁt levels. In Denmark, for example, the old age pen-
sion scheme became universal in 1960, eligibility criteria in the disability
beneﬁt scheme were signiﬁcantly widened in 1965, and sickness and unem-
ployment beneﬁt levels were considerably increased in 1972 (Jonasen,
1998). When the crisis during the 1970s showed to be lasting the number of
people withdrawing temporarily or permanently from the labour market,
while receiving a social beneﬁt, soared, and, so did social expenditures. In
the European Union nations social security transfers rose from an average of
11 percent of gdp between 1960 to 1967 to 16.4 percent between 1974 and
1979, and to 19.1 in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s (Table 4.3).
The development in Denmark was close to the European average with so-
cial transfers rising from around 8 percent during the 1960s to 14 percent in
the late 1970s, and to more than 17 percent in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. In
contrast, the Netherlands was one of Europe’s high spenders. Not only were
social transfers well above the European average before the crisis, they also
grew faster during the crisis. Between 1968 and 1973 Dutch social security
transfers equalled an average of 17.7 percent of gdp, which was almost 5
percentage points above the European average. In the mid-1980s Dutch so-
cial security transfers had risen by 10 percentage points compared to a Eu-
ropean average of 6 percentage points. 
Exit pathways
Increasing social expenditure in Denmark and the Netherlands reﬂect the
fact that an increasing number of people permanently or temporary left the
labour market. Labour market exit may happen through different path-
ways, i.e. via unemployment insurance, social assistance, sickness and dis-
ability beneﬁt and early retirement schemes (cf. Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1).
The Netherlands is among other things known for the ‘Dutch disease’, re-
ferring to a heavy load on the disability pathway. The truth of this attribute
is clearly illustrated in Table 4.4 Looking at the main pathways, the disabili-
ty pathway was clearly the most used pathway in the Netherlands during the
crisis in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s. In 1985 around a
third of the labour force were receiving some form of social security beneﬁt,
with disability and sickness beneﬁts alone accounting for more than half.
Although the social assistance and unemployment pathways were less fre-
quently used than the disability pathway, the social assistance pathway in
particular grew considerably during the 1980s. In 1980, the number of so-
cial assistance beneﬁciaries corresponded to 4.0 percent of the labour force
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and unemployment beneﬁciaries to 2.8 percent. In 1985 the number of so-
cial assistance beneﬁciaries had more than doubled to almost ten percent of
the labour force, while the number of unemployment beneﬁciaries grew to
4.3 percent. In other words, the Dutch development during the late 1970s
and the ﬁrst half of the 1980s was not only a disability crisis, but also a more
general crisis of labour market exit. 
Because valid time-series data are lacking, it is difﬁcult to describe the use
of exit pathways in Denmark. The ﬁgures of the number of social assistance
and unemployment beneﬁciaries and especially sickness beneﬁciaries are in-
accurate. In spite of these problems, the available evidence seems to suggest
that Denmark suffered less from disability problems during the second half
of the 1970s and in the 1980s than the Netherlands. In Denmark the num-
ber of disability beneﬁciaries made up 5 percent of the labour force in 1970,
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Table 4.3 Social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP,1960-1999.
1960-67 1968-73 1974-79 1980-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-1999
The Netherlands -- 17.7 23.5 27.5 26.0 25.8 22.21
Denmark 8.2 11.1 14.0 17.3 17.1 20.5 19.31
EU-15 11.0 13.0 16.4 19.1 17.4 19.2 19.81
Source:OECD (1987),OECD (1999),and Eurostat (2001a) for the period 1996-1999.
Note:"--":Not available.
1 Estimated figures.The figures for 1996-1999 are equal to the OECD figures for 1991-1995 ad-
justed for the development between 1991-95 and 1995-99 according to the Eurostat data.
Table 4.4 Social security beneficiaries in the Netherlands as a percentage of the labour force.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Social assistance -- -- 4.0 9.9 7.4 6.6 4.1
Unemployment 0.9 2.9 2.8 4.3 2.6 5.3 2.4
Sickness 4.6 5.3 5.4 4.2 5.1 3.0 1.3
Disability 4.5 7.0 12.2 13.2 12.8 11.6 11.8
Early retirement 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 1.9 2.1 1.4
(VUT-schemes)
Total -- -- 24.8 32.8 29.8 28.6 21.0
Source:Cstv (1996,table 2.1.),Lisv (1998,table 2.1.),Lisv (2001,table 2.1.),OECD (1991,table 3.0.),
OECD (2001c:12-13).
Note:"--":Not available.
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which is almost the same rate as in the Netherlands. But in contrast to the
Dutch rate, which almost tripled between 1970 and 1985, the Danish rate
only increased by 67 percent (Table 4.5).
No complete national registration of sickness beneﬁt receipt exists in Den-
mark.1 Einerhand et al. (1995), who calculated comparable measures of
short-term and long-term work incapacity in six countries in 1990, found
that the short-term work incapacity rate was considerably lower in Den-
mark (4.4 percent) than in the Netherlands (7.1 percent). Statistics for pri-
vate sector workers in Denmark between 1980 and 1990 suggest that the
level of absenteeism due to sickness dropped in 1980 and 1981 and then re-
mained fairly constant during the rest of the 1980s (Dansk Arbejdsgiver-
forening, 1996). In other words, we can conclude that Denmark did not suf-
fer from the Dutch disease during the 1970s and 1980s.
Rather than disability beneﬁt exit, it appears that Denmark relied on exit
through the unemployment pathway. Thus, unemployment beneﬁciaries in
percent of the labour force grew from 1.0 percent in 1970 to 7.1 percent in
1985 meaning that the number of unemployment beneﬁciaries was almost
equal to the number of disability beneﬁciaries (Table 4.5). It should also be
noted that the early retirement pathway has been used more frequently in
Denmark than in the Netherlands. In 1985 the number of early retirement
beneﬁciaries corresponded to 3.5 percent of the labour force in Denmark
compared to 1.2 percent in the Netherlands. 
The lack of good comparable data makes it difﬁcult to assess the overall
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Table 4.5 Social security beneficiaries in Denmark as a percentage of the labour force
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Social assistance1 -- -- 3.4 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.33
Unemployment2 1.0 4.3 6.0 7.1 7.3 8.3 4.4
Disability 5.0 6.0 5.7 8.4 8.7 9.7 9.3
Early retirement 0.0 0.0 2.0 3.5 3.4 4.9 6.3
Total -- -- 17.1 22.7 23.4 26.6 23.3
Source:Various issues of Statistiske Efterretninger,Statistisk Årbog,and Statistisk tiårs over-
sigt from Statistics Denmark.
Note:"--":Not available.
1 Families (1980) that have received social assistance and full-year recipients (1985 to 2000).
2 Full-time recipients ultimo the year (1970,1975),average number of insured recipients during
the year (1980,2000) and full-year recipients (1985-1995).
3 Figure from 1998.
Effective Disability Policy def  29-09-2003  12:04  Pagina 70
labour market exit in the Netherlands and Denmark. The ﬁgures of social
expenditures (Table 4.3) and beneﬁciaries (Table 4.4 and Table 4.5) seem to
tell the same story. While labour market exit increased considerably in both
nations during the second half of the 1970s and the ﬁrst half of the 1980s,
labour market exit reached higher levels in the Netherlands than in Den-
mark. The growth, however, stagnated in the Netherlands during the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, but continued well into the 1990s in Denmark (an is-
sue discussed in more detail below and in Chapter 9).
In brief, it is correct to say that the Netherlands suffered from a disability
crisis during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, but it is also
fair to say that the disability problem was (an important) part of a more gen-
eral exit problem. In Denmark the paid labour market exit was smaller in
scope during this period and more evenly spread over different exit routes.
Active labour market policies
Active labour market policies aim at reversing the ﬂow of people out of the
labour force. Active labour market policies may be directed toward sick-
ness, social assistance, and unemployment beneﬁciaries, and they comprise
the provision of active measures, such as subsidised job training, subsidised
education, and job search courses, that may bring people back into ordinary
employment.2 Also active labour market policies regard the linking of bene-
ﬁt receipt to participation in activation measures and active job search (see,
Hvinden, Heikkilä and Kankare, 2001).
Statistics published by the oecd suggest that during the 1980s active
measures for unemployed and work-disabled people were used more often
in Denmark than in Netherlands. In 1986 Denmark used 0.75 percent of
gdp on activation of unemployed in terms of labour market training, youth
measures, and subsidised employment, whereas the Netherlands only used
0.35 percent (calculated from oecd, 1992a). This crossnational difference
in activation increased during the second half of the 1980s until the mid-
1990s, when Denmark’s spending corresponded to 1.53 percent of gdp and
Dutch spending to 0.35 percent (calculated from oecd, 1992a, 1996,
1998, 2001b). However, this difference is exaggerated. Firstly, as unem-
ployment in the second half of the 1990s was lower in the Netherlands than
in Denmark, the need for activation was lower in the Netherlands (Hvinden,
Heikkilä and Kankare, 2001). Secondly, if expenditure to public employ-
ment services and administration are included, the crossnational difference
in the mid-1990s tends to disappear.3
Denmark has also been more active than the Netherlands with respect to
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the vocational rehabilitation of work-disabled people. In Denmark voca-
tional rehabilitation measures accounted for 0.16 percent of gdp in 1986.
Throughout the second half of the 1980s and during the 1990s vocational
rehabilitation expenditures grew steadily and in 2000 they equalled 0.33
percent of gdp. In contrast, the Netherlands has not devoted resources to
vocational rehabilitation; public expenditure remained below 0.005 per-
cent of gdp during the 1980s and 1990s (oecd, 1992a, 1996, 1998,
2001b, see also Aarts, de Jong and Burkhauser, 1996).
In summary, we can conclude that both the Netherlands and Denmark
were seriously affected by the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1970s.
In both countries economic growth stopped while unemployment and social
expenditure soared. The two nations managed this crisis differently. In Den-
mark employment was kept relatively high and labour market exit low,
whilst the emphasis was put on active labour market measures. In contrast,
in the Netherlands little emphasis was put on active labour market measures
and labour market exit was massive, especially through the disability path-
way.
From crisis to recovery 
During the late 1980s most Western nations recovered somewhat from the
economic crisis. In the European Union the growth rate rose from 1 percent
during the ﬁrst half of the 1980s to 2.8 percent during the second half (Table
4.1). The development in the Netherlands mirrored this trend; gdp growth
per capita rose from an average of 0.2 percent between 1979 and 1985 to
2.5 between 1985 and 1990. The Danish experience was somewhat differ-
ent. Compared to most other nations, Denmark had higher gdp growth
rates in the ﬁrst half the 1980s, lower rates in the second half, and higher
growth rates during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, see Table 4.1. In other words,
the timing of the economic crisis and recovery was somewhat different in
Denmark than in the Netherlands and the average European nation.
In terms of unemployment Denmark and in particular the Netherlands
have fared much better in the 1990s than the European Union average.
While unemployment has remained at a high level in many European na-
tions, it has decreased signiﬁcantly in the Netherlands and Denmark. The
European average unemployment rate remained around 9 to 10 percent
since the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, but dropped from 9 to less than 6 percent in
Denmark and from 11 to less than 5 percent in the Netherlands in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s (Table 4.2). During the last two or three years unem-
ployment has in fact been as low as 3 percent in the Netherlands. 
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The impressive Dutch development was caused by a signiﬁcant job growth
and increasing female labour force participation. The number of employed
people as a percentage of the population increased from an average of 52.8
percent between 1980 and 1985 to 69.5 percent in the second half of the
1990s. In the same period female labour force participation increased by al-
most 25 percentage points, from 38.8 percent in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s to
63.1 percent in the second half of the 1990s. During the same period, em-
ployment only increased slightly in Denmark and the labour force remained
constant. In other words, the Netherlands is catching up on Denmark in
terms of employment and labour force participation. It should be noted,
however, that the female labour force participation in the Netherlands still
is more than 10 percent below the level in Denmark, and that (female) part-
time employment is much more common in the Netherlands than in Den-
mark. In 2000 32 percent of all Dutch jobs were part-time, in contrast to
only 16 percent in Denmark (oecd, 2001c).4
The Netherlands is also catching up on Denmark in terms of social securi-
ty beneﬁt expenditure and labour market exit. During the ﬁrst half of the
1990s social security expenditure was brought to a halt in the Netherlands,
whereas in Denmark it continued to rise (Table 4.3). In a similar vein, the
number of social beneﬁciaries relative to the labour force decreased in the
Netherlands, while they continued to increase and Denmark (Tables 4.4 and
4.5). The Dutch development was caused by a declining number of people
receiving social assistance and unemployment beneﬁts and to a much lesser
extent by a decreasing number of disability beneﬁciaries. In Denmark the
development was caused by an increasing number of people leaving the
labour force through early retirement and disability beneﬁts. In other
words, even though Denmark survived the crisis during the late 1970s and
the 1980s better than the Netherlands, Denmark had more exit problems
during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. In particular one can speak of a sneaking
disability problem in Denmark, as the steady growth in the disability roll
during the 1980s continued into the 1990s.
Despite these somewhat different developments it can be concluded that
the disability pathway has been and still is the most important exit route
both in the Netherlands and Denmark. Furthermore, while the improved
economic situation during the 1990s, especially in the second half of the
decade, enabled the two nations to signiﬁcantly reduce the number of unem-
ployed people, it apparently has only had a small effect on the number of
people receiving disability beneﬁts. In other words, the period with eco-
nomic growth has apparently improved the labour market situation of un-
employed people without health problems but to a large extent bypassed
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people with disabilities. As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, this is not be-
cause efforts to increase labour market integration and to reduce the num-
ber of disability beneﬁciaries have been lacking. Furthermore, as illustrated
in Chapter 9, it does not, at least in Denmark, reﬂect that it has been impos-
sible to limit entry into the disability rolls. Rather it reﬂects that it is possi-
ble to get people off social assistance and unemployment insurance schemes
when the economic conditions improve, but it is much more difﬁcult to
bring disability beneﬁciaries back into the labour market.
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5 Dutch Disability Reforms: Redefining Responsibilities
In 1990 the Dutch Prime Minister declared the Netherlands ‘a sick country’
and that he would resign if the number of disability beneﬁciaries grew be-
yond 1 million (Aarts and de Jong, 1996b). At that time the disability prob-
lem had become synonymous with the crisis in the Dutch welfare state. It re-
ﬂected an increasing problem of paid inactivity: the number of people re-
ceiving social beneﬁts relative to the number of employed people had be-
come alarmingly high. For every 100 employed more than 80 people were
receiving some form of social security beneﬁt (including old age pension)
(Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Combined with very luxury social security
beneﬁts this caused an economic crisis of serious dimensions. Not only did
rising public expenditure and foreign debt threaten the functioning of the
social security system, increasing taxes and social contributions also raised
companies’ costs, thereby reducing their ability to earn money on interna-
tional markets. The disability problem had also become synonymous with a
seemingly ungovernable system: a ﬁrst round of welfare reforms in 1985
and 1987 had almost no visible impact on the number of beneﬁciaries. More
fundamental changes seemed necessary.
In 1991 the Dutch government launched a welfare reform package, which
was the ﬁrst step towards a major overhaul of the Dutch welfare system and
in particular of the sickness and disability beneﬁt programmes. During the
1990s changes within the organisation of the Dutch welfare system and in-
surance covering unemployment, sickness and disability aimed to restrict
paid labour market exit and increase employment. The reforms were harsh.
Eligibility criteria and entitlements to social security beneﬁts were nar-
rowed and beneﬁt levels were reduced. Furthermore, organisational amend-
ments signiﬁcantly changed the institutional ‘rules of the game’ in that the
inﬂuence of the social partners (unions and employers associations) was
considerably restricted, while market forces were allowed to play an inﬂuen-
tial role in social security. This development has been labelled ‘managed lib-
eralisation’ (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; van der Veen and Trommel,
1999).
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This chapter looks into the background of the disability crisis and into the
reforms of the Dutch disability policy. The disability problem did not arise
overnight, and had been known since the early 1980s, so why were the prob-
lems allowed to become so out of control? And how did the reforms come
about, and what do they imply for the principles on which the Dutch disabil-
ity policy rests?
A sick nation
In crude terms, the Dutch disability crisis can be said to reﬂect problems at
all levels in society. That is, at the welfare state, the political and the admin-
istrative level, as well as in the disability beneﬁts scheme and among employ-
ers and workers.
Problems at the welfare state level
At the level of the welfare state, the Netherlands was characterized by strong
conservative attributes like, for example, Germany, France and Italy (Esp-
ing-Andersen, 1990; 1999). These nations have traditionally had a very low
female labour supply and the economy has been based on a limited but high-
ly productive male labour force. To ensure high productivity, companies in-
vested in equipment while shedding the least productive labour. When the
number of beneﬁciaries increases because of economic stagnation as during
the crisis in the mid-1970s, taxes and social contributions increase, and so
companies’ wage costs increase. When employers approach this problem by
shedding more labour a negative spiral is started. In the Dutch case this hap-
pened by letting mainly older workers exit through the disability pathway.
In contrast, the Scandinavian nations have to a greater extent solved eco-
nomic crises with policies, such as active labour market measures, that in-
crease the labour supply and reduce the number of beneﬁciaries (Esping-An-
dersen, 1996b; Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).
Problems at the political level
At the political level at least two problems stand out. As Visser and Hemeri-
jck (1997) emphasise, in the period between 1971 and 1981 various govern-
ments aimed to reduce unemployment and limit public expenditures
through modest wage increases. Since the Second World War and until
1963, agreement between governments, unions, and employer associations
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about wage restraint had successfully secured very low labour costs, im-
proved international competition, and economic growth. This policy failed
after the mid-1960s, wages soared because of tight labour markets and tri-
partite agreement could not be obtained. In order to restore the low-wage
consensus policy the governments tried to make a ‘social contract’ with
unions trading wage restraint for income distribution and extensive social
protection. In other words, social security retrenchment was forgiven for
wage restraint. This policy was costly. To induce unions to limit wage de-
mands, social security beneﬁts became linked to the wage development in
the private sector. This meant that not only were beneﬁts linked to inﬂation,
as wages were automatically tied to inﬂation, it also meant that social secu-
rity beneﬁciaries got their share of the annual increases in the national in-
come. Unions did not, however, exercise wage moderation. Consequently,
the governments (den Uyl, 1973-77; van Agt, 1978-81 and 1981-82) could
neither steer the wage development nor the rise in public expenditures.1 In
this way as much as up to 60 percent of the rise in the annual budgets was
out of government control (ibid.).
A second problem relates to the corporate structures where political deci-
sions in practice often presupposed consensus between the governing politi-
cal parties and various committees mostly dominated by the social partners
(see Cox, 1993 for a description of the various committees). While this
model might be second to none in times of consensus, such as during the
wage restraint period in the 1950s, it may effectively block necessary re-
forms in times of disagreement. In that case, compromising becomes time
consuming, decisions are delayed and any agreements that are ﬁnally ob-
tained tend to be toothless. According to Aarts and de Jong (1996b) this was
exactly what happened before 1987.
Problems at the administrative and organisational level
The corporate structure also gave rise to problems at the administrative lev-
el. Dutch social security programmes are organised in three tiers; the peo-
ple’s insurance providing old age pension and survivor’s beneﬁt as well as
sickness and disability beneﬁts for people who are not covered by the labour
market insurance; the labour market insurance dealing with unemploy-
ment, sickness and disability beneﬁts; and the social assistance scheme, pro-
viding a safety-net for needy citizens that are not (sufﬁciently) covered by
other programmes. Local authorities (municipalities) administer the social
assistance scheme. Before 1995 the social partners were to a large degree re-
sponsible for the daily administration of both the peoples insurance and es-
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pecially the labour market insurance. The Social Insurance Council (svr), a
tripartite institution with a third of their members appointed by the govern-
ment and the remaining members appointed by the social partners, was in
charge of the administration of the peoples insurance. Industrial Insurance
Boards headed by members appointed by unions and employer associations
were responsible for the administration of the labour market insurance.
The organisation of the administration meant that the Industrial Insur-
ance Boards, and therefore the social partners, were delegated great autono-
my over the administration. This autonomy may have limited importance in
programmes where beneﬁt awards involve little discretion as in programmes
covering demographic risks and unemployment. In such cases the assess-
ment of eligibility only demands information about, for example, age (old
age pension) and work record (unemployment). In contrast, eligibility to
disability beneﬁts involves medical and occupational aspects and the assess-
ment therefore comprises a great deal of subjectivity (see Stone, 1984 and
Chapter 1 in this book). The importance of this is demonstrated by a study
by van der Veen (1990) showing that Dutch gatekeepers apparently applied
their own subjective criteria in terms of ‘deservingness’ and ‘need’ when
awarding disability beneﬁts (referred from Aarts and de Jong, 1996b).
The administrative discretion in the disability programme was apparently
used more for excessive beneﬁt awards than to return the work-disabled to
work. A report from the Public Audit Ofﬁce in 1992 and a later parliament
inquiry with television-transmitted hearings in 1993 revealed that although
beneﬁt applications were handled on time and correctly, rehabilitation and
reintegration were almost completely lacking. This was related to the fact
that there were no incentives to facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration.
On the contrary, the Industrial Insurance Boards ﬁnancial resources’ were
linked to the number of beneﬁciaries so more beneﬁciaries meant more re-
sources (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).
The organisational structure of the disability beneﬁt scheme, the sickness
beneﬁt scheme, and of the vocational rehabilitation instruments gave rise to
problems. A close connection between the sickness and disability beneﬁt
schemes probably contributed to the growing number of disability beneﬁt
recipients. The Industrial Insurance Boards administered both schemes. In
case of illness or work injury all workers were covered by the sickness beneﬁt
act, which gave entitlement to a beneﬁt equal to 80 percent of the wage with
a relatively high ceiling. The ceiling corresponded to 2-3 times the statuary
minimum wage, and so (in 1978) the average income earner had a net re-
placement rate on 90 percent (Emanuel, 1987). In addition, most workers
were covered by collective agreements giving them 100 percent after tax
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wage compensation (Haveman, Halberstadt and Burkhauser, 1984). The
beneﬁt period expired after 12 months of sickness, but eligibility for disabil-
ity beneﬁt was automatically assessed before this time limit was reached
(Emanuel, 1987). In combination with the low eligibility threshold in the
disability beneﬁt scheme, cf. below, this facilitated a massive transition of
long-term sick-listed workers from the sickness beneﬁt scheme to the dis-
ability beneﬁt scheme.
While the sickness and disability beneﬁt schemes were highly integrated
this was much less the case with the vocational rehabilitation instruments.
The instruments comprised: rehabilitation measures for work incapacitated
people in the sickness and the disability schemes, wage subsidies for both
partially sick-listed workers (‘therapeutic work resumption’) unemployed
handicapped people as well as quota legislation.
Except for therapeutic work resumption (Van Groenestijn, 1991), these
schemes were not used to any notable extent. The quota legislation was nev-
er enforced among other reasons because no organisation was appointed to
inspect whether the law was followed (Emanuel, Halberstadt and Petersen,
1984). Vocational services for people in the sickness and the disability
schemes were organised under the disability beneﬁt scheme and adminis-
trated by the Industrial Insurance Boards. These services were almost only
directed towards disability beneﬁciaries and were predominantly used to al-
leviate the social consequences of disability rather than to ensure reintegra-
tion into the labour market (Haveman, Halberstadt and Burkhauser, 1984;
Emanuel, Halberstadt and Petersen, 1984). Vocational measures for sick-
listed workers were almost completely lacking. To establish these measures,
the Industrial Insurance Boards were supposed to report relevant cases to
another administrative unit, the Gemeenschappelijke Medische Dienst.
This seldom happened. In 1977 only 8,664 requests for rehabilitation ser-
vices were reported out of a total of more than 110,000 (Emanuel, 1987). In
other words, no coherent reintegration policy existed; instruments were
split between several laws, the administration was poorly organised and im-
plemented, measures were to a large extent applied after a disability beneﬁt
had been awarded, and they aimed only in part at labour market integra-
tion.
In brief, the integrated organisation of the sickness and disability schemes
in combination with a disordered organisation of vocational rehabilitation
instruments ensured that people remained on the disability pathway once
having entered it.
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Problems at the programme level
The many disability beneﬁt awards and the lack of vocational rehabilitation
also seem related to a very ‘luxurious’ disability beneﬁt scheme. In contrast
to disability schemes in many other nations, no distinction in the Dutch
scheme is made between work-related disability and disability caused by
other circumstances. The only thing that matters is the presence of a condi-
tion that limits work capacity. The Dutch scheme also has a remarkable low
eligibility threshold (Einerhand et al., 1995). The scheme operates with sev-
en disability categories ranging from an invalidity degree as low as 15 per-
cent up to 100 percent.2 In contrast, the scheme in Denmark and many oth-
er nations demands an invalidity degree of above 50 percent.
Work capacity was assessed in relation to the applicant’s former job or a
similar job and not to ‘a generally accepted’ job. The applicant’s work ca-
pacity was estimated as the amount the applicant with a present (reduced)
work capacity would earn in the previous job or in a similar job as a percent-
age of the earnings of a non-disabled person with otherwise similar charac-
teristics in a similar job. If, for example, the disabled person would be able
to earn 1000 ngl in his present job, while a similar but healthy person
would earn 3000 ngl, the work capacity would be 33 percent. The invalidi-
ty degree was then calculated as 100 percent minus the estimated work ca-
pacity, in this example 67 percent. As disabilities often are work related
(Bengtsson, 1997) the earnings potential in the previous job was very limit-
ed, and consequently many applicants were granted full disability beneﬁt. If
the work capacity, as it is today, was instead assessed in relation to a gener-
ally accepted job many applicants would have a signiﬁcant earnings capaci-
ty despite their disability, e.g. the painter with a lung disease would be able
to work as an unskilled factory worker.
The bias towards awarding full beneﬁts was reinforced by the principle of
anti-discrimination. Partially disabled people, entitled to partial disability
beneﬁt, should exploit their remaining work capacity in ordinary employ-
ment. It was, however, acknowledged that partially disabled people could
have difﬁculty ﬁnding a job similar to their previous job either because va-
cant jobs were lacking or because employers discriminated against them. In
the legislation, it was mentioned that gatekeepers should take such prob-
lems into consideration. In practice, it was impossible to separate unem-
ployment caused by disability and that caused by labour market circum-
stances. These problems were, therefore, solved administratively by treating
the partially disabled as if they were fully disabled and consequently partial
beneﬁts were seldom awarded (Aarts and De Jong, 1992). In 1980, as many
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as 85 percent of the beneﬁciaries received full beneﬁt (Emanuel, 1987). In
other words, the scheme had also become an unemployment insurance
scheme. The unemployment component has been estimated to account for
between 19 and 51 percent of the disability beneﬁt volume in 1980/81
(Aarts and De Jong, 1996b).
Problems at the level of actors
At the individual level the Dutch policy gave incentives to exploit the dis-
ability pathway. The disability programme was attractive for employers
who could use the scheme as a cheap and easy way to ‘get rid of’ low-pro-
ductivity workers. The disability programme was ﬁnanced through uni-
form contributions paid by employers and workers. As employers’ contribu-
tions were related to total wage payments, the individual employer had no
incentive to avoid beneﬁt awards. That is, the cost of the enrolment of one
additional worker in the disability beneﬁt scheme was spread among all em-
ployers and workers and therefore did not affect the individual employer.
Dismissal was an alternative solution, which was often more costly and ad-
ministratively difﬁcult than disability beneﬁt awards. The dismissal of espe-
cially older workers could only take place after a notice period of up to 13
weeks and after approval from the regional labour market authorities. Col-
lective dismissals were even more complicated. The employer had to notify
the work council and the union, in addition to the regional labour market
authorities, and allow the involved people to negotiate a ‘social plan’ for the
redundant workers (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Hassink, van Ours and
Ridder, 1997).
Enrolment in the disability beneﬁt scheme was attractive for workers
wishing to withdraw from the labour market. Compared to the unemploy-
ment beneﬁt, the disability beneﬁt amount was higher and it could be ob-
tained for longer, i.e. until eligibility to the old age pension was obtained. In
other words, in times of slack labour markets disability exit was attractive
for employers and often the least poor solution for redundant workers.
This description of the Dutch policy during the 1980s suggests that the
problems cannot be isolated to one or two areas: problems existed at all lev-
els. The policy of wage restrainment was abortive; the administration,
which was delegated great autonomy, focused more on passive income pro-
tection than reintegration; the integrated organisation of the sickness and
disability beneﬁt schemes in combination with a diffuse organisation of the
vocational rehabilitation instruments promoted a focus on income protec-
tion rather than reintegration; and the policy gave all those involved incen-
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tives to use the disability pathway. It explains why the disability problem
could get so out of control, and, at least at the beginning of crisis, there was
no political will to intervene, and problems were so extensive that no simple
operation could solve them.
Ineffective changes
At the beginning of the 1980s the focus was on the growing public expendi-
ture and the rising unemployment ﬁgures. Disability was not yet considered
as the major problem. The changes in 1985 and 1987 did not therefore par-
ticularly focus on sickness and disability but on a reduction in public expen-
diture in general. In 1985, the replacement rate in the unemployment, sick-
ness and disability schemes was lowered from 80 to 70 percent of the previ-
ous wage. In 1987, eligibility to unemployment beneﬁts was narrowed and
the duration of beneﬁt receipt was shortened. The disability beneﬁt scheme
was changed in order to abolish the labour market considerations from the
invalidity assessment. Partially disabled people were only to be awarded a
full disability beneﬁt when substantial evidence showed that the applicant’s
poor employment prospects were caused by employers’ discrimination. If
poor employment prospects were caused by a lack of jobs the applicant
should be granted a partial disability beneﬁt in combination with a partial
unemployment beneﬁt. In other words, the disability scheme should no
longer function as an unemployment scheme (Aarts and de Jong, 1996b).
Steps were also taken to advance the labour market integration of work-
disabled people. In 1987 a new act on reintegration of disabled people was
introduced (wagw). The act made it obligatory for employers to adjust job
demands and working conditions to the abilities of impaired workers (Aarts
and de Jong, 1996b). Administrative authorities were given the right to ﬁne
employers who dismissed a disabled worker, and a new quota measure was
launched to increase the employment of disabled people. If the employment
of disabled people remained unsatisfactory 3 years after the introduction of
the quota measure, Industrial Branches could be demanded to employ be-
tween 3 and 7 percent disabled people. These punitive measures were never
used to any signiﬁcant extent. Although the act did not introduce signiﬁcant
new effective measures, it was recognized for the ﬁrst time that it was neces-
sary to reduce the number of disability beneﬁciaries and that public inter-
vention in the labour market was necessary to achieve this goal (Van Oor-
shot and Boos, 2000).
The 1987 changes apparently had some effect, but it was much smaller
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than anticipated (Aarts and de Jong, 1996a). It was increasingly felt that the
growth in the number of social beneﬁciaries was unstoppable and the crisis
was therefore no longer merely seen as ﬁnancial, but also as a crisis of gov-
ernability. Focus was removed from unemployment ﬁgures to the more gen-
eral notion of inactivity problems: too many people were inactive and re-
ceiving social beneﬁts, while too few were working (Visser and Hemerijck,
1997). In this context, it was increasingly recognised at the political level
that more radical measures were necessary to bring back governability in
the Dutch welfare policy. Here the seemingly unstoppable growth in the dis-
ability rolls came high on the political agenda. When the Prime Minister,
Ruud Lubbers, declared the Netherlands a sick nation in September 1990,
he emphasized the need for changes to the Dutch culture in respect to work
absenteeism and disability claims (Aarts and de Jong, 1996b). The prob-
lems were recognized by unions and employers associations and in October
1990 during the annual social economic summit of leaders from unions,
employer associations, and cabinet delegates agreement was reached that
considerable efforts were necessary. These efforts were however restricted
to changes within the existing administrative procedures and did not alter
the basic structure of the disability policy (Aarts and de Jong, 1996b). The
government was not satisﬁed with this agreement and asked a tripartite in-
stitution, the Social Economic Council, to make a proposal to reduce the
number of disability beneﬁciaries. The Council could not reach agreement
because one of the major unions (fnv) refused to compromise. This enabled
the government to neglect tripartite consensus and launch its own and more
radical policy in the summer of 1991 (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).3
The beginning of a reform
The ﬁrst major piece of legislation, the Act on the Reduction of the Number
of People with a Work Disability (tav), came into effect in March 1992.
The act increased employers’ incentives for the integration of partially dis-
abled people. Employers who hired a partially disabled person for at least a
year received a bonus of 6 months salary, while employers should pay a so-
called ‘malus’ (ﬁne) if one of their workers became disabled. The malus was
abolished in 1995, because of massive opposition from employers and prac-
tical difﬁculties in implementing the measure. In addition to the one-off
bonus, employers were given a 20 percent wage subsidy for hiring partially
disabled people, and administrative authorities were given a larger budget
for vocational rehabilitation (van Oorschot and Boos, 2000).
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The act also affected the ﬁnancing of sickness beneﬁts. The uniform con-
tributions paid by employers and workers were replaced by contributions
depending on the level of sickness absenteeism within industrial branches,
so employers in branches with a high absenteeism rate had to pay more than
employers in branches with a low rate.
In August 1993 another act, the Act on the Reduction of the Number of
Disability Beneﬁt Claims, that aimed at reducing the number of disability
beneﬁciaries was enacted (tba). In several aspects the new legislation made
the disability beneﬁt programme less attractive compared to the unemploy-
ment programme, for example. Eligibility criteria were narrowed in two
ways. The act stipulated that eligibility demanded a direct and objective as-
sociation between illness, physical defects and a reduction in the applicant’s
earning capacity. This should be compared to the earlier regulation where
eligibility only demanded that illness and physical defects should lead to an
expected reduction in the applicant’s earning capacity. Secondly, the deter-
mination of the invalidity degree should refer to generally accepted work
and not to the former job or a similar job. As a consequence more jobs
would in principle be available to applicants, meaning that less applicants
would be entitled to a disability beneﬁt, and more applicants would be
awarded partial beneﬁt instead of full beneﬁt (see above and Aarts and de
Jong, 1996b). All new beneﬁciaries should have their beneﬁt re-assessed af-
ter a year and again after 5 years. The new and stricter eligibility criteria
were also to be applied to existing beneﬁciaries younger than 50, who
should have their invalidity degree reassessed. 
Entitlement criteria were also tightened. For new beneﬁciaries the beneﬁt
level in the labour market insurance was made dependant on age. Now the
beneﬁt period was split in two subperiods. In the ﬁrst period the beneﬁt was
related to the pre-disability wage level (with a ceiling). The length of this pe-
riod depended on the claimant’s age. In the second period the beneﬁciary
was entitled to a basic amount equal to 70 percent of the minimum wage
and an age-related beneﬁt supplement. The difference between the beneﬁt
level in the ﬁrst period and the second period, the so-called wao gap, has
been compensated in collective agreements for an estimated 60 percent of
the workers (van Oorschot and Boos, 2000).
The Act on Reducing Sickness Absence (tz), which came into effect in
January 1994, strengthened the individual employer’s incentive to limit
sickness absenteeism. Since 1992 sickness beneﬁts had been ﬁnanced by em-
ployer and worker contributions that were depending on the sickness rate
within industrial branches. Consequently, the individual employer had no
incentive to limit sickness absenteeism. With the new act employers were
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now made responsible for the ﬁnancing of sickness beneﬁts of their own
workers for the ﬁrst 6 weeks (2 weeks for employers with less than 16 work-
ers). Employers were allowed to reinsure this risk with private insurance
companies or to take the risk themselves.
Parallel to the Act on Reducing Sickness Absence, the existing act on
working circumstances (Arbowet) was changed so employers became oblig-
ed to implement a sickness absence and control policy. The individual em-
ployer was demanded to contract a private consultancy company (Arbo-
dienst) to assist in the implementation of a prevention and sickness absence
policy. In addition to preventive issues, the Arbodienst was to assist the em-
ployer by providing counselling to sick-listed workers and support the rein-
tegration of workers on sick leave. In the act, which was gradually enforced,
the responsibility of employers for reintegration was strengthened. Employ-
ers were made responsible for drawing up reintegration plans for sick-listed
workers after 13 and 26 weeks of work incapacity, respectively. It was also
emphasised that employers should maintain regular contact with sick-listed
workers, and ‘do everything within the scope of the company to limit the du-
ration of the sick leave so that the employee can return to work as quickly as
possible...’ (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1995). If the
employer can justify that he is unable to provide a suitable job for a sick-list-
ed worker, the socio-medical supervision of the worker is taken over by the
administrative authorities, which should consider opportunities for em-
ployment with another employer (Beljaars and Prins, 1997).
In brief, we can conclude that the changes to the Dutch disability policy
during the beginning of the 1990s not only constituted harsh retrenchment
in terms of lowering beneﬁts and restricting access to beneﬁts. They also
represented an attempt to strengthen incentives to limit work disability and
increase labour market integration, to introduce market mechanisms, and
to give employers a larger responsibility for policy implementation. 
Redefining responsibilities
In the 1994 elections, the Lubbers/Kok government was punished for its re-
trenchment and voted out of ofﬁce. Even though the Social Democrats
(PvdA) lost a quarter of their votes, Lubbers’s Christian Democrats (cda)
lost even more, a third. As a consequence, the Social Democrats remained
the largest party and they formed a new government together with two lib-
eral parties (vvd, d66) leaving out the Christian Democrats (Visser and
Hemerijck, 1997). The new government carried on with the reforms of the
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disability policy, which had been started by the former government, and
they went on to reduce the inﬂuence of social partners on the administration
of social security. This happened in the light of an increasing political and
public consensus on the responsibility that the social partners had had for
the disability problems. Thus, during the beginning of the 1990s the social
partners came under attack for their administration of the labour market in-
surance and their inﬂuence and participation in the supervision of social
policy. This critique was amongst others expressed in 1991 by crown mem-
bers of the Social Economic Council (ser), by the Public Audit Ofﬁce in
1992, and in a Parliamentary Inquiry in 1993.
Reforming the disability policy
The efforts to reduce work disability and strengthen employers’ responsibil-
ity continued in March 1996 with the Act on the Enlargement of Wage Pay-
ment during Sickness (wulbz). The sickness beneﬁt scheme was almost
completely privatised. Employers’ are now obliged to ﬁnance sickness bene-
ﬁts for their sick-listed workers for a year, such that the national sickness
fund only covers special groups such as workers on temporary contracts and
partially disabled workers.4 Employers can choose to reinsure this risk with
a private insurance company, which approximately 80 percent have done. 
In 1998, the disability beneﬁt scheme underwent an almost similar reform
(pemba). The law aimed to reduce the number of disability beneﬁciaries by
making employers more directly responsible for future developments in the
number of beneﬁciaries. Before the new act, all employers paid the same
contributions (i.e. a uniform percentage of wages). Now employers were
obliged to ﬁnance disability beneﬁts for their workers for up to 5 years, ei-
ther by paying a strongly increased insurance contribution when their work-
ers enter the disability beneﬁt programme, or by leaving the public disabili-
ty insurance and paying the beneﬁts themselves. The premium differentia-
tions started in 1998 and they will be fully completed in 2003. As in the sick-
ness beneﬁt scheme, employers can choose to reinsure the risk with a private
insurance company.
The efforts to improve working conditions and enhance the labour market
integration of disabled people were also continued. In 1995 a new act (am-
ber) stipulated that employers were exempted from wage payment in the
case of the sickness of a partially disabled worker. The wage subsidy intro-
duced by the tav was extended, and disabled people who would lose income
by accepting a job were granted a wage supplement. Moreover, employers
who employed a partially disabled person for a trial period of 3 months
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could receive a 100 percent wage subsidy during this period. The act on the
reintegration of handicapped people (rea) in 1998 has strengthened em-
ployers’ economic incentives to hire disabled people. Employers are given a
ﬁxed budget when they recruit a disabled person. The budget can be used to
pay for necessary workplace adaptations and to ease access to the work-
place. Employers can also get a reduction in their contribution to the dis-
ability beneﬁt scheme if wages paid to disabled workers constitute more
than 5 percent of the total wage expenditures. In addition, on an experi-
mental basis, disabled people are granted a budget to buy vocational ser-
vices to facilitate their labour market integration. Also in 1998, the act on
working conditions was changed. It was speciﬁed that employers’ policies
on working conditions should be tailormade and administrative authorities
were delegated the power to ﬁne employers without the interference of a
judge (Van Oorshot and Boos, 2000).
In order to further increase reintegration and reduce the number of dis-
ability beneﬁt awards, the act on gatekeeper improvements was implement-
ed in April 2002 (Wet Verbetering Poortwachter). The act increases and
speciﬁes in details the obligations of workers and especially of employers
during sick leave. For example, the employer, together with the Arbodienst,
is obliged to assess whether an action plan should be made and, based on
this, the Arbodienst should advise the employer and the worker of the op-
portunities for the worker quickly returning to work. This must take place
within 6 weeks after the ﬁrst day of sick leave. The employer and the worker
should then make a so-called action plan and based on this they should to-
gether produce a reintegration report. This report is necessary if the worker
is going to apply for disability beneﬁt. If the employer or the worker does not
fulﬁl their requirements they may be ﬁned, that is, the employer’s obligation
to pay wage during sick leave may be extended and the worker may lose his
or her protection against dismissal or the worker’s wage payments may be
stopped. While the act represents a cultivation of the existing policy in that
the responsibility of employers is increased, it also introduces new elements
in respect to the obligations of sick-listed workers. Before the act was imple-
mented the obligations of sick-listed workers were very limited.
The most signiﬁcant changes during the 1990s seem to be the increased re-
sponsibility of employers. These changes should be seen in relation to the
existing, restrictive, job-protection legislation (Buitengewoon Besluit Ar-
beidsverhoudingen, bba). In principle sick-listed workers are protected
against dismissal for up to 2 years. Employers that want to dismiss a worker
must obtain permission to end the contract from the regional employment
council or from a district court. In the case of sick leave, the permission can
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only be obtained under speciﬁc circumstances, for instance, if it is obvious
that the worker never will be able to perform a job within the company or if
the employer can justify that continuation of the employment contract will
seriously damage the company’s economic performance. Without the re-
strictive job protection of sick-listed workers, the ﬁnancial responsibility of
employers and the obligation to facilitate reintegration would be meaning-
less. That is, if employers have no obligation to offer the worker a vacant job
it makes no sense to demand that they reintegrate workers (Høgelund,
2002).
In other words, the job protection of sick-listed (and the failed quota poli-
cy) suggests that the principle of making employers responsible for work
disability is not alien to Dutch disability policy. Seen in this light, the dis-
ability reforms are not so pathbreaking as they might appear at ﬁrst sight. 
Reforming the organisational structure
Since the mid-1990s the organisational structure of the social security sys-
tem has undergone important changes that gradually decimated the inﬂu-
ence of the social partners. The inﬂuence of unions and employers associa-
tions on the administration of social security programmes has roots going
back to the Industrial Injuries act of 1901. From 1952 until 1995, the social
partners had almost autonomous inﬂuence on the administration of the
labour market insurance and considerable inﬂuence on the supervision of
social security programmes. They were entirely in charge of the Industrial
Insurance Boards that were responsible for the daily administration of the
labour market insurance, and they had the majority of votes on the board at
the central supervisory and administrative level, the Social Insurance Coun-
cil (de Sociale Verzekeringsraad, svr). In 1995 the Social Insurance Council
was divided into two institutions whereby supervisory tasks were separated
from central administrative tasks. This meant a reduction in the inﬂuence
employers associations and unions had on supervisory tasks as three inde-
pendent members managed the new supervisory board. The central admin-
istration was carried out by a temporary organisation governed by the social
partners and an independent chairman.
In 1997, the social partners’ inﬂuence on the daily administration was re-
duced. The central administration was now placed in the hands of a new in-
stitution (Lisv). This institution was governed by a board of representatives
from employers associations, unions, independent members and a chairman
appointed by the government. The industrial insurance boards were ofﬁ-
cially abolished; instead the daily administration was contracted out to gov-
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ernment-approved administrative bodies in the shape of the former industri-
al insurance boards.
In 2000 the ‘managed liberalisation’ of the social security administration
was reversed. A majority in parliament feared that in a liberalised system
commercial interests would inﬂuence decisions about beneﬁt awards (Terp-
stra, 2002). In 2002 the central administration (Lisv) and the units responsi-
ble for the administration of the labour market insurances were merged into
one large organisation, the Administrative Institute for Workers Insurance
(uwv). The Administrative Institute for Workers Insurance is governed by
the state and is thus without representation of the social partners.
The Administrative Institute for Workers Insurance cooperates closely
with local Centres for Work and Income. In these centres several organisa-
tions cooperate and compete, for example the Public Employment Service,
municipalities, social security units representing the Administrative Insti-
tute for Workers Insurance, and in some cases also private employment
agencies. The Centres for Work and Income are responsible for the adminis-
tration of social assistance and unemployment insurance, for collecting in-
formation about the clients’ situation, assessing barriers for returning
clients to work, mediate jobs, and for the visitation of clients to active mea-
sures. By means of cooperation and competition between the different or-
ganisations represented in the Centres for Work and Income, it is hoped to
alleviate the previous imbalance between the administration of beneﬁts and
reintegration efforts. So far the centres have not apparently been successful,
probably because a coherent national policy in the area is lacking and, close-
ly related to this, because of conﬂicting interests of the participating organi-
sations (ibid.).
With the organisational changes the social partners lost their inﬂuence on
the administration and supervision of the labour market insurances. Unions
and employers associations do however still have some formal inﬂuence vis
á vis their representation in various advisory boards such as the Social Eco-
nomic Council (ser) and the new Council for Work and Income (rwi).
Conclusion
No single factor can explain the extraordinary load on the Dutch disability
pathway during the 1980s. Rather, it seems that a whole range of factors
contributed to the Dutch disease. An abortive wage restraint policy during
the 1970s, an autonomous administration that kept the focus more on pas-
sive income protection than on labour market integration, an integrated or-
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ganisation of the sickness and disability beneﬁt schemes combined with a
disordered organisation of the vocational rehabilitation instruments, an
easy accessible disability beneﬁt scheme and a system giving the central ac-
tors incentives to use the disability pathway are some of them. Seen in this
light it can hardly be surprising that fundamental changes were necessary
and that it took a considerably amount of time and political struggle before
they were launched and carried out.
The pressure for changes to the Dutch social policy was enormous. As we
saw in Chapter 4, public expenditure during the 1980s was at a record high
by international standards and the economic performance was only modest.
The pressure was fortiﬁed when the ﬁrst attempts in 1985 and 1987 to limit
social security beneﬁt receipt failed. The notion of problems changed, from
a ﬁnancial and unemployment crisis to a crisis of inactivity and governabili-
ty, and broad political awareness emerged that more radical measures were
necessary. With among other things a television transmitted parliament in-
quiry, it became public wisdom that the social partners had violated their
administrative duties and that many employers had exploited the disability
scheme to shed redundant labour. This opened the door to reforming the
disability policy.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant changes, which took place between 1991 and 1995,
not only involved harsh retrenchment in terms of narrowing eligibility crite-
ria, cutting beneﬁts and shortening beneﬁt periods, they were also directed
towards one of the ‘public villains’: employers. Thus, the amendments
aimed to improve employers’ incentives to limit the number of disability
beneﬁciaries by increasing their responsibility for the ﬁnancing of sickness
and disability beneﬁts, on the one hand, and by subsidizing their employ-
ment of disabled people on the other.
This policy development gained further momentum in the second half of
the 1990s with the privatisation of the sickness beneﬁt scheme in 1996 and
the changes to the disability beneﬁt scheme in 1998. The increasing respon-
sibility of employers indirectly undermined the inﬂuence of the social part-
ners: when employers ﬁnance beneﬁts fewer administrative tasks are left to
the social partners. The social partners were also under direct attack. The
administrative changes starting in 1995 reduced their inﬂuence on both the
daily administration and on the monitoring of the administration, and to-
day the social partners are without inﬂuence on the administration of the
social security schemes.
The reforms seem to have two important implications for the Dutch dis-
ability policy. From a policy with predominant emphasis on beneﬁts and lit-
tle emphasis on reintegration, the policy has moved towards more emphasis
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on reintegration and less emphasis on beneﬁts. The responsibility of the ac-
tors involved in the implementation of the disability policy has changed.
The responsibility (and inﬂuence) of the social partners has been nulliﬁed,
while the responsibility of employers in combination with public and pri-
vate sector agents has increased. This has been labelled a move towards
‘managed liberalisation’, reﬂecting that although market forces have come
to play a larger role in the disability policy, the scope for free choices is re-
stricted by state regulation (van der Veen and Trommel, 1999). In principle,
however, this shift does not signiﬁcantly alter the state’s ability to steer poli-
cy implementation; while the implementation used to be dependent on
unions and employers’ associations, it is now predominantly depending on
the efforts of employers (and the services they buy in the market). In other
words, the success of the policy is dependent on the strength of the system
incentives that affect how employers and market providers act.
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6 Danish Disability Policy: Small Steps,Big Change?
In contrast to the Netherlands, Denmark has never been involved in a direct
ﬁght against disability problems. The development in the number of disabil-
ity beneﬁciaries has evolved much more slowly than in the Netherlands (see
Chapter 4), which is probably the reason why disability problems has not
been a contested issue in the political landscape. Danish disability policy
has instead developed in the wake of efforts to limit public expenditure and
later in the 1990s in the wake of the general discourse of an active labour
market policy. The development has not involved radical reforms, but a se-
ries of adjustments that cultivated the existing policy, where public authori-
ties are almost entirely responsible for the ﬁnancing, administration and im-
plementation of the disability policy.
This chapter provides an outline of the Danish disability policy and how it
has developed over the last two decades. The chapter concludes with a com-
parison of the principles on which the Dutch and Danish disability policies
rest. I argue that a very important difference concerns the emphasis they put
on different actors; in Denmark the responsibility for the disability policy
rests to a large degree with the public sector, whereas in the Netherlands this
responsibility has been delegated to the individual employer. As a conse-
quence, actors in Denmark and the Netherlands face very different con-
straints and opportunities, giving them very different incentives both in re-
spect of the work retention of sick-listed workers and integrating non-em-
ployed disabled people.
Danish disability policy in the 1980s
With the social reform between 1972 and 1976 the responsibility for the
Danish social policy was to a large extent delegated from the state to the lo-
cal level, in the shape of 14 counties and 275 municipalities. The reform was
based on the notion of a one-string system: in the case of a social contin-
gency the individual would only have to address himself or herself in one
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place, the municipality (Andersen, 1971).1 A municipal worker would then
handle the case, be it a question of social assistance, sickness beneﬁt, dis-
ability beneﬁt or vocational rehabilitation. Beneﬁts paid by the municipali-
ty were in varying degrees refunded by the state. In other words, the organi-
sation, administration and ﬁnancing of cash beneﬁts and reintegration in-
struments for the work-disabled was highly integrated.
In the event of sickness, wage earners and the self-employed were covered
by the sickness beneﬁt act.2 Beneﬁts were paid from the ﬁrst day of work in-
capacity and until recovery. Employers ﬁnanced beneﬁts for the ﬁrst 5 weeks
and the municipalities for the remaining period, with 75 percent of their ex-
penditure being reimbursed from a public fund. Beneﬁt amounts were equal
to 90 percent of the previous wage with a ceiling of 90 percent of the average
wage in the industrial sector.
All adult citizens were covered by a public disability beneﬁt scheme. Eligi-
bility was conditional on invalidity caused by physical or psychological im-
pairment. Work capacity should be permanently reduced with at least 50
percent and improvements through vocational rehabilitation should be im-
possible. The beneﬁt could be received until eligibility to old age beneﬁt was
attained or until recovery, which in practice happened very seldom. There
were three beneﬁt categories: full (100 percent invalidity degree), medium
(67-99 percent), and low (50-66 percent). Beneﬁts were ﬂat rate and means-
tested, and were ﬁnanced by municipalities and contributions from employ-
ers (depending on wage expenditure). The municipalities’ expenditure on
disability beneﬁts was fully reimbursed by the state. The municipalities per-
formed the preparation of beneﬁt applications, but 15 regional state com-
mittees were responsible for decisions about beneﬁt awards.3
The reintegration instruments were also based on the so-called one-string
system. The municipal case managers were supposed to evaluate all cases of
sickness beneﬁt, social assistance and, in principle, other cases where voca-
tional rehabilitation seemed to be needed in order for clients to support
themselves and their family. In order to assess the need for vocational reha-
bilitation the case manager could call for medical and vocational expertise,
e.g. a test of work capacity. The basic instruments were: general and speciﬁc
education, job training, wage subsidies and full or partial ﬁnancing of spe-
cial equipment and tools. In 1977, 19,035 families received economical
support according to the provision concerning vocational rehabilitation. In
1984 this ﬁgure had risen to 37,700 families, corresponding to 1.3 percent
of the labour force (Valbak and Wamsler, 1986).
Finally, it should be noted that the Danish policy allowed (and still does)
employers to dismiss workers after a relatively short period of sick leave.
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The white-collar act (funktionærloven) stipulated that employers, if speci-
ﬁed in the employment contract, could dismiss a sick-listed worker with
one-month’s notice when the absence had lasted for 120 days within one
year. The notice of dismissal should be given in direct connection with the
120 days’ sick leave, meaning that this provision could not be used at other
times during sick leave (Andersen, 1998). Outside the 120 days, dismissal of
sick-listed workers was somewhat more difﬁcult and costly. Formally, dis-
missal should be motivated by ‘reasonable circumstances’ related to the
company or the worker. In practice ‘reasonable circumstances’ were settled
by court decisions. In relation to the dismissal of sick-listed workers, it ap-
pears that in many circumstances it was (and still is) legal to motivate dis-
missal by conditions either directly or indirectly related to sickness ab-
sence.4
The dismissal of blue-collar workers was (and still is) regulated in several
collective agreements and, therefore, the stipulations varied across industri-
al sectors. Many blue-collar workers were covered by a ‘central agreement’,
which stated that workers with 9 months’ seniority could not be dismissed
within the ﬁrst 4 months of sick leave. After this period dismissal could take
place with normal notice, with the length depending on seniority. In brief,
within the ﬁrst 4 months of sick leave many blue collars workers were better
protected against dismissal than white-collar workers, whereas after 4
months the protection of white-collar workers was relatively good. 
A comparison of the Danish and Dutch disability policy in the 1980s re-
veals several similarities and especially differences. Firstly, both nations’
sickness beneﬁt schemes appear to have been quite generous with high bene-
ﬁt levels and in practice no limit on beneﬁt receipt. That is, while no legal
maximum duration for beneﬁt payments existed in the Danish scheme,
Dutchmen losing entitlement to sickness beneﬁts had easy access to disabili-
ty beneﬁts.
Secondly, the Dutch disability beneﬁt scheme was much more comprehen-
sive and generous than the Danish scheme. Not only did the Danish scheme
demand a much higher degree of invalidity than the Dutch scheme, access to
full beneﬁts as well as beneﬁt amounts was also much stricter in the Danish
scheme. In 1980, only 30 percent of the Danish beneﬁciaries received full
beneﬁt compared to 85 percent in the Netherlands (Lavindkomst Kommis-
sionens Betænkning, 1982 and Emanuel, 1987). In the Netherlands an aver-
age wage earner with full disability beneﬁt was in 1978 entitled to an esti-
mated net replacement rate of 80-85 percent (Emanuel, 1987). In contrast, a
Danish male unskilled worker in 1978 was entitled to a net replacement rate
of 75 percent (full beneﬁt), 60 percent (medium), and 26 percent (low), re-
spectively (Knudsen,1979).
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Thirdly, vocational rehabilitation seems to have been a much more inte-
grated element in the Danish policy than in the Dutch policy. Thus, in Den-
mark one law covered vocational rehabilitation (the social assistance act)
and only one administrative unit (the municipality) was responsible for ben-
eﬁt payments and the implementation of vocational rehabilitation. In the
Netherlands, in contrast, reintegration instruments were split between sev-
eral laws and the administration was poorly organised (see Chapter 5).
Fourthly, the responsibility of employers in terms of legal restrictions as
regard the dismissal of sick-listed workers was much more comprehensive in
the Netherlands than in Denmark. While it was often impossible for Dutch
employers to dismiss a sick-listed worker within the ﬁrst 2 years of sick
leave, dismissal was often possible after 4 months in Denmark.
Defects in Danish disability policy
The characteristics mentioned above and the relatively slow development in
the number of disability beneﬁciaries (cf. Chapter 4) suggests that Danish
disability policy supported attachment to the work pathway. Still, it is pos-
sible to point to several defective elements, both at the organisational/ad-
ministrative level and at the level of the actors involved in the policy.
Problems at the organisational and administrative level
Job placement for people who were unemployed after completing vocational
rehabilitation was performed by the public employment service (Arbejds-
formidlingen) meaning that cooperation between the municipality and the
public employment service was needed. Valbak (1988) points to a weakness
in this construction. On the one hand, the municipal case manager had a
good knowledge of the client’s work potential, interests, etc., but was not al-
lowed to establish job placement in ordinary employment. On the other
hand, the job placement expert had good knowledge of vacant jobs, but a
limited knowledge of the client’s work capacity, preferences, etc. Conse-
quently, employment results may have been hampered in cases where coop-
eration between the two organisations was poor. This problem was further
accentuated when the 12 regional vocational rehabilitation centres were
closed and their tasks transfer to the municipalities. Now the public employ-
ment service agencies had to cooperate with 275 municipalities instead of 12
regional ofﬁces. Finally, during the recession in the late 1970s and the 1980s
the load on the public employment service increased due to rising unemploy-
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ment. This might have lead the public employment service agencies to give
lower priority to the placement of vocational rehabilitation clients, particu-
larly because the prospects of ﬁnding employment for people with reduced
work capacity are relatively poor when the demand for labour is low.
At the administrative level, the municipalities often failed to fulﬁl their
duty to monitor sickness beneﬁt cases. In order to assess, among other
things, the need for vocational rehabilitation it was stipulated that all sick-
ness beneﬁt cases should be evaluated at the latest within 3 months after the
beginning of the period of sickness. In many instances this requirement was
not met and vocational rehabilitation was, therefore, considered either not
at all or too late. Rørbech et al. (1985) studied sickness beneﬁt cases lasting
more than 5 weeks. Among cases lasting 14-26 weeks the followup evalua-
tion was not performed in 40 percent of the cases. Among cases lasting 27-
52 weeks and cases lasting more than 52 weeks this ﬁgure was 3 and 7 per-
cent, respectively.
Another weakness relates to the administrative interpretation of the prin-
ciple of ‘vocational rehabilitation before disability beneﬁt award’. Award-
ing a disability beneﬁt was illegal unless the municipality had assessed that
vocational rehabilitation could not improve the applicant’s work capacity.
In most cases this assessment took place without vocational rehabilitation
having been applied. In a study, only 7 percent of the disability beneﬁciaries
reported having participated in vocational rehabilitation before being
awarded beneﬁt (Bengtsson, 1989). In addition, vocational rehabilitation
was sometimes established after the application for a disability beneﬁt had
been forwarded to one of the 15 beneﬁt award committees. Bengtsson
(1989) found that more than half of the municipalities reported that they al-
ways or sometimes established vocational rehabilitation after they, on be-
half of the client, had applied for a disability beneﬁt. It is therefore reason-
able to assume that in many of these cases vocational rehabilitation was
used to justify eligibility to disability beneﬁts rather than to advance labour
market integration.
Problems at the level of actors
The sick-listed worker’s economic incentive for participation in vocational
rehabilitation was in certain cases hampered. In contrast to sickness beneﬁt,
the beneﬁt paid during vocational rehabilitation was determined against
spousal income. For sick-listed people whose spouse had a medium to high
income, this meant that participation in vocational rehabilitation would
lead to a reduction of their income.
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The ﬁnancing of social security beneﬁts gave municipalities an incentive
to use the disability pathway instead of the work pathway. Municipalities
were entitled to a 100 percent state refund of disability beneﬁts and a 75
percent refund of sickness beneﬁts, whereas they only received a 50 percent
refund of vocational rehabilitation costs. In other words, they could reduce
their expenditure by ‘producing’ more disability beneﬁciaries. Obviously,
this incentive structure must have increased the number of disability beneﬁt
awards. However, it is difﬁcult to assess the magnitude of this effect. On the
one hand, municipalities were not directly involved in decisions about dis-
ability beneﬁt awards, as these were in the hands of the state committees.
When directly asked, the municipal workers answered that they did not take
reimbursement rates into consideration in case management decisions
(Bengtsson, 1989). On the other hand, municipalities were responsible for
decisions about whether or not the client should apply for disability beneﬁt
and for the preparation of the applications. This is supported by ﬁndings
showing that the rate of disability beneﬁt awards is related to administrative
characteristics of the municipalities (ibid).
Changes during the 1980s: crisis management
The changes to the disability policy during the 1980s did not seek to allevi-
ate the above defects. Rather, the development appears to reﬂect retrench-
ment to coping with the economic crisis, on the one hand, and continued
‘maturation’ of the social security programmes, on the other (see Jonasen,
1998). The Schlüter right-wing government that came into ofﬁce in 1982
had as its declared goal improving the economic situation. According to the
government, economic problems were related to unemployment, deﬁcits in
the balance of payments, and deﬁcits in the public budget.5 Priority was es-
pecially given to the last two goals (Jonasen, 1998). To achieve this, among
other things, the companies’ ability to compete on international markets
had to be improved through a slow wage (and price) development, and pub-
lic expenditure in general, and social security expenditure in particular, had
to be reduced. In other words, during the 1980s changes were motivated by
‘economic necessity’ rather than considerations about the level of sickness
absenteeism and the number of disability beneﬁt beneﬁciaries.
The efforts to retrench social security expenditures did affect the sickness
beneﬁt scheme but not the disability beneﬁt scheme. In 1982 the sickness
beneﬁt scheme was changed in a number of dimensions.6 A maximum dura-
tion on beneﬁt payments was introduced: beneﬁts could only be received for
98 danish disability policy: small steps, big change?
Effective Disability Policy def  29-09-2003  12:04  Pagina 98
up to 91 weeks within a period of 36 months. A 1-day waiting period for
beneﬁt receipt was introduced and employers’ ﬁnancing of beneﬁts was ex-
tended from the ﬁrst 5 weeks of sick leave to 13 weeks. It was argued that
employers’ cost savings from the 1-day waiting period would be ‘taxed’
away by the extended employer period.
While the right-wing parties saw the extension of the employer period as
an economic necessity and the left-wing parties left it unnoticed, the 1-day
waiting period was met with stiff opposition from the left-wing parties that
considered it as socially unjust. When in 1986 the government acknowl-
edged that the waiting period had unjust consequences, mainly affecting
public sector workers, and the economic conditions had improved some-
what, the 1982 changes were reversed. In 1987, the 1-day waiting period
was abolished and the employer period was reduced from 13 to 5 weeks.
This was later reduced to 1 week in 1988 and then extended to 2 weeks in
1990 (where it has remained).
Another, more successful, conduct of retrenchment concerns the lowering
of the sickness beneﬁt. This happened gradually, starting in 1979 when the
automatic price indexation of beneﬁts was temporarily suspended and fol-
lowed in 1982 by a new suspension. Instead beneﬁts were to be regulated ad
hoc. With this policy the real value of sickness beneﬁts was reduced by 25
percent between 1979 and 1985 (Jonasen, 1998).
The disability beneﬁt scheme was changed in 1984. This happened
against the background of a report published by a disability beneﬁt commit-
tee that was established in 1977 (Betænkning nr. 898, 1980). In 1983 the
government reached an agreement with the Social Democrats about a new
disability beneﬁt act, which to a large extent followed the ideas of the com-
mittee.
At the administrative level, the orphans beneﬁt (enkepension) and early
old age beneﬁt (førtidig folkepension) were collapsed with the disability
beneﬁt. Eligibility to disability beneﬁt was extended to include social crite-
ria, and the number of beneﬁt categories was extended from three to ﬁve.
The ‘lowest’ beneﬁt with an invalidity degree of 50-66 percent was split into
three categories with entitlement based on: 1) only medical causes; 2) med-
ical and social causes; and 3) means. The full beneﬁt (invalidity degree 100
percent) and medium beneﬁt (invalidity degree 67-99 percent) remained un-
changed. The changes implied that the lowest beneﬁt level was raised con-
siderably.
The 1984 reform of the disability scheme implied that two new groups of
people became eligible to a disability beneﬁt: 1) people over 50 who due to
social circumstances could not support themselves; and 2) people between
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18 and 66 who partly due to health related circumstances and partly due to
social circumstances were not able to support themselves. It has been esti-
mated that the 1984 change resulted in an annual increase of 3,000-4,000
beneﬁciaries (Bengtsson, 1989).
In brief, the development of the Danish disability policy during the 1980s
provides a mixed picture. One the one hand, the sickness beneﬁt scheme was
affected by retrenchment measures, which were partly offset when the eco-
nomic situation improved. On the other hand, the disability beneﬁt scheme
was extended both in terms of eligibility and amounts of beneﬁt – a develop-
ment that seems to represent ‘a delayed maturing of social security rights’
similar to the development of other social security programmes that took
place during the 1960s and 1970s.
Changes during the 1990s: increased emphasis on activation
In contrast to the 1980s where changes to improve work-disabled peoples’
attachment to the work pathway were lacking, the policy during the 1990s
evolved around the idea of activation. By putting greater emphasis on active
measures such as vocational rehabilitation the dependency on social securi-
ty beneﬁts would be reduced.
Reaching consensus about activation
The ﬁrst major and almost unanimous political endorsement to the activa-
tion strategy was reached in 19897 when the third Schlüter government
launched a proposal for a combined revision of the sickness beneﬁt act and
the stipulations about vocational rehabilitation (in the social assistance
act).8 The proposal aimed to curb the increasing expenditure related to
work injuries, sickness beneﬁts and disability beneﬁts.9 To achieve this goal,
municipalities needed to increase their efforts in bringing people with health
problems back into employment. Entitlement to sickness beneﬁts was re-
duced to 1 year within 36 months, which should compel municipalities to
strengthen (early) followup activities. More emphasis was put on vocation-
al rehabilitation. The means-tested vocational rehabilitation beneﬁt was re-
placed by a non-means-tested beneﬁt (bruttorevalideringsydelse) of the
same size as the sickness beneﬁt. In this way, economic disincentives for po-
tential participants’ enrolment in vocational rehabilitation were levelled
out. It was stipulated that the municipality was obliged to draw up a reha-
bilitation plan with a description of instruments (education, job training,
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etc.) and expected vocational result (type of employment). At the same time
a so-called pre-vocational rehabilitation period was introduced. Pre-voca-
tional rehabilitation is established when vocational rehabilitation accord-
ing to a rehabilitation plan is assessed to be necessary but temporarily un-
feasible, for instance because the rehabilitee lacks educational or personal
abilities. Prevocational rehabilitation may consist of an examination of the
work capacity, vocational maturing activities, courses and education. Dur-
ing pre-vocational rehabilitation the rehabilitee is entitled to his/her previ-
ous support, e.g. sickness beneﬁt or social assistance.
Finally, the changes comprised what were labelled administrative simpliﬁ-
cations: the employer period was extended from 1 to 2 weeks, eligibility to
sickness beneﬁts was made conditional on a certain employment record
(120 hours of employment within 13 weeks), and public employers were
obliged to ﬁnance sickness beneﬁts for their own employees (for as long as
they were employed in the company).
For the Social Democrats who intensively fought retrenchments during
the 1980s, the narrowing of eligibility and entitlement criteria was not seen
as retrenchment, it was argued that those who would be affected by the
changes were offered vocational rehabilitation instead. In other words, re-
ductions in the right to social security beneﬁts were exchanged for an im-
proved state commitment to returning the sick-listed to work.
With the 1990 changes two defects in the Danish disability policy had
been addressed, namely individuals’ disincentives for participation in voca-
tional rehabilitation and municipalities’ incomplete followup of sickness
beneﬁt cases. In 1992 a third defect, municipalities’ disincentives to estab-
lish vocational rehabilitation, was addressed. All rates for state refunds of
social beneﬁts to municipalities were harmonised. Refunds for disability
beneﬁts and sickness beneﬁts were reduced to 50 percent and thus made
equal to the refunds for vocational rehabilitation beneﬁts. Consequently,
municipalities were given economic incentives for the initiation of vocation-
al rehabilitation. 
The cultivation of public responsibility
Having obtained political consensus about the merits of activation, the door
was opened for further changes. Thus, the policy development in the early
1990s, with a strengthening of municipalities’ obligations and incentives to
activating sick-listed workers while providing municipalities with more/bet-
ter integration instruments, was further cultivated throughout the 1990s. 
Municipalities’ obligations were strengthened on several occasions. For
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instance, in 1997, the obligation to perform a followup evaluation of all
sickness beneﬁt cases was advanced from 3 to 2 months after the beginning
of sick leave, and the followup should now be repeated at least every second
month instead of every third month. The municipality also became obliged
to draw up a reintegration plan before a sickness beneﬁt case had lasted 6
months. In 1999, it was stipulated that municipalities could not apply for a
disability beneﬁt on behalf of the client unless reintegration measures such
as vocational rehabilitation had been applied.
In addition to the reintegration plan, municipalities were provided with
better integration instruments. Most importantly, the existing wage subsidy
scheme, the 50/50 scheme, was replaced with the ﬂexjob scheme in order to
prevent further increases in the number of disability beneﬁciaries. While the
50/50 scheme operated with a 50 percent wage subsidy to people with per-
manently reduced work capacity, the ﬂexjob scheme comprises three levels
(33, 50 and 67 percent). The present ﬂexjob scheme is also more attractive
for the disabled participants. For example, the ﬂexjob scheme covers more
different job types, and in 2000, people in ﬂexjobs were allowed to move
from one municipality to another without loosing their ﬂexjob, and their en-
titlement to special unemployment beneﬁt was improved.
On several occasions the incentives of municipalities to apply active rather
than passive measures have been strengthened. Most importantly, in 1999,
the state refund for disability beneﬁts was reduced from 50 to 35 percent,
hence it has become more costly for the municipality to award a disability
beneﬁt than to apply vocational rehabilitation measures or job placement in
a ﬂex job. To reduce the number of long-term sick-listed workers, munici-
palities are now also obliged to ﬁnance the payment of sickness beneﬁts
when they last longer than the normal sickness beneﬁt period of 52 weeks
(sickness beneﬁt payments may be extended beyond 52 weeks if, for exam-
ple, vocational rehabilitation is expected to be established or assessment for
a disability beneﬁt is ongoing).
The effect of this incentive policy has been fortiﬁed by the decentraliza-
tion of the disability beneﬁt award procedure. Prior to 1990 disability bene-
ﬁt awards were a matter for 15 state committees and the municipalities were
only responsible for the preparation of applications. Starting in 1989 on an
experimental basis, municipalities were gradually delegated greater compe-
tence and in 1998 municipalities were given absolute competence to award
disability beneﬁts.
As of yet, the culmination of the municipality-based policy aimed at active
instead of passive beneﬁt receipt is a reform of the disability beneﬁt scheme
that took place in January 2003. It sustains the principle of vocational reha-
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bilitation and wage-subsidized employment prior to considering an applica-
tion for disability beneﬁt. That is, eligibility to a disability beneﬁt cannot be
considered if the client is able to work in an ordinary job or in a ﬂex job. As
ﬂex jobs demand a permanently reduction of work capacity by between 50
and 67 percent, eligibility for disability beneﬁt in principle presupposes a re-
duction of the work capacity of at least twothirds, compared to 50 percent
in the old scheme. The new act also aims to increase the focus on clients’
work capacities rather than their inabilities. The old procedure of assessing
the extent of reduced occupational capacity, which to a large degree relied
on medical diagnoses and their impact on the occupational capacity, was re-
placed with an assessment of the work capacity based on the applicant’s de
facto ability to work. Finally, the ﬁve disability beneﬁt levels were replaced
by one level, where the beneﬁt is equal to the sickness beneﬁt for single peo-
ple and to 70 percent of the sickness beneﬁt for cohabiting people. In this
way, the extent of means testing was reduced. On the top of the ﬂat-rate ben-
eﬁt, certain supplementary beneﬁts exist, covering rebuilding of apart-
ments, aids, reimbursement of additional expenses caused by disability, etc.
Alongside the development emphasising municipalities’ responsibility for
integration, efforts have been made to increase the (voluntary) participa-
tion of employers and other actors such as voluntary organisations and
unions in work retention and labour market integration of work-disabled
people (Damgaard, 2000; Rosdahl, 2001). Starting in 1994, the Social De-
mocrat Minister of Social Affairs, Karen Jespersen, launched a campaign ‘it
concerns all of us – employers’ social responsibility’. At the organisational
level the policy is supported by the socalled Local Coordination Commit-
tees with representative from e.g. the municipality, unions, employers asso-
ciations and handicap organisations. These committees are advisory to the
municipal councils. Since 1999 all municipalities have been instructed to es-
tablish coordination committees. Together with a National Coordination
Committee, they aim to facilitate labour market integration taking place at
local labour markets.
In brief, policy changes during the 1980s were characterized by efforts to
retrenchment the sickness beneﬁt scheme, on the one hand, and an extension
of the disability beneﬁt scheme on the other. The policy in the 1980s evolved
around the necessity to curb the increasing public expenditure where policy
options were seen as a ‘zero sum game’ of the choice between more or less
social security protection for work-disabled people. In contrast, the devel-
opment in the 1990s was driven by concern about the increasing number of
passive people receiving long-term social security beneﬁts and the notion of
activation as a reinvented instrument that could turn the zero sum play into
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a win-win solution. It was no longer a question of more or less social securi-
ty, but a question of providing social security as a combination of entitle-
ments to cash beneﬁts and opportunities for reinsertion into the labour mar-
ket.
The development of the Danish disability policy since the 1980s can be
characterized as a cultivation of a policy within a framework that was
founded with the ﬁrst vocational rehabilitation act in 1960 and the social
reforms in 1972 to 1976. The changes to the sickness, disability beneﬁt and
vocational rehabilitation schemes have preserved and developed the basic
structures of the system. That is, a disability policy based on an extensive
public responsibility for the ﬁnancing and administration of universal cash
and inkind beneﬁt schemes; a public local one-string administration com-
bined with state reimbursements of municipalities’ social security expendi-
tures; limited responsibility for employers both in terms of ﬁnancing of ben-
eﬁts and obligations to integrate work-disabled people.
Dutch and Danish disability policies: different developments
Despite a disability crisis during the 1980s that was much more profound in
the Netherlands than in Denmark, the two nations’ policy developments
share some important characteristics. In both nations the economic crisis
caused a considerable pressure towards retrenchment during the 1980s, and
in both nations efforts to retrench were not very successful, apparently be-
cause political consensus was lacking (see also Green-Pedersen, 2001). At
the brink of the 1990s, in the Netherlands as well as in Denmark, the in-
creasing numbers of passive social security beneﬁciaries were considered to
be a serious problem, although the public and political debate probably was
more heated in the Netherlands than in Denmark. In both nations the subse-
quent policy changes aimed at reducing the number of sickness and disabili-
ty beneﬁciaries and increasing citizens attachment to the work pathway.
When it comes to the political strategies and the instruments applied to
obtain the political goals the similarity between the Netherlands and Den-
mark ceases. While Denmark opted for a cultivation of the existing policy,
the Netherlands turned the policy into an at least partly new direction. In
Denmark the institutional setup of the disability policy remained intact,
with a limited responsibility of employers and with public local authorities
having the major responsibility for the ﬁnancing and administration of cash
beneﬁts and of integration measures. In the Netherlands, in contrast, the re-
sponsibility for the ﬁnancing and administration of the disability policy has
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been transferred from a semi-public-corporate level to the individual em-
ployer. Thus, in contrast to the Danish development, the Dutch develop-
ment involved a redistribution of responsibilities for the disability policy. It
can be argued, therefore, that the Dutch policy changes were of a more fun-
damental character than those taking place in Denmark (for a discussion of
the character of the Dutch changes, see van der Veen and Trommel, 1999).
Dutch and Danish disability policies: different principles
Different policies toward employers
As a consequence of the different developments today’s Dutch and Danish
disability policies are of a very different nature both in terms of the role of
different actors, the incentives these actors face and the policy instruments
applied. It is possible to distinguish between four different types of policy
instruments (Vedung, 1998; Elmore, 1987; and Chapter 3 in this book): reg-
ulation in terms of formulated rules and directives, economic means that in-
volve the transfer of resources such as money, capacity-building measures
that comprise investments in future material, intellectual and human re-
sources, and information or moral suasion that aims to make people act in a
desired way through the transfer of knowledge, communication of reasoned
argument and persuasion. What divides these instruments is the degree of
constraint they involve. Regulation is more constraining for the receivers
than economic means and capacity-building measures, which are more con-
straining than information or moral suasion.
In the Dutch policy, the individual employer is a central actor in facilitat-
ing the labour market attachment of work-disabled people, and regulation is
the primary instrument applied to make employers act in a desirable way.
Examples of this are the solid job-protection legislation that forbids employ-
ers to dismiss sick-listed workers, employers’ obligation to reintegrate
workers on sick leave, their obligation to ﬁnance sickness beneﬁts and to
contract a private consultancy company to assist with the implementation
of a sickness and absence policy. These regulations work in two ways. If em-
ployers comply with regulations it will result in desirable outcomes: an ab-
senteeism policy will prevent unnecessary sickness, workers that fall ill will
not be dismissed, and employers will apply the necessary measures to facili-
tate their return to work. At the same time these instruments inﬂict costs
upon the employer. This is clearly the case with the ﬁnancing of sickness
beneﬁts and the contracting of a private consultancy company, but also with
respect to the job-protection stipulations because it might be costly to retain
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a sick-listed worker, whose future productivity is lower than that of a
healthy, newly recruited worker. A consequence of the Dutch regulations,
therefore, is that employers have strong incentives to reduce production
costs related to work disability. Employers can achieve this by limiting sick-
ness absenteeism and increasing reintegration among their staff, but also by
limiting the recruitment of people with health problems. The latter will
make it more difﬁcult to integrate non-employed disabled people into the
labour market and it may increase discrimination against disabled people if
employers increase statistical discrimination, i.e. disregarding all disabled
job seekers because on average they have higher sickness rates.
Although less dominant, the Dutch policy also relies on economic means.
Wage subsidies for employers who hire partially disabled people, ﬁxed bud-
gets or subsidies for adaptations of the workplace, and the exemption from
sick pay during sick leave of partially disabled workers are measures that en-
hance employers’ incentives to recruit workers with reduced work capacity
(cf. Chapter 5).
In the Danish policy, employers have a less central role and the preferred
instruments are economic means and moral suasion. The ﬂexjob and
skaane-job schemes are economic means instruments where wage subsidies
prompt employers to employ work-disabled people. The government cam-
paign ‘it concerns all of us – employers’ social responsibility’ where moral
arguments are used to persuade employers to enhance the labour market in-
tegration of work-disabled people falls within the category of moral sua-
sion. The Local Coordination Committees that aim to involve employers
and other actors in the disability policy also entail elements of moral sua-
sion and information.
We can therefore conclude that the Dutch and Danish policies differ in re-
spect of the instruments they apply to affect employers. Regulation is the
preferred instrument in the Netherlands whereas economic means and
moral suasion are central instruments in Denmark. Consequently, the
Dutch policy is much more constraining for employers than the Danish poli-
cy; in the Netherlands policy outcomes are obtained by demanding that em-
ployers act in a certain way meaning that in principle all employers will act
in a similar way. In contrast, Danish employers’ scope of action is left almost
unrestricted because the policy makes certain actions more economically
and maybe also morally attractive to employers than others. However, as
the economic costs of certain actions differ from case to case, for example
because the severity of workers’ illness varies, it is by no means certain that
employers will act in a uniform way. It is this difference in mandated respon-
sibility to act in a speciﬁc way that justiﬁes the conclusion that the employer
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is a much more central actor in the Dutch policy than they are in the Danish
policy.
Different policies toward administrative authorities
Striking crossnational differences are also present with respect to the role of
public authorities. Clearly, these differences mirror the noted diversities be-
tween the roles of employers insofar as tasks that have been delegated to em-
ployers in the Netherlands rest with public authorities in Denmark. As this
delineation of responsibilities takes place via regulation, it can be argued
that in both nations regulation is the preferred instrument used to govern
how public administrative authorities act in the implementation of the dis-
ability policy. In Denmark regulation is used to delegate inﬂuence and obli-
gations to public authorities. In contrast, in the Netherlands certain admin-
istrative tasks have been delegated to the individual employers that contract
private companies such as insurance companies and consultancy companies
(Arbodienst) to perform certain administrative duties. Consequently, it can
be argued that in the Netherlands regulations serve to restrict or limit public
authorities from the sphere of disability policy more than in Denmark. Fur-
thermore, in contrast to the Dutch policy, economic means seem to be an
important instrument in the Danish policy towards administrative authori-
ties. For instance, we have seen that reimbursement rates are actively used to
induce municipalities to pursue an active rather than a passive disability
policy. In this way economic means instruments support the effect of regula-
tions because they increase the likelihood that public authorities will com-
ply with the intentions of regulations. In other words, the Danish policy is
different from the Dutch policy both in terms of the extent to which public
authorities are delegated inﬂuence and responsibilities for the implementa-
tion of the policy and in terms of the instruments that are applied to make
administrative authorities act in the desired way. 
In fact the Danish policy towards public authorities appears to have much
in common with the Dutch policy towards employers. In both instances
comprehensive tasks and obligations are delegated to the actors through
regulations and economic means. There is, however, one important differ-
ence. Whereas the use of regulations in the Dutch case represents an inter-
vention in the labour market, this is much less the case in Denmark where
local authorities only to a very limited extent operate directly in the labour
market. 
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Different policies toward work-disabled people
Employers and public authorities are important actors that inﬂuence the
outcomes of disability policies because both of them provide resources and
impose constraints and opportunities upon disabled people, which inﬂu-
ence their employment possibilities and exit conditions (cf. Chapter 3). Fol-
lowing the arguments above, we may expect that sick-listed workers in the
Netherlands have a better chance of returning to work with their previous
employer than sick-listed workers in Denmark, because Dutch employers
have strong economic incentives to retain sick-listed workers. Similarly, it is
likely that disabled people without attachment to an employer fare better in
Denmark than in the Netherlands. 
On the face of it, publicly provided exit conditions through the sickness
and disability beneﬁt schemes appear to be better in the Netherlands than in
Denmark. The Dutch disability scheme only demands an invalidity degree
of 15-25 percent compared to 67 percent in the Danish scheme. Further-
more, in the Netherlands sick-listed workers are automatically assessed for
eligibility to disability beneﬁt when their entitlement to sickness beneﬁt ex-
pires. This is not the case in Denmark where municipalities have to apply on
behalf of the client and where possibilities for vocational rehabilitation
should be exhausted before an application can be ﬁled. Differences in the
administrative practices may however counteract these formal differences
and it is therefore difﬁcult to conclude that exit conditions are better in the
Netherlands than in Denmark.
Dutch workers also seem to enjoy better income protection during sick
leave than Danish workers. Thus, the Danish scheme operates with a rela-
tively low beneﬁt ceiling,10 and Dutch workers are through collective agree-
ments entitled to full wages during sick leave more often than Danish work-
ers. In 1998 approximately 90 percent of the Dutch workers were entitled to
full wages (Schellekens et al., 1999), compared to less than 60 percent of the
Danish workers (in 1989) (calculated from Nord-Larsen, 1991).
Capacity-building instruments such as vocational rehabilitation that im-
prove the resources of work-disabled people seem to be a much more inte-
grated element in the Danish policy than in the Dutch policy. This is reﬂect-
ed in much higher public expenditure on vocational rehabilitation in Den-
mark than in the Netherlands (see Chapter 4). However, as Dutch employers
are responsible for the reintegration of their sick-listed workers, it is possi-
ble that vocational rehabilitation is to a large extent established and ﬁ-
nanced by employers leading to an underestimation of the supply of capaci-
ty-building measures in the Netherlands. I will return to this question in
Chapter 7.
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Conclusion
During the last few decades the development of Danish disability policy
seems in many respects comparable to the development that took place in
the Netherlands. In the 1980s the development was affected by the econom-
ic stagnation and efforts to retrench, which only succeeded partly, leaving
the institutional structures unchanged. During the 1990s the emphasis on
the labour market integration of disabled people was gradually increased.
But in contrast to the Netherlands where the responsibilities have been man-
dated to the individual employer, the development in Denmark can be char-
acterised as a cultivation of the existing policy. That is, a policy based on an
extensive public responsibility for the ﬁnancing and administration of the
sickness, disability, and vocational rehabilitation schemes; a public, local
one-string administration combined with state reimbursements of munici-
palities’ social security expenditures, and a limited responsibility of em-
ployers both in terms of ﬁnancing of beneﬁts and obligation to integrate dis-
abled people.
A comparison of the present policy in the Netherlands and Denmark sug-
gests that they differ in important respects. A principal difference seems to
be the division of the responsibility for the labour market integration of dis-
abled people. In Denmark the labour market integration of people with
health problems is mainly a public responsibility, whereas in the Nether-
lands it is much more the responsibility of the individual employer. The lat-
ter is to a great extent obtained through regulations such as job-protection
legislation and obligations to ﬁnance sickness beneﬁts. Compared to the
Danish policy where instruments such as wage subsidies and persuasion
campaigns inﬂuence the behaviour of employers, the Dutch emphasis on
regulations is much more constraining for employers’ scope of choice. On
the one hand, it makes work disability expensive for employers and, there-
fore, provides employers with an incentive to reduce sickness absenteeism
and increase the labour market reintegration of sick-listed workers. On the
other hand, it may also make the integration of non-employed disabled peo-
ple more difﬁcult because employers may reduce their future costs if they
can avoid recruiting people with a high risk of becoming work-disabled. The
consequence that these crossnational differences have for the integration of
disabled people is the topic of the following chapters.
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7 Different Routes to Integration
The Dutch and Danish disability policies differ with respect to with whom
the responsibility for labour market integration of sick-listed workers rests.
The responsibility of employers is much more extensive in the Netherlands
than in Denmark, and vice versa with regard to the responsibility of public
authorities. Workers’ income protection during sick leave constitutes an-
other difference: Dutch workers generally seem to enjoy better income pro-
tection during sick leave than Danish workers. This and the following two
chapters shed light on how these differences inﬂuence the labour market in-
tegration of work-disabled people.
Extensive employer responsibility makes it costly and difﬁcult for employ-
ers to substitute sick-listed workers. Compared to the Danish policy, we
should, therefore, expect that the Dutch policy will enhance the labour mar-
ket attachment of disabled workers. But we should also anticipate that the
Dutch policy makes labour market entry difﬁcult for disabled people with-
out attachment to an employer, because employers will be reluctant to re-
cruit people whom they expect have high sickness absenteeism rates. In con-
trast, the Danish policy stresses a public responsibility for the integration of
disabled people. In this respect an extensive public supply of vocational re-
habilitation measures is an integrated part of Danish policy. Consequently,
we should expect that in Denmark disabled peoples’ labour market integra-
tion will often be facilitated by such measures.
This chapter seeks to uncover to what extent these institutional differ-
ences exist, and how they inﬂuence the mechanisms through which labour
market integration takes place. Does the solid job-protection legislation in
the Netherlands reduce dismissals of sick-listed workers? Does the extensive
responsibility of employers increase their efforts in integrating sick-listed
workers? Similarly, does the formal emphasis on publicly supplied vocation-
al rehabilitation in Denmark lead to more disabled people participating in
such measures? How these differences affect labour market integration of
disabled people is studied in the next chapter.
The empirical analyses rest to a large extent on data from a crossnational
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study of long-term sick-listed workers. These data are brieﬂy described in the
next section. In the proceeding sections the consequences of crossnational
differences in job-protection legislation, the supply of vocational rehabilita-
tion measures, and income protection during sick leave are discussed. 
The data
The study of the consequences of the Dutch and Danish disability policies
are mainly based on data from a comparative study, Work Incapacity and
Reintegration, carried out under the auspices of the International Social Se-
curity Association (Bloch and Prins, 1997; 2001). In the six participating
nations data was gathered according to common guidelines concerning:
– The demarcation of the cohort
– The observation period
– The timing and frequency of the collection of data 
– The contents of the data collection
The national cohorts consisted of workers who: had been continuously sick-
listed for 90-120 days on admission to the study, were sick-listed with cer-
tain low back pain diagnoses, fully work incapacitated and aged between
18 and 59. Data was collected three times: shortly after admission to the
study (wave 1), a year after the ﬁrst day of work incapacity (wave 2), and 2
years after the ﬁrst day of work incapacity (wave 3). The variables to be
measured, their content and response categories were speciﬁed for each of
the three waves. The common guidelines ensure that the Dutch and Danish
data are quite homogenous with regard to duration of sickness absence, di-
agnoses and age.
The data have two advantages. Most crossnational studies of sick leave
and disability policies are based on macro-level data (e.g. Einerhand, et al.,
1995; Prins, 1990; Bergeskog, 2001; eim, 2002). Consequently, the num-
ber of crossnational differences that can be taken into consideration is re-
stricted (Esping-Andersen, 1993). In contrast, the present data allows us to
combine macro-level information (e.g., about job-protection legislation)
with micro-level data (about sick-listed workers), thus making it possible to
take numerous conditions into account. Furthermore, the comparability of
studies based on existing macro data may be restricted because the delin-
eation of populations and deﬁnitions of policy instruments and other issues
of interest varies across nations. 
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Some limitations of the data should, however, be noted. Neither of the co-
horts is necessarily representative for all Dutch, or Danish, long-term sick-
listed workers with a low back pain diagnosis. The Dutch cohort is collected
among private sector workers who at the time of selection had hired a pri-
vate consultancy company to assist in the implementation of a prevention
and reintegration policy (the obligation to hire a private consultancy com-
pany was not implemented in full when the collection of data began). The
Danish cohort is drawn from private sector workers from the 24 largest mu-
nicipalities in the country.1 This poses a limitation to the reliability of de-
scriptive analyses, whereas it is expected to be of less importance in causal
analyses because causal relationships are assumed to be sufﬁciently similar
in different groups of sick-listed workers, for example between workers
with residence in small and large municipalities.
The timing of the data collection should also be noted. The collection of
data was carried out between 1995 and 1997, with the result that several of
the changes in the Dutch and Danish disability policies were not yet estab-
lished. Most importantly the major part of the Dutch ﬁnancial reforms of
the sickness and disability beneﬁt schemes had not been implemented by the
beginning of the study.2 Consequently the effects of the Dutch reforms were
not fully manifest. On the other hand, fundamental crossnational differ-
ences between the Dutch and Danish policies with regard to employers’ re-
sponsibility were present at the time, indicating that a meaningful compari-
son is feasible.
Information about the two data sets is shown in Table 7.1.
In the Dutch study 547 people were approached for participation and
data was gathered for 427 people in the ﬁrst measurement round, wave 1,
corresponding to a response rate of 78 percent. In the Danish study 668 peo-
ple were approached and 565 participated in the ﬁrst measurement round
corresponding to a response rate of 85 percent. For a few selected character-
istics there is no sign of signiﬁcant differences between respondents who
participated in the ﬁrst wave and those who did not (Prins, Veerman and
van der Giezen, 1996; Høgelund and Modvig, 1998). The analyses deal
with the complete 2-year observation period and they are based on respon-
dents who participated both in the ﬁrst and the second wave.
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Dismissals during sick leave3
Dutch job-protection legislation against dismissal during sick leave is much
stricter than the provisions stipulated in Danish legislation and major col-
lective agreements. We should therefore expect to ﬁnd more workers dis-
missed during sick leave in the Danish data than in the Dutch. This does in-
deed seem to be the case.
Half of the private sector workers in the Danish data were dismissed dur-
ing sick leave whereas this was only the case for 11 percent in the Dutch
data, see Table 7.2. Thus, dismissals occur 41⁄2 times as often in the Danish
data as in the Dutch data. Furthermore, among those workers who were dis-
missed, the average time until dismissal was 11.1 months among the Dutch
but only 4.1 months for the Danes. This gives further support to the impor-
tance of job-protection stipulations, because in Denmark the stipulations
often allow employers to effectuate dismissals after 4 months of sick leave
within a year.
These crossnational differences may be exacerbated, however, because
they may also reﬂect crossnational differences that are unrelated to provi-
sions about job protection during sick leave. Danish employers may for oth-
er, e.g. cultural, reasons dismiss their workers more often and quicker than
Dutch employers. The differences may also reﬂect differences between the
sampling procedures used to create the two data sets. For example, if work-
ers with low educational attainment are overrepresented in the Danish data
and are also dismissed relatively frequently, this may cause the noted differ-
ences. Accordingly, adjustments with regard to such circumstances should
be made.
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Table 7.1 Sick-listed workers in the Dutch and Danish data sets.
Dutch data Danish data Total
Measurement Private Private Public Private and 
workers workers workers public workers
Wave 11 427 386 178 565 992
Wave 21 392 327 166 494 886
Wave 31 370 284 156 441 811
Source:Høgelund (2002)
1 Wave 1 was on average carried out 4 months (NL) and 51⁄2 months (DK) after the first day of
work incapacity.Wave 2 and wave 3 were on average carried out 13 months and 25 months,
respectively,after the first day of work incapacity.
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In order to shed light on this issue, the probability of dismissal during sick
leave is estimated in a multivariate regression model. The explanatory vari-
ables are supposed to capture conditions that in general are supposed to af-
fect the likelihood of dismissal (Colbjørnsen, 1986; Klaas, Brown and Hen-
eman, 1998; Langager, 1993). At the micro level conditions related to ﬁve
different types of explanations are considered:
1 Productivity
2 Seniority
3 Loyalty 
4 Structural resources
5 Company vulnerability
It is anticipated that workers with low productivity have a high risk of dis-
missal because they have a lower net value for the ﬁrm than workers with a
high productivity. Productivity is often assumed to be associated with age,
educational background, on-the-job training, previous periods of unem-
ployment, sick leave and health (Colbjørnsen, 1986, Andersen, 1991).
Workers with little seniority are expected to have an above average risk of
dismissal because seniority rules often stipulate that ‘the last hired is the
ﬁrst ﬁred’. Employers may abstain from the dismissal of workers whom they
consider as loyal towards the company or workers they expect to suffer
greatly from dismissal. When workers are loyal to their company they make
up a steady and compliant labour supply whereby employers’ turnover costs
are minimised.
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Table 7.2 Dismissals during sick leave among long-term sick-listed workers with low back pain
diagnoses (as percentages).
Denmark The Netherlands
Private workers Private workers Significance level
(percent) (percent)
Dismissed 50 11 ***
Number of cases 319 390
used in calculations
Source:Høgelund (2002).
Note:Dismissed people include people who were dismissed before first returning to work.For
70 people the calculations are based only on the first year of the observation period.The signif-
icance level is calculated in a χ2 –test:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,**:signif-
icant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10 percent
level.
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Some workers possess structural resources that give them a certain control
over their job, which may protect them from dismissal. This is so because it
is complicated to measure the productivity of workers in autonomous jobs,
which in turn makes it difﬁcult for employers to determine whether it will be
efﬁcient to dismiss the workers in question (Colbjørnsen, 1986). Compa-
nies in certain branches are particularly vulnerable to ﬂuctuations in the de-
mand for their products and workers in these companies are therefore as-
sumed to run a higher risk of dismissal (Topel, 1982).
Finally, at the macro-level, crossnational differences in the dismissal rate
during sick leave may be caused by the fact that Danish companies in gener-
al dismiss more often than Dutch companies. This may very well be true.
Thus, among people who left their job within the past 6 months in 1993-
1994 dismissals and redundancies occurred more than 3 times as often in
Denmark as in the Netherlands (oecd, 1997). This difference may however
not only reﬂect the risk of dismissal but also the chance of ﬁnding a new job
(ibid.). Such crossnational differences may be caused by differences in na-
tional economic conjunctures or by different labour market structures mak-
ing it more or less difﬁcult or costly to dismiss workers. This may for in-
stance concern job-protection legislation (unrelated to sickness) and the un-
employment insurance system that may inﬂuence the workers’ costs of being
dismissed, which in turn may affect their demand for job security and/or
compensation in the event of dismissal.
The results of a logistic regression model that estimates the risk of dis-
missal during sick leave is shown in Table 7.3 (descriptive statistics of the ex-
planatory variables are shown in Appendix A).
The importance of nationality and therefore the importance of provisions
concerning job protection is supported: The probability of dismissal is con-
siderably higher among workers in the Danish group than in the Dutch
group. A comparison of the estimates in Table 7.3 with those in Table 7.2
suggests that the crossnational difference in the risk of dismissal is not re-
duced when crossnational differences in other explanatory variables are
taken into account.4
We can also see that educational attainment, pain intensity, gender and se-
niority are signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients of these variables are as expected, i.e.
male workers with a high level of education, little pain and long seniority
have a low risk of dismissal. The importance of these variables to some ex-
tent supports the assumptions about productivity (pain intensity, educa-
tion), seniority, and structural resources (education, gender).
As the branch is insigniﬁcant no support is provided for the assumption
that dismissals are caused by companies’ vulnerability to ﬂuctuations in the
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Table 7.3 Logistic regression model of dismissal of long-term sick-listed private sector workers
with low back pain diagnoses (n=663).
Variable Coefficient level Std.Error Significance 
level
Nationality (Denmark=1) 2.649 0.265 ***
Productivity
Age 0.005 0.012 ns
Educational background:1
Secondary (yes=1) -0.730 0.362 **
Tertiary (yes=1) -1.719 0.545 ***
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.263 0.051 ***
Number of weeks on sick leave the year 
prior to present sick leave 0.022 0.014 ns
Seniority
Number of months in present job2 -0.405 0.146 ***
Loyalty
Living with a spouse? (yes=1) 0.205 0.311 ns
Living together with children? (yes=1) 0.049 0.232 ns
Structural resources
Sex (female=1) 0.554 0.266 **
Country of birth (not born in 
country=1) 0.517 0.388 ns
Occupation in pre-sick leave job: 3
Sales,service (yes=1) 0.253 0.362 ns
Craft and plant work (yes=1) 0.186 0.421 ns
Elementary work (yes=1) -0.614 0.565 ns
Company vulnerability
Company branch:4
Trade (yes=1) 0.358 0.348 ns
Private service (yes=1) 0.192 0.340 ns
Public,social,educ.sector (yes=1) -0.065 0.372 ns
Company size:Number of workers in 0.047 0.038 ns
company2
General dismissal tendency
Company history:(Layoffs within the 
year before present sick leave=1) 0.066 0.475 ns
Constant -1.319 0.858 ns
Log likelihood -278.5
Note:All variables are measured at the first interview,wave 1.Significance levels:*:significant
at a 10 percent level of significance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 per-
cent level,ns:not significant at a 10 percent level.
1 Reference category:primary education
2 Figure multiplied by 100.
3 Reference category:manager,professional.
4 Reference category:primary and secondary sector.
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demand for products. The general dismissal tendency is also insigniﬁcant
suggesting that, even though Danish employers in general tend to dismiss
their workers more often than Dutch employers, it does not explain why
sick-listed workers are dismissed more often in the Danish data than in the
Dutch data.5
In brief, the data supports the fact that Dutch job-protection legislation
makes employers refrain from dismissing sick-listed workers. This may be
interpreted as if this legislation increases employers’ responsibility for sick-
listed workers, because it induces employers to give their sick-listed workers
a ‘second chance’ of returning to work.
The supply of vocational rehabilitation measures
In principle one can distinguish between two different types of vocational
rehabilitation. Capacity-building measures comprise measures that aim to
improve the work capacity of disabled people and consequently their chance
of ﬁnding employment. These measures comprise job training and educa-
tional activities. Another type of measure seeks to adjust or reduce job de-
mands in order to meet the abilities of disabled people. These so-called
workplace-based measures include workplace adjustments, changes in job
tasks and changes in working hours. This section describes how often these
two different types of measures are established among Dutch and Danish
long-term sick-listed workers.
Educational activities
While publicly provided, and ﬁnanced, vocational rehabilitation measures
have been an integrated element in Danish policy for many years, such in-
struments have apparently not been important in Dutch policy (see Chapter
4). This is supported by Table 7.4, which shows long-term sick-listed work-
ers’ participation in general educational activities such as secondary level
school classes.6
The table shows that 10 percent of the sick-listed workers in the Danish
cohort participated in general education compared to only 2 percent in the
Dutch cohort.7
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Workplace-based measures
Many sick-listed workers who return to work may continue to have health-
related problems and reduced work capacity. The working conditions in the
job they return to may therefore be crucial to their possibility of remaining
in work. If job demands exceed their work capacity, many of those resuming
work may report sick again. To avoid this, employers and the social security
ofﬁce can establish workplace-based vocational rehabilitation measures
that reduce job demands.
When a sick-listed worker returns to work with their original employer,
i.e. the employer where the sick-listed worker reported sick, the establish-
ment of workplace-based measures will be costly for the employer. This is
because it involves a deviation from the pre-sick leave situation. For exam-
ple, if the sick-listed worker’s working hours are reduced it may be costly for
the employer because another worker will have to take over some of the job-
based tasks. The establishment of workplace-based vocational rehabilita-
tion measures can therefore be said to reﬂect the efforts of employers to fa-
cilitate integration. Keeping in mind that the incentives of Dutch employers
to reintegrate their sick-listed workers are stronger than those of Danish em-
ployers, we should expect that in the Netherlands workplace-based mea-
sures are established more often among sick-listed workers who return to
work with the old employer than among those returning to work with a new
employer. 
Table 7.5 presents ﬁgures for the frequency of workplace-based rehabili-
tation deﬁned as either workplace adaptation, new tasks or new working
hours.
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Table 7.4 Participation in general education during sick leave among long-term sick-listed
workers with low back pain diagnoses (as a percentage).
Denmark The Netherlands
Private workers Private workers Significance level
(percent) (percent)
Participated in general 10 2 ***
education
Number of cases 323 390
used in calculations
Note:For 70 people,calculations are based only on the first year of the observation period.Sig-
nificance level is calculated in a χ2 –test:*:Significant at a 10 percent level of significance,**:sig-
nificant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10 percent
level.
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The table shows several interesting results. Firstly, we can see that work
resumption with the original employer happens much more frequently in
the Dutch data than in the Danish data. 85 percent returned to work with
their old employer in the Dutch data, whereas this was only true for 41 per-
cent of workers in the Danish data. This marked crossnational difference
can be ascribed to institutional differences. In the Netherlands returning to
work with the old employer is likely because it is costly and/or difﬁcult for
Dutch employers to get rid of sick-listed workers, making it more attractive
for employers to retain them. Furthermore, the job search intensity of sick-
listed workers will often be restricted as long as they have a vacant job to re-
turn to, as is the case in the Netherlands.
Secondly, the table supports the theory that crossnational institutional
differences also lead to differences in how often workplace-based vocation-
al rehabilitation is established with the old employer and a new employer,
respectively. Thus, in the Dutch data at least one rehabilitation measure is
established in 81 percent of the cases where the sick-listed worker returned
to work with the old employer, compared to only 64 percent among those
who returned to work with a new employer. The reverse is true in the Danish
data: workplace-based measures are established in only 67 percent of the
cases where the sick-listed worker returned to work with the old employer,
compared to 85 percent among those who returned to work with a new em-
ployer (these differences do not change when corrections for other explana-
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Table 7.5 Workplace-based rehabilitation measures among long-term sick-listed private sec-
tor workers with low back pain diagnoses (as a percentage).
Denmark The Netherlands
Old New Old New
employer employer Total employer employer Total
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
Workplace adaptations 36* 23* 28 35*** 13*** 32
New job tasks 39*** 82*** 64 45ns 49ns 46
New working hours 36ns 48ns 43 67*** 34*** 62
At least one measure 67*** 85*** 78 81*** 64*** 79
Number of observations 60 85 145 268 47 315
Note: The analysis concerns respondents that report to be working 1 year (wave 2) and/or 2
years (wave 3) after the first day of work incapacity. Differences are tested in a χ2 -test:*:signifi-
cant at a 10 percent level of significance, **: significant at a 5 percent level, ***: significant at a 1
percent level,ns:not significant at a 10 percent level.
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tory variables are made, cf. Appendix B).
How can we explain the difference in the Danish data? As noted, work-
place-based measures are often costly for the original employer. Neverthe-
less, this is much less the case when a sick-listed worker returns to work with
a new employer. While workplace adaptations are of course costly also for a
new employer, new working hours and a change in job tasks will not nor-
mally be costly for a new employer because these changes do not represent
deviations from a pre-sick leave situation. That is, we may assume that em-
ployment contracts entered in the ordinary labour market express the pref-
erences of both jobseekers and employers. In other words, the ﬁnding may
reﬂect a ‘compensatory strategy’ of the sick-listed workers: when the need
for workplace-based measures cannot be meet with old employer, because
the sick-listed workers are dismissed, the need is accomplished through a job
change.
In other words, this suggests that Dutch and Danish disability policies dif-
fer in important respects. The differences in employers’ formal responsibili-
ty toward sick-listed workers seem to lead to different mechanisms both
with regard to return to work patterns and the supply of workplace-based
vocational rehabilitation. Dutch policy seems to facilitate return to work
with the old employer who is induced to establish workplace-based voca-
tional rehabilitation measures. In contrast, Danish policy leads to labour
market integration with a new employer, and because this involves a job
change it also often allows sick-listed workers to change their working con-
ditions. That is, workplace-based vocational rehabilitation measures are
apparently established without public involvement.8 The public responsi-
bility for labour market integration of work-disabled people seems to stop
at the factory gate: while it is a public responsibility to provide capacity-
building measures in terms of education that may help people to enter em-
ployment, it is left to market forces to establish workplace-based vocational
rehabilitation measures that may help workers to remain employed.
Income protection during sick leave
Crossnational differences in income protection during sick leave are the ﬁ-
nal issue that will be scrutinized in this chapter. A comparison of the Dutch
and the Danish legislation on income protection unveil that Danish workers
are entitled to a replacement rate of 100 percent up to a quite low ceiling,
whereas Dutch workers are guaranteed a replacement rate of 70 percent up
to a relatively high ceiling (cf. Chapter 6). We should therefore expect that
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workers with low incomes have higher replacement rates in Denmark than
in the Netherlands, and workers with medium to high incomes have lower
replacement rates in Denmark than in the Netherlands.
These differences, however, may be inﬂuenced by crossnational differ-
ences in the extent to which workers are entitled to full wage during sick
leave through either collective or internal company agreements. It is there-
fore the aim of this section to shed light on two questions: are Dutch work-
ers entitled to full wage payments during sick leave more often than Danish
workers? And do we ﬁnd the expected crossnational differences in net re-
placements rates among workers that only are entitled to sickness beneﬁt
during sick leave.
Entitlement to wages during sick leave
The net replacement rate is calculated as the post-tax (net) income during
sick leave (in terms of sickness beneﬁt or wage) divided by the net income be-
fore sick leave. Table 7.6 shows the percentage of workers entitled to sick-
ness beneﬁt and wage during sick leave, respectively.
Table 7.6 shows that sick-listed private sector workers in the Dutch data
are entitled to wages during sick leave much more often than private sector
workers in the Danish data. Only about one in three of the Danes are enti-
tled to wage during sick leave compared to almost nine out of ten of the
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Table 7.6 Entitlement to sickness benefit and wage,respectively,during sick leave among
long-term sick-listed workers with low back pain diagnoses (as a percentage).
Denmark The Netherlands Significance level
Private workers Private workers
(percent) (percent)
Entitled to wages 34 861 ***
Entitled to sickness benefit 66 142
Number of cases used 316 283
in calculations
Note:Crossnational differences are tested in a χ2-test:*:significant at a 10 percent level of sig-
nificance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not signifi-
cant at a 10 percent level.
1 The figure includes people who report to receive sickness benefit during sick leave having a
replacement rate above 0.95.
2 The figure does not include people who report to receive sickness benefit during sick leave
having a replacement rate above 0.95.
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Dutchmen. It therefore seems that Dutch workers in the private sector are
covered by collective agreements or company-based agreements giving them
entitlement to wage during sick leave much more often than their Danish
colleagues.
Entitlement to sickness benefit
Net replacement rates of sick-listed workers entitled to sickness beneﬁt dur-
ing sick leave are shown in Table 7.7. Replacement rates for low and high in-
come workers are also shown in order to clarify whether workers with low
123income protection during sick leave
Table 7.7 Average net replacement rates of long-term sick-listed workers with low back pain
diagnoses entitled to sickness benefit during sick leave (standard error).
Denmark The Netherlands
Private Number Private Number Significance
workers of cases workers of cases level
used in used in
calcu- calcu-
lations lations
Average net replacement rate 0.83 (0.012) 97 0.80 (0.037)2 18 NS
among sickness recipients 
with pre-wage income below 
the median1)
Average net replacement rate 0.62 (0.013) 77 0.79 (0.043)2 21 ***
among sickness recipients 
with pre-wage income above 
the median1)
Average net replacement rate 0.74 (0.012) 174 0.79 (0.028)2 39 *
among all sickness recipients
Note:Entitlement to sickness benefit comprises people with replacement rates below 95 per-
cent.The number of people entitled to sickness benefit during sick leave does not correspond
to the number of people mentioned in Table 7.6.because of missing values on replacement
rates.The significance level is calculated in a two-tailed T-test:*:significant at a 10 percent level
of significance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,NS:not sig-
nificant at a 10 percent level.
1 Includes sickness recipients who before the beginning of the sickness spell had a net wage
income below/above the median net pre-wage income among all sick-listed, i.e.among sick-
listed entitled to wage during sick leave and sick-listed entitled to sickness benefit.
2 The figure does include people who report to receive sickness benefit during sick leave and
have a replacement rate below 0.95.
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income have relatively good income protection in Denmark, and if workers
with high income have a relatively good income protection in the Nether-
lands.9
The ﬁgures only partly conﬁrm the expected crossnational differences. As
expected, Dutch workers with high pre-wages have higher replacement
rates than Danish workers. The average replacement rate for Dutch workers
with a high pre-wage income is 0.79 compared to only 0.62 among Danish
workers.
We would, however, also expect the average replacement rate of workers
with low pre-wages to be higher among Danish workers than among Dutch
workers. This is apparently not the case, i.e. the average replacement rate is
0.83 in the Danish data and 0.80 in the Dutch data. The low replacement
rates of Danish workers seem to reﬂect that a large proportion have pre-
earnings above the statuary ceiling and therefore have replacement rates
well below 100 percent. This is illustrated by the fact that the average net re-
placement rate is 0.92 among the very few (10) workers with a monthly net
pre-wage income up to dkk 6,000, which is below or near the ceiling. In
other words, it is likely that the Danish sickness beneﬁt scheme yields high
replacement rates for low wage workers, but only a few workers have such
low wage incomes that they enjoy a high replacement rate.
To sum up, this section has shown that Dutch workers through collective
agreements and company agreements seem to be entitled to wage during
sick leave much more frequently than Danish workers. As regards income
protection legislation, the data only allow for tentative conclusions and sug-
gest that high-income groups tend to have better income protection in the
Netherlands than in Denmark.
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the immediate consequences of some of the im-
portant differences between Dutch and Danish disability policies. Most of
our expectations have been supported by the data. Compared to the Danish
situation, the solid job-protection legislation in the Netherlands apparently
leads to fewer dismissals of sick-listed workers. I argue that this ﬁnding can
to a large extent be attributed to how the nations’ policies affect employers’
costs when workers are at risk of being marginalised from the labour mar-
ket. In the Netherlands employers’ costs are high because they cannot easily
get rid of sick-listed workers, and in recent years also because their responsi-
bility for the ﬁnancing of sickness and disability beneﬁts has increased. Con-
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sequently, it is much more attractive for Dutch than for Danish employers to
retain sick-listed workers, and to provide workplace-based vocational reha-
bilitation measures that can facilitate their continued employment.
This interpretation is supported by the data. We ﬁnd that sick-listed work-
ers in the Dutch data returned to work with the old employer much more of-
ten than the sick-listed workers in the Danish data. A similar difference ap-
pears when we look at workplace-based vocational rehabilitation measures
such as workplace adaptations, changes in working hours and new job
tasks. Among the Dutch respondents these measures are much more fre-
quently established when the sick-listed worker returns to work with the old
employer than is the case when return to work takes place with a new em-
ployer. The reverse is true among sick-listed workers in the Danish data.
These differences conﬁrm that Dutch and Danish disability policies rest
on very different principles. The Dutch regulation-based policy delegates
the responsibility for the labour market integration of disabled people to the
individual employer. In contrast, the limited use of regulation instruments
in Denmark makes labour market integration more a matter of unrestrained
labour market forces combined with public provision of capacity-building
measures aiming at an upgrading of work-disabled peoples’ resources.
Judging from the issues considered in this chapter, both policies can be
said to be effective, but in different respects. The Dutch policy is effective
because the regulations guiding employers’ obligations seem to work as in-
tended, that is, employers do not dismiss sick-listed workers and they often
provide workplace-based vocational rehabilitation measures that can facili-
tate continued employment. The Danish policy is effective in the sense that
it does not interfere with market mechanisms. The ﬁndings concerning
workplace-based vocational rehabilitation measures illustrate this. When
sick-listed workers return to work with a new employer, which is often the
case in Denmark, changes in working hours and job tasks do not inﬂict ad-
ditional costs upon the employer because these conditions have been agreed
upon in an employment contract. In contrast, when sick-listed workers re-
turn to work with their original employer, which is often the case in the
Netherlands, changes in working hours and job tasks do result in additional
costs for the employer because these conditions represent deviations from
the pre-sick leave labour contract.
In short, despite the fact that Dutch and Danish policies rest on very dif-
ferent principles, both of them seem to have positive consequences. Unfor-
tunately, as we will see in the next two chapters both policies also comprise
drawbacks that counteract the labour market integration of disabled peo-
ple.
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Appendix A
Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables used in the dismissal
analysis
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the dismissal analysis.Long-term sick-listed
private sector workers.Separate for the Dutch and the Danish data sets.
Denmark The Netherlands
Variable Mean (sd) Mean ( sd) Significance 
level1
Productivity
Age 39.67 (10.21) 39.91 (9.43) ns
Educational background:
Primary (yes=1) 0.07 (0.25) 0.14 (0.34) ***
Secondary (yes=1) 0.81 (0.39) 0.80 (0.40) ns
Tertiary (yes=1) 0.12 (0.33) 0.06 (0.24) ***
Number of weeks on sick leave the year 
prior to present sick leave 3.77 (7.91) 3.38 (6.95) ns
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 5.50 (2.35) 5.71 (2.19) ns
Seniority
Number of months in present job 71.16 (83.28) 119.26 (100.05) ***
Loyalty
Living with a spouse? (yes=1) 0.79 (0.41) 0.91 (0.28) ***
Living together with children? (yes=1) 0.50 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) ***
Sex:(female=1) 0.45 (0.50) 0.38 (0.48) **
Country of birth (not born in country=1) 0.10 (0.30) 0.03 (0.17) ***
Occupation in pre-sick leave job:
Manager,professional (yes=1) 0.13 (0.34) 0.20 (0.40) **
Sales,service (yes=1) 0.32 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) ns
Craft and plant work (yes=1) 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) ns
Elementary work (yes=1) 0.09 (0.28) 0.05 (0.23) *
Company vulnerability
Company branch:
Primary,secondary sector (yes=1) 0.44 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) ns
Trade (yes=1) 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) ns
Private Service (yes=1) 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) ns
Public,social,educ.sector (yes=1) 0.22 (0.42) 0.22 (0.42) ns
Company size:Number of workers 147.72 102.80 *
in company (422.39) (155.87)
Company size observed (missing=1) 0.04 (0.19) 0.06 (0.25) ns
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To limit the number of missing observations the logistic model in Table 7.3
includes two dummy variables indicating if company size and company his-
tory, respectively, are missing. Their coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant (with p
values of 0.448 and 0.889, respectively) and they are not displayed in Table
7.3.
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Dismissal tendency
Company history:(layoffs within the 0.22 (0.41) 0.14 (0.35) ***
last year before present sick leave=1) 
Company history observed (missing=1) 0.07 (0.26) 0.03 (0.16) ***
Number of cases 321 390
Note:All variables are measured at the first interview,wave 1.
1 The significance level is calculated in a two-tailed T-test:*:significant at a 10 percent level of
significance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not sig-
nificant at a 10 percent level.
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Appendix B
Logistic regression models of workplace-based vocational rehabilitation
measures.
(Insigniﬁcant) variables included in the analysis: age, educational attain-
ment, previous sick leave (number of weeks on sick leave the year prior to
present sick leave), living with a spouse, living together with children, sex,
physical job demands, and company history (layoffs within the year before
present sick leave).
To limit the number of missing observations the logistic model in table 1
includes a dummy variable indicating if company size is missing. The coefﬁ-
cient is insigniﬁcant (with a p value of 0.150) and it is not shown in Table 1.
The odds ratio of workplace adaptation (of respondents returning to work
with a new employer versus those returning to work with the old employer)
calculated from Table 7.5 is 0.28 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on
[0.11;0.66], and the odds ratio based on the coefﬁcient of the logistic model
in Table 1 is 0.28 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [0.11;0.71].
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Table 1 Reduced logistic regression model of workplace adaptation among Dutch long-term
sick-listed private sector workers with low back pain diagnoses who returned to work (n=301).
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Significance
level
Returned to work with new employer (yes=1) -1.288 0.484 ***
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.155 0.062 **
Number of months in present job -0.2561 0.1531 *
Occupation in pre-sick leave job2):
Sales,service (yes=1) -0.659 0.370 *
Craft and plant work (yes=1) -0.547 0.351 ns
Elementary work (yes=1) -0.309 0.620 ns
Company size:Number of workers in company 0.1581 0.0811 *
Constant 0.436 0.744 ns
Log likelihood -172.7
Note:The analysis concerns respondents that report to be working 1 year (wave 2) and/or 2
years (wave 3) after the first day of work incapacity.All explanatory variables are measured at
the first interview,wave 1.Significance levels:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,
**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10
percent level.The model has a p value of 0.480 in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
1 Figure multiplied by 100.
2 Reference category:manager,professional.
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(Insigniﬁcant) variables included in the analysis: age, educational attain-
ment, previous sick leave (number of weeks on sick leave the year prior to
present sick leave), seniority, occupation in pre-sick leave job, living with a
spouse, living together with children, sex, company size and company histo-
ry (layoffs within the year before present sick leave).
The odds ratio of new job tasks (of respondents returning to work with a
new employer versus those returning to work with the old employer) calcu-
lated from Table 7.5 is 1.17 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [0.63;2.17],
and the odds ratio based on the coefﬁcient of the logistic model in Table 2 is
1.08 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [0.56;2.08].
129appendix b
Table 2 Reduced logistic regression model of new job tasks among Dutch long-term sick-list-
ed private sector workers with low back pain diagnoses who returned to work (n=304).
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Significance
level
Returned to work with new employer (yes=1) 0.075 0.336 ns
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.111 0.055 **
Physical job demands,index 1 to 4 -0.322 0.189 *
(not demanding)
Constant -0.285 0.644 ns
Log likelihood -172.7
Note:The analysis concerns respondents that report to be working 1 year (wave 2) and/or 2
years (wave 3) after the first day of work incapacity.All explanatory variables are measured at
the first interview,wave 1.Significance levels:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,
**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10
percent level.The model has a p value of 0.598 in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
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(Insigniﬁcant) variables included in the analysis: educational attainment,
previous sick leave (number of weeks on sick leave the year prior to present
sick leave), pain intensity, seniority, living with a spouse, physical job de-
mands, company size and company history (layoffs within the year before
present sick leave).
The odds ratio of new working hours (of respondents returning to work
with a new employer versus those returning to work with the old employer)
calculated from Table 7.5 is 0.25 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on
[0.13;.0.49], and the odds ratio based on the coefﬁcient of the logistic model
in Table 3 is 0.18 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [0.08;0.37].
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Table 3 Reduced logistic regression model of working with new working hours among Dutch
long-term sick-listed private sector workers with low back pain diagnoses who returned to
work (n=310).
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Significance 
level
Returned to work with new employer (yes=1) -1.736 0.382 ***
Occupation in pre-sick leave job1)
Sales,service (yes=1) -0.500 0.395 ns
Craft and plant work (yes=1) -1.1 1 5 0.432 **
Elementary work (yes=1) -1.291 0.649 **
Age -0.036 0.015 **
Sex (female=1) -1.051 0.392 ***
Children 0.478 0.274 *
Constant 4.875 0.920 ***
Log likelihood -185.1
Note: The analysis concerns respondents that report to be working 1 year (wave 2) and/or 2
years (wave 3) after the first day of work incapacity. All explanatory variables are measured at
the first interview, wave 1. Significance levels: *: significant at a 10 percent level of significance,
**: significant at a 5 percent level, ***: significant at a 1 percent level,ns: not significant at a 10
percent level.The model has a p value of 0.476 in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
1 Reference category:manager,professional.
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Table 4 Reduced logistic regression model of workplace adaptation among Danish long-term
sick-listed private sector workers with low back pain diagnoses who returned to work (n=145).
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Significance
level
Returned to work with new employer (yes=1) -0.595 0.387 ns
Occupation in pre-sick leave job:1
Sales,service (yes=1) -0.930 0.533 *
Craft and plant work (yes=1) -1.221 0.473 *
Elementary work (yes=1) -1.310 0.885 ns
Constant 0.931 0.676 ns
Log likelihood -82.8
Note:The analysis concerns respondents that report to be working 1 year (wave 2) and/or 2
years (wave 3) after the first day of work incapacity.All explanatory variables are measured at
the first interview,wave 1.Significance levels:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,
**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10
percent level.The model has a p value of 0.071 in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
1 Reference category:manager,professional.
(Insigniﬁcant) variables included in the analysis: educational attainment,
previous sick leave (number of weeks on sick leave the year prior to present
sick leave), pain intensity, seniority, living with a spouse, living with a chil-
dren, age, sex, physical job demands, company size and company history
(layoffs within the year before present sick leave).
The odds ratio of workplace adaptation (of respondents returning to work
with a new employer versus those returning to work with the old employer)
calculated from Table 7.5 is 0.53 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on
[0.24;1.02], and the odds ratio based on the coefﬁcient of the logistic model
in Table 4 is 0.55 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [0.26;1.18].
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(Insigniﬁcant) variables included in the analysis: educational attainment,
previous sick leave (number of weeks on sick leave the year prior to present
sick leave), pain intensity, seniority, living with a spouse, living with a chil-
dren, age, sex, physical job demands, company size and company history
(layoffs within the year before present sick leave).
The odds ratio of new job tasks (of respondents returning to work with a
new employer versus those returning to work with the old employer) calcu-
lated from Table 7.5 is 7.13 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [3.79;18.21],
and the odds ratio based on the coefﬁcient of the logistic model is 12.02 with
a 95% conﬁdence interval on [4.80;30.14].
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Table 5 Reduced logistic regression model of new job tasks among Danish long-term sick-list-
ed private sector workers with low back pain diagnoses who returned to work (n=145).
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Significance
level
Returned to work with new employer (yes=1) 2.487 0.469 ***
Occupation in pre-sick leave job:1
Sales,service (yes=1) -0.224 0.609 ns
Craft and plant work (yes=1) 1.181 0.550 **
Elementary work (yes=1) -0.730 0.838 ns
Constant -3.468 0.783 ***
Log likelihood -71.2
Note:The analysis concerns respondents that report to be working 1 year (wave 2) and/or 2
years (wave 3) after the first day of work incapacity.All explanatory variables are measured at
the first interview,wave 1.Significance levels:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,
**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10
percent level.The model has a p value of 0.736 in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
1 Reference category:manager,professional.
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(Insigniﬁcant) variables included in the analysis: age, educational attain-
ment, previous sick leave (number of weeks on sick leave the year prior to
present sick leave), seniority, occupation in pre-sick leave job, living with a
spouse, living together with children, physical job demands, company size
and company history (layoffs within the year before present sick leave).
The odds ratio of new working hours (of respondents returning to work
with a new employer versus those returning to work with the old employer)
calculated from Table 7.5 is 1.64 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on
[1.16;4.62], and the odds ratio based on the coefﬁcient of the logistic model
in Table 6 is 2.42 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [1.18;5.00].
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Table 6 Reduced logistic regression model of working with new working hours among Danish
long-term sick-listed private sector workers with low back pain diagnoses who returned to
work (n=144).
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Significance
level
Returned to work with new employer (yes=1) 0.886 0.369 **
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.134 0.072 *
Sex (female=1) 0.730 0.366 **
Constant -2.600 0.728 ***
Log likelihood -91.5
Note:the analysis concerns respondents who report to be working 1 year (wave 2) and/or 2
years (wave 3) after the first day of work incapacity.All explanatory variables are measured at
the first interview,wave 1.Significance levels:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,
**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10
percent level.The model has a p value of 0.659 in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test.
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8 Different Policies – Different Outcomes
The Dutch and Danish policies differ with respect to the division of the re-
sponsibility for the integration of disabled people into the labour market. In
the Netherlands this responsibility mainly rests with the individual employ-
er, whereas in Denmark it is largely delegated to public authorities. This
chapter sheds light on some of the consequences that these differences have
for the extent to which disabled people are integrated into the labour mar-
ket.
The Dutch regulations make it costly for employers to marginalise sick-
listed workers and we should therefore expect that it will enhance the labour
market integration of disabled workers. The drawback, however, might be
that Dutch employers will be reluctant to employ people with health prob-
lems without prior labour market attachment because they may have an
above average risk of becoming long-term sick-listed, which in turn may in-
duce costs upon employers. Another drawback might be that the relatively
good income protection during sick leave that Dutch workers enjoy might
give them economic incentives to enter and stay on the disability pathway.
Whereas the Danish policy may not suffer from the same drawbacks as
the Dutch policy, it is likely that it encounters other problems. The compre-
hensive public responsibility in terms of vocational rehabilitation is sup-
posed to help work-disabled people to work. But it is an open-ended ques-
tion if vocational rehabilitation can offset the negative consequences that
may stem from the widespread dismissal of sick-listed workers. In spite of
vocational rehabilitation, it is possible that these people will be unable to
ﬁnd ordinary employment because of their health problems.
To address these questions, I use the theoretical framework set out in
Chapter 3 to identify factors that affect the return to work of long-term
sick-listed workers. Within this analytical model it is then possible to disen-
tangle some of the effects that the unique characteristics of the Dutch and
Danish disability policies have for the labour market integration of work-
disabled people. That is, do dismissals counteract the reintegration of long-
term sick-listed workers? Does an extensive income protection reduce rein-
135
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tegration? Does vocational rehabilitation in terms of education help the
sick-listed back to work? And equally important: do the high employer costs
in the Netherlands reduce the labour market integration of partially work-
disabled people without prior labour market attachment?
The return to work of long-term sick-listed workers
I have used the framework from Chapter 3 to select variables to be included
in the analysis of factors affecting the return to work of sick-listed workers.
To recap, three major different groups of factors can be expected to affect
the future labour market status of a work-disabled person:
– The disabled individual’s characteristics
– Employment conditions 
– Exit conditions
Each sick-listed individual possesses resources that inﬂuence the possibility
of returning to work. These resources concern health and other personal
and occupational skills such as educational background. In addition to
these resources, the sick-listed worker may ﬁnd their situation as work-dis-
abled to be associated with social and psychological costs, which will inﬂu-
ence their inclination to work: when costs are high the inclination to work is
strong. During sick leave individual health resources may be affected by
medical treatments, whereas other individual resources may be strength-
ened through participation in capacity-building instruments such as voca-
tional rehabilitation.
Independent of individual characteristics, structural conditions in terms
of employment and exit conditions may facilitate or limit the possibility of
resuming work. Employment conditions concern conditions that affect the
possibility of returning to work with the old employer, employment possi-
bilities in the ordinary labour market, and employment in special jobs for
disabled people. Exit conditions concern the sick-listed worker’s access to ﬁ-
nancial resources that make it possible to stay outside the labour market,
e.g. on sickness beneﬁt or ﬁnancial support from family members.
In the empirical analysis, sick-listed workers’ individual characteristics
are measured using eight variables.1 Individual health resources are mea-
sured, as self-perceived pain intensity and whether or not the sick-listed
worker in addition to low back pain suffers from other diseases. Other re-
sources are measured in terms of educational attainment, seniority and oc-
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cupation, which may indicate skills that the sick-listed worker possesses,
e.g. a professional worker is supposed to possess more job related skills than
a manual worker.2 Social and psychological costs of work disability are
measured as the sick-listed worker’s perception of the support that he or she
received from colleagues and superiors prior to becoming sick. When job
support is comprehensive, the costs of being out of work are expected to be
high and so are the chances of resuming work. In addition to these individ-
ual characteristics, sex and age are also included.
Employment conditions with the original employer are measured using
two variables: physical job demands and dismissal. Because of low back
problems, sick-listed workers in physically demanding jobs are supposed to
have a relatively low chance of returning to work. We can also assume that
workers who are dismissed during sick leave have a very limited chance of
returning to work because dismissal indicates that the possibility of return-
ing to work with the original employer is limited. Employment conditions in
the ordinary labour market are measured as the ratio between the number
of years employed since the age of 20 and the worker’s age. This variable ex-
presses the individual’s labour market history and ‘success and failure’ in
the labour market and therefore presumably also future employment possi-
bilities (see Jensen, 1997). Clearly, it would have been better to also include
a variable that captures the demand for labour such as the local unemploy-
ment rate. Due to the lack of data, it is not possible to include such a variable
in the crossnational analysis, but its importance will be addressed in a sepa-
rate analysis based on the Danish data.
Exit conditions are measured using two variables, one measuring the pos-
sibilities for labour market exit through the family, another measuring exit
conditions related to the social security system. The family variable mea-
sures the income of other family members relatively to the sick-listed work-
er’s wage income prior to becoming sick. The social security variable mea-
sures the income that the sick-listed worker received during sick leave divid-
ed by the wage income prior to becoming sick. The disability beneﬁt scheme
is another important potential exit pathway that work-disabled people may
use. How the disability beneﬁt award policy of local authorities affect the
return to work of long-term sick-listed workers is analysed separately using
the Danish data.
The importance of the dismissal and replacement rate 
The empirical analysis of factors inﬂuencing the return to work of long-
term sick-listed workers is based on a panel of about 700 Dutch and Danish
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private sector workers who were long-term sick-listed with low back prob-
lems (see Chapter 7 for a description of the data).
Before considering the estimated results of a complete model of returning
to work, it might be fruitful to look at the association between dismissal and
return to work (see Table 8.1).
From the table we can see that the percentage of long-term sick-listed
workers returning to work is much higher in the Dutch cohort, 85 percent,
than in the Danish cohort, 59 percent. We can also see that dismissal in both
data sets seems to have a strong effect on the chance of returning to work:
sick-listed workers who are not dismissed return to work much more often
than those who are dismissed. Knowing that the frequency of dismissals is
about 50 percent in the Danish data and only 10 percent in Dutch data, the
crossnational differences in job protection legislation seems to be an impor-
tant explanation for the high return to work rate in the Dutch cohort.
It is important, however, to remember that dismissals occur in the course
of the sick leave, and, therefore, factors may exist that both affect the risk of
being dismissed and the chance of returning to work. For instance, if poorly
educated workers are often dismissed during sick leave and often do not re-
turn to work because they lack educational skills, it is not the fact that they
are dismissed that prevents them from returning to work but the lack of edu-
cational resources. To isolate the effect of dismissal, we need to take account
of such common factors. When observed common factors are taken into
consideration, the effect of dismissal remains to be strong and signiﬁcant
(Høgelund, 2002, and Table 2 in appendix C). 
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Table 8.1 Return to work among long-term sick-listed private sector workers with low back
pain diagnoses.Separate for workers who are (not) dismissed during sick leave (as a percent-
age).
Denmark The Netherlands
Not Dismissed Total Not Dismissed Total
dismissed (percent) dismissed (percent)
(percent) (percent)
Returned to work 75*** 41*** 59 91*** 26*** 85
Number of cases used 164 155 319 356 34 390
in calculations
Note:Dismissed people include people who were dismissed before first return to work.For 70
people,calculations are based only on the first year of the observation period.
The significance level is calculated in a χ2 –test:*:significant at a 10 percent level of signifi-
cance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at
a 10 percent level.
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The common causes of dismissal and return to work may also be un-
known to us. For example, if we do not measure the sick-listed worker’s mo-
tivation to work, it is possible that low work motivation prevents them from
returning to work, rather than the fact that they are dismissed. One way of
dealing with this problem is to make a two-step estimation, ﬁrst estimating
the probability of dismissal and then using these estimates when estimating
the probability of returning to work (e.g. Greene, 2000). The results of such
estimation are presented in Table 8.2 The ﬁndings suggest that in the Dutch
cohort dismissal signiﬁcantly prolongs the time off work, i.e. the median
time to return to work for a dismissed person is estimated to be 91⁄2 times
longer than for a person who has not been dismissed. In contrast, the effect
of dismissal is insigniﬁcant in the Danish data.3 This seems to indicate that
the Danish long-term sick-listed workers possess characteristics that in-
crease the chance of dismissal and at the same time reduce the chance of re-
turning to work.
It may appear as a paradox that dismissal has a positive effect on the likeli-
hood of returning to work in the Dutch data but not in the Danish data. It
does, however, make sense in the light of the crossnational differences in the
institutional setup. The strict Dutch job-protection legislation makes it dif-
ﬁcult for employers to get rid of sick-listed workers. As a consequence em-
ployers who cannot lay off sick-listed workers have strong incentives to fa-
cilitate their return to work, even though the work capacity of these work-
ers may be considerably reduced. This is because the alternative is even more
costly. It is costly to keep a vacant job available in case the sick-listed worker
should return to work, and since 1996 and 1998 it has become even more
costly as employers are obliged to ﬁnance sickness and disability beneﬁts.
At the same time this explanation indicates why the chance of returning to
work is low when the sick-listed worker is dismissed. These people are
forced to ﬁnd work with a new employer who will be reluctant to offer them
a job because their extensive sick leave record indicates that they have a po-
tentially high future risk of disability. In other words, the effect of dismissal
may reﬂect that the Dutch disability policy tends to create an insider/out-
sider divide between work-disabled people with and without attachment to
an employer.
That the Dutch policy causes employment problems for work-disabled
outsiders is also supported by other pieces of evidence. After the ﬁnancial
reforms of the sickness beneﬁt scheme, Dutch employers have apparently
employed strategies other than reintegration to reduce the ﬁnancial costs as-
sociated with work disability. Thus, it has been observed that employers in-
creasingly employ workers on temporary contracts, meaning that the oblig-
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Table 8.2 Log-logistic survival analysis of time to first returning to work of long-term sick-list-
ed private sector workers with unobserved heterogeneity.Separate for the Dutch and the Dan-
ish data sets.
Denmark The Netherlands
Variable Coefficient (se) Coefficient (se)
Individual resources,health
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.220 (0.068)*** 0.068 (0.028)**
Chronic disease,not including 0.452 (0.250)* -0.365 (0.188)*
back condition (yes=1)
Individual resources,skills
Educational background:1
Secondary (yes=1) -1.126 (0.462)**
Tertiary (yes=1) -1.066 (0.689)ns
Seniority:number of months in present job2 -0.084 (0.063)ns
Occupation in pre-sick leave job:3
Sales,service (yes=1) 0.669 (0.268)** -0.002 (0.139)ns
Craft and plant work (yes=1) 0.528 (0.272)* -0.340 (0.141)**
Elementary work (yes=1) 0.506 (0.372)ns -0.134 (0.211)ns
Individual psychological and social costs of disability
Job support, index 1 to 4 (much) -0.264 (0.122)** -0.492 (0.174)***
Other individual characteristics
Sex:(female=1) -0.409 (0.145)***
Age 0.016 (0.009)* 0.017 (0.006)***
Employment conditions,old employer
Risk of dismissal, 0.743 (1.370)ns 2.248 (0.784)***
between 0 and 1 (high risk)4
Physical job demands, -0.137 (0.106)ns -0.299 (0.081)***
index 1 to 4 (low demands)
Employment conditions,ordinary labour market
Number of years employed -1.097 (0.439)** -0.465 (0.250)*
since the age of 20 divided by age
Exit conditions
Replacement rate -0.248 (0.417)ns -0.025 (0.292)ns
Replacement rate observed? (missing=1) -0.352 (0.732)ns -0.136 (0.308)ns
Income from other household members -0.235 (0.135)* -0.011 (0.030)ns
divided by the sick-listed person’s pre-sick 
leave wage2
Income from other household members -0.370 (0.270)ns 0.133 (0.132)ns
observed? (missing=1)
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ation to reintegrate workers on sick leave and pay their sickness beneﬁts
ends when the employment contract expires (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbu-
reau, 1997). Similarly, employers have also applied health tests to jobseekers
to avoid employing people with a high risk of falling ill (ibid.). To counteract
this, the Dutch government enacted a law in 1998 that forbids employers to
use health examinations and to ask jobseekers questions about their health
and past sick leave record unless the job involves special ﬁtness demands.
Despite this regulation, employers continue to use health examinations and
questions about health status when they recruit new personal (Oorschot
and Boos, 2000). Finally, it has been noted that the employment chances of
disability beneﬁciaries has decreased signiﬁcantly since the privatisation of
the sickness beneﬁt scheme. The number of disability beneﬁts terminated
because the recipients started to work relatively to the stock of disability
beneﬁciaries has decreased from 6.1 percent before privatisation (1995) to
approximately 3.5 percent afterwards (1996-1997) (Sociaal en Cultureel
Planbureau, 2000, referred from Oorschot, 2001).
The above analysis also indicates that the Danish policy does not suffer
from insider-outsider problems. The lax job-protection legislation in com-
bination with limited employer responsibility means that the reintegration
of long-term sick-listed workers to a large extent takes place based on mar-
ket conditions. That is, the old employer will only retain sick-listed workers
and promote their reintegration if it is economically worthwhile compared
to the option of employing a new and healthy worker. Similarly, a new em-
ployer will only recruit a disabled person if it seems proﬁtable. In other
words, the integration of disabled people entirely depends on their working
potential.
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Constant 3.535 (1.186)*** 2.486 (0.762)***
Gamma 0.574 (0.068) 0.373 (0.029)
Unobserved heterogeneity with a 0.549 (0.308)** 0.712 (0.146)***
Gamma distribution
Log likelihood -365.9 -451.2
Number of cases 302 348
Note:All variables are measured at the first interview,wave 1,except "replacement rate" and
"income from other household members",which are measured at waves 1 and 2.The signifi-
cance levels:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,
***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10 percent level.
1 Reference category:primary education
2 Figure multiplied by 100.
3 Reference category:manager,professional.
4 Estimated risk of dismissal,cf.Appendix D.
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We can conclude that the institutional structures of the Dutch policy seem
to increase the return to work of long-term sick-listed workers: employers
refrain from dismissing workers on sick leave which in turn increases their
reintegration. The downside of the Dutch policy is related to the fact that
employers have to bear the majority of the costs of the policy. They have to
pay either for the reintegration that may follow from employing a person
with permanently reduced productivity, or for the costs associated with the
dismissal of the sick-listed workers. The major drawback of the Danish poli-
cy appears to be a limited reintegration of workers with health problems
caused by a policy that only provides employers with limited incentives to
retain these workers. However, this may have the advantage that it facili-
tates an efﬁcient job match because employers are not stuck with workers
that do not ﬁt the employer’s demands for manpower. In other words, the
Danish policy does not seem to make the labour market entry of work-dis-
abled people outside the labour market extraordinarily difﬁcult.
Finally, the analysis does not support the fact that the workers’ income
compensation during sick leave affects whether or not they return to work.
As shown in Table 8.2, the replacement rate is very insigniﬁcant, with a p
value of 0.552 in the Danish model and 0.932 in the Dutch model. Also,
there is no indication that the effect of replacement rate differs between
groups of sick-listed workers, e.g. that the replacement rate has a positive ef-
fect for old people and a negative effect for young people. To test for the ex-
istence of such effects, the interactions between the replacement rate and
each of the other explanatory variables in Table 8.2 have been tested, but no
interactions were signiﬁcant, either in the Danish or the Dutch model. It is
of course possible that the replacement rate affects the return to work of
workers sick-listed for shorter periods than those that are under study here.
But as suggested in the literature review the evidence on this issue is mixed
(see Chapter 2).
The importance of capacity-building measures
Capacity-building measures in terms of vocational rehabilitation are an im-
portant element in the Danish disability policy (eim, 2002). The increased
emphasis on active measures in the 1990s was at least partly seen as a strate-
gy that could increase the labour market integration of people with health
problems without damaging their social rights. That is, a publicly provided
supply of capacity-building measures should compensate for a stricter dis-
ability beneﬁt award policy (see Chapter 6). Phrased in the context of the
present analysis, the question is: does vocational rehabilitation help long-
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term sick-listed workers back to work? To shed light on this question, it is
analysed whether participation in general education or vocational educa-
tion increases the probability of returning to work in the Danish data. As in
the estimation of the effect of dismissal, I have used a two-step procedure:
the probability of participation in educational activities is estimated and
then entered into the return-to-work model in Table 8.2 (see Appendix E for
the results of the estimates of participation in education).
The fact that 20 percent of the long-term sick-listed workers participated
in education during sick leave conﬁrms that capacity-building measures are
an integrated element in the Danish policy. Nevertheless, this does not seem
to help the sick-listed back to work. The variable for participation in educa-
tion is insigniﬁcant, although the p value of 0.141 and the negative coefﬁ-
cient of the variable suggest that education may tend to shorten the duration
of the absence from work. It could be argued that the lack of an effect is
caused by a too-short observation period: at the time when the observation
period ends many participants are still under education, and because job
search activities decrease during participation in education, the positive ef-
fect of having completed an education is not sufﬁciently captured in the
analysis. However, this seems not to be the case. A followup study of the
Danish cohort, where the long-term sick-listed workers were interviewed 5
years after their ﬁrst day of work incapacity, does neither ﬁnd an effect of
participation in education (Høgelund and Holm, 2002). Another objection
concerns the lumping together of general and vocational education into one
variable. As general education, in contrast to vocational education, does
not qualify for a speciﬁc job type, it is possible that a positive effect of voca-
tional education is mixed up with a negative effect of general education.
Once again, this seems not to be the case. When vocational education alone
is entered into the model shown in Table 8.2, it also becomes insigniﬁcant
(with a p value of 0.295).4
In other words, the Danish capacity-building strategy does not appear to
be an effective instrument for integrating work-disabled people in the
labour market. This suggests that the exchange of narrower eligibility crite-
ria for disability beneﬁts for the right to participate in capacity-building
measures that took place during the 1990s in fact resulted in some loss of so-
cial rights for the long-term sick-listed workers. 
The importance of other variables
The model in Table 8.2 to a large extent supports the theoretical proposi-
tions in Chapter 3. The analysis strongly supports the importance of the
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sick-listed workers’ resources in terms of health (cf. the importance of pain
intensity, and in the Danish model the presence of a chronic disease) and
skills (cf. the importance of occupation and also in the Danish model of edu-
cation). The high return to work rate among people with a great deal of job
support further suggests that the individual perception of the social and
psychological costs of work disability is important. That is, we may assume
that workers receiving job support ﬁnd it harder to be without work and
therefore also more attractive to resume work than those who do not receive
much support.
As argued above the Dutch disability policy remains largely the responsi-
bility of the old employer, whereas labour market integration in Denmark is
delegated to take place in the ordinary labour market, i.e. with a new em-
ployer. This conclusion, which is based on crossnational differences in the
importance of dismissal, gains further support when we look at the effects
of the other variables under consideration. While high physical job demands
signiﬁcantly reduce the chance of returning to work in the Dutch data, job
demands do not matter in the Danish model. Similarly, the proxy for em-
ployment conditions in the ordinary labour market, the number of years em-
ployed divided by age, has a larger magnitude and is more signiﬁcant in the
Danish data than in the Dutch data. In other words, when institutional con-
ditions make reintegration a matter of returning to work with the original
employer, conditions related to the old job become crucial. Likewise, when
you are forced to ﬁnd a new job in the ordinary labour market, conditions
related to this sphere are most inﬂuential for the chance of returning to
work. 
As noted the proxy for employment opportunities at the ordinary labour
market is an indirect measure. To include a more direct measure the develop-
ment in the local unemployment rate has been included in the Danish mod-
el.5 It does not, however, give further support to the importance of external
employment conditions, i.e. the variable has a p value of 0.134, and, sur-
prisingly, there is a tendency that the probability of returning to work in-
creases when the unemployment rate increases. Other studies have found
mixed evidence about the importance of unemployment (see Chapter 2).
Thus, the absence of an effect could reﬂect that unemployment conditions
do not affect labour market integration at all, that it only has an effect early
in the sickness spell or that unemployment conditions are difﬁcult to mea-
sure.6
Apparently the analysis does not support the theory that good exit condi-
tions hamper reintegration. As noted, the replacement rate is insigniﬁcant
in both the Danish and the Dutch data. In addition, there is no support for
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the inﬂuence of exit conditions through family support. In contrast to what
could be expected, sick-listed workers in the Danish data with high-income
family members have a high probability of returning to work.7
The absence of a good measure of the possibilities of exiting the labour
market through the disability pathway is clearly a weakness. In the Danish
model, I therefore include an indicator of the exit policy of the 24 municipal-
ities that are included in the Danish data. It measures the extent to which the
municipality’s annual number of awarded disability beneﬁts in 1996 and
1997 is above or below the national average. As the municipality is responsi-
ble for the administration of all cases of sickness beneﬁt, social assistance
and disability beneﬁt, and of the establishment of vocational rehabilitation
measures, this indicator is supposed to reﬂect the municipalities’ exit policy.
In other words, how do municipalities choose the administrative approach
to sick-listed workers? Do they use a passive exit policy rather than an active
integration policy? We would expect that the probability of returning to
work is low when the municipality has an above-average number of beneﬁt
awards, and vice versa.8 The analysis supports this conclusion. Sick-listed
workers from municipalities with many disability beneﬁt awards have a
lower probability of returning to work than sick-listed workers from munic-
ipalities with few awards (p value 0.071). In other words, it seems that exit
conditions in terms of access to the disability beneﬁt scheme do matter.
It is likely that this effect is even more pronounced today. In 1996 and
1997, when the data used in the present study was gathered, municipalities
were only responsible for the preparation of applications for disability bene-
ﬁts, whereas 15 regional state committees took the decisions about beneﬁt
awards. Although municipalities could inﬂuence disability beneﬁt awards
through the preparation of applications, the administrative structures may
have dampened the consequences that differences between municipal poli-
cies have. Since 1999 municipalities have had full competence to award dis-
ability beneﬁts, meaning that they have obtained greater discretion to effect
their own award policy, be it a lenient or a harsh policy.
Dutch and Danish disability policies: a question of different rights?
The analysis suggests that the Dutch policy is more effective in reintegrating
long-term sick-listed workers than the Danish policy. In Denmark the com-
bination of the limited responsibility of employers and public responsibility
for the provision of reintegration measures does not promote the labour
market reintegration of long-term sick-listed workers. The limited employer
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responsibility leads to many dismissals and thus to a marginalization of
sick-listed workers who despite public reintegration efforts often remain
without work. The Danish policy is nevertheless efﬁcient in the sense that
employers only have to bear a minor part of the costs of reintegration, facili-
tating a ﬂexible labour market.
The comprehensive responsibility of Dutch employers seems to facilitate
reintegration because regulations give employers strong incentives to retain
sick-listed workers. It does not, however, take place without cost. The policy
seems to make it more difﬁcult for disabled people without attachment to an
employer to enter the labour market. This creates increasing insider/out-
sider problems that reduce labour market ﬂexibility. 
Furthermore, while the Dutch policy seems effective in returning the long-
term sick-listed to work, it seems ineffective in preventing people from be-
coming long-term sick-listed in the ﬁrst place. It has been estimated that in
1994 the Netherlands had 2.5 times more people who were sick-listed for 3
months or more than Denmark, 1.5 times more than Sweden, and 1.75
times more than Germany (Cuelenaere et al., 1999). That is, the effective-
ness of the Dutch policy in reintegrating long-term sick-listed workers may
be more than offset by the high ‘production’ of long-term sick-listed work-
ers. Or put differently, the Danish policy appears efﬁcient because it pre-
vents people from becoming long-term sick-listed.
It has been suggested that this crossnational difference could be related to
differences in job protection during sick leave (Cuelenaere et al., 1999;
Veerman and Palmer, 2001; Høgelund, 2002). In Denmark a high risk of
dismissal may force sick-listed workers to make an early decision about
whether to attempt to return to work, whereas the extensive job protection
in the Netherlands may prolong this decision. According to the micro-socio-
logical perspective on work disability, a delayed decision will reduce the
chance of a successful return to work because the sick-listed worker be-
comes more and more adapted to the role as work-disabled as the spell of
sickness progresses. As a consequence the social and psychological costs of
disability will decrease and so will the inclination to resume work.
This interpretation is supported by a study suggesting that Dutch and
Danish workers may have very different perceptions of work and work dis-
ability (Hohnen, 2002). The study, which is based on in-depth interviews,
compares Danish workers in wage-subsidy jobs for people with permanent-
ly reduced work capacity and Dutch people receiving a partial disability
beneﬁt while working in a wage-subsidised job. Hohnen ﬁnds that the
Dutch workers to a large extent takes it for granted that they can return to
work with their old employer after a relatively long period of work disabili-
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ty, whereas the Danish workers consider their job more as a gift they should
be grateful for. In other words, there seems to be a marked difference in
what Dutch and Danish workers perceive as their well-earned rights. This
may indicate that in the Netherlands work disability is not supposed to have
signiﬁcant consequences for the right to work, whereas in Denmark this
right is conditional upon the individual’s health. Following this line of argu-
mentation, it may be more socially legal both to report sick from work and
to perceive oneself as work-disabled and thus to remain off work for longer
time in the Netherlands than in Denmark.
In other words, the issue of job-protection legislation may not merely be a
question of return-to-work incentives that are present at certain stages dur-
ing sick leave, e.g. after 120 days of sick leave in Denmark, but also a ques-
tion of culturally different notions about work disability and the right to
work. Notions about work and work disability may of course be related to
the long-standing differences in job-protection legislation during sick leave,
but they may also be caused by other circumstances such as differences in
social security schemes. Thus, in contrast to Danish workers, Dutch work-
ers until recently directly contributed to the ﬁnancing of the sickness and
disability beneﬁt schemes with payments depending on their wage. This
may in turn mean that Dutch workers more than Danish workers feel they
have the right to be work-disabled for shorter or longer periods.
Conclusion
What does the analysis of Dutch and Danish policies toward disabled people
tells us? In a theoretical context, it suggests that the importance of various
factors for the integration of work-disabled people depends on the institu-
tional context within which they operate. It is our knowledge of the institu-
tional differences between the Dutch and Danish disability policies that en-
able us to interpret why the observed effect of dismissal differs between the
Dutch and Danish data sets. It hereby follows that any analysis must take
account of factors at both the micro- and macro-levels. In a similar vein,
support is also given to a multidisciplinary research approach. If we wish to
enhance our understanding of the mechanisms that determine whether
work-disabled people are integrated into the labour market, it seems insufﬁ-
cient to focus merely on factors related to one or two theoretical disciplines.
The analysis also demonstrates that the institutional differences between
the Dutch and Danish disability policies have important consequences for
policy outcomes. The Dutch emphasis on employers’ responsibility creates
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strong ties between employers and sick-listed workers. These ties have posi-
tive effects in terms of the reintegration of long-term sick-listed workers.
The drawback appears to be that the policy promotes insider-outsider prob-
lems so people with health problems without attachment to an employer en-
counter difﬁculties in entering the labour market. Furthermore, it seems
likely that the Dutch policy counteracts the reintegration of short-term sick-
listed workers, such that more people are becoming long-term sick-listed.
The Danish policy seems to suffer neither from the problems of returning
the short-term sick-listed to work nor from insider-outsider problems. In-
stead the most important drawback of the Danish policy seems to be that
many long-term sick-listed workers with poor employment prospects are
dismissed, and that they – despite extensive public integration efforts – of-
ten do not return to work.
It has been argued that one of the most crucial characteristics of the Dutch
reforms during the 1990s has been the introduction of ‘managed liberalisa-
tion’ (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; van der Veen and Trommel, 1999). The
regulated privatisation of the sickness beneﬁt scheme, the obligation of em-
ployers to hire privately owned health service companies (Arbodienst) and
the possibility of employers insuring disability risks with private insurance
companies are examples that clearly justify this classiﬁcation. This could
suggest that the integration of disabled people in the Netherlands depends
much more on market mechanisms than in Denmark where the integration
mainly is a public responsibility. However, the present analysis suggests that
the reverse is true. The limited responsibility of Danish employers both in
terms of ﬁnancial obligations and how easily they can dismiss sick-listed
workers combined with a public system that promotes integration through
capacity-building instruments, wage subsidies and persuasion policies
makes the integration of work-disabled people take place under market con-
ditions. In contrast, the analysis suggests that the institutional conditions in
the Netherlands, especially the delegation of responsibilities to employers,
are decisive for the integration of work-disabled people. This may indicate
that the ‘management’ element in the Dutch disability policy is more impor-
tant for integration outcomes than the ‘liberal’ element.
In the discussion of the consequences following welfare state reforms, the
privatisation of the Dutch sickness beneﬁt scheme has been mentioned as an
example of a fundamental change in the institutional rules that have hardly
any effect in terms of the outcome (van Kersbergen, 2000). It is argued that
the privatisation has not signiﬁcantly changed the right to social protection.
This seems correct when outcomes are measured in terms of income protec-
tion during sick leave. In spite of this, the present analysis suggests that the
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change of institutional structures may inﬂuence the labour market attach-
ment and thus the welfare of work-disabled people. Consequently, whether
the Dutch reforms have had any effects in terms of outcomes may depend on
the choice of how the outcome is measured.
In a similar vein, when policy reforms result in a new division of the eco-
nomic responsibilities for social protection, the present analysis indicates
that this will affect insiders as well as outsiders. Methodologically speaking,
it may be fruitful, therefore, to consider not only the negative effects that the
Dutch disability reforms have had for the integration of outsiders (see
Oorschot, 2001), but also possible positive effects on the retention of insid-
ers, i.e. the sick-listed workers.
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Appendix C
Descriptive statistics for variables used in models of the time to returning
to work
150 different policies – different outcomes
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the dependent and the explanatory variables used in the log-
logistic survival analysis of the time to first returning to work.Long-term sick-listed private
sector workers.Separate for the Dutch and the Danish data sets.
Denmark The Netherlands
Variable Mean (sd) Mean (sd) Significance
level1
Individual resources,health
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 5.50 (2.35) 5.71 (2.19) ns
Chronic disease, 0.12 (0.33) 0.06 (0.24) ***
not including back condition (yes=1)
Individual resources,skills
Educational background:
Primary (yes=1) 0.07 (0.25) 0.14 (0.34) ***
Secondary (yes=1) 0.81 (0.39) 0.80 (0.40) ns
Tertiary (yes=1) 0.12 (0.33) 0.06 (0.24) ***
Seniority:number of months 70.54 (83.07) 119.46 (99.90) ***
in present job
Occupation in pre-sick leave job:
Manager,professional (yes=1) 0.13 (0.34) 0.20 (0.40) **
Sales,service (yes=1) 0.32 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) ns
Craft and plant work (yes=1) 0.45 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) ns
Elementary work (yes=1) 0.09 (0.28) 0.05 (0.23) *
Individual psychological and social costs of disability
Job support, index 1 to 4 (much) 3.36 (0.65) 3.30 (0.33) *
Other individual characteristics
Sex:(female=1) 0.45 (0.50) 0.38 (0.48) **
Age 39.67 (10.21) 39.91 (9.43) ns
Employment conditions,old employer
Risk of dismissal, 0.49 (0.15) 0.09 (0.10) ***
between 0 and 1 (high risk)2
Physical job demands, 1.90 (0.76) 1.68 (0.64) ***
index 1 to 4 (low demands)
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Employment conditions,ordinary labour market
Number of years employed since 0.76 (0.22) 0.77 (0.22) ns
the age of 20 divided by age
Exit conditions
Replacement rate 0.78 (0.23) 0.77 (0.39) ns
Replacement rate observed? (missing=1) 0.02 (0.16) 0.18 (0.36) ***
Income from other household members 58.21 (57.57) 143.73 (235.59) ***
divided with the sick-listed person’s 
pre-sick leave wage
Income from other household members 0.13 (0.34) 0.34 (0.48) ***
observed? (missing=1)
Returned to work? (yes=1) 0.59 (0.49) 0.09 (0.28) ***
Time to returning to work 7.45 (6.05) 4.11 (3.69) ***
Number of cases 321 390
Note:All variables are measured at the first interview,wave 1,except "replacement rate" and
"income from other household members",which are measured at waves 1 and 2.
1 The significance level is calculated in a two-tailed T-test:*:significant at a 10 percent level of
significance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not sig-
nificant at a 10 percent level.
2 See Appendix D.
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Table 2 Log-logistic survival analysis of the time to first returning to work without unob-
served heterogeneity.Long-term sick-listed private sector workers.Separate for the Dutch and
the Danish data sets.
Denmark The Netherlands
Variable Coefficient (se) Coefficient (se)
Individual resources,health
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.189 (0.031)*** 0.116 (0.022)***
Chronic disease, 0.297 (0.233)ns -0.338 (0.197)*
not including back condition (yes=1)
Individual resources,skills
Educational background:1
Secondary (yes=1) -0.977 (0.418)** -0.142 (0.156) ns
Tertiary (yes=1) -1.029 (0.469)** -0.313 (0.261)ns
Seniority:number of months in pres-ent job2 0.010 (0.097) ns 0.095 (0.061) ns
Occupation in pre-sick leave job:3
Sales,service (yes=1) 0.389 (0.230)* 0.019 (0.154) ns
Craft and plant work (yes=1) 0.340 (0.239)* -0.342 (0.158)**
Elementary work (yes=1) 0.502 (0.326) ns -0.130 (0.238) ns
Individual psychological and social costs of disability
Job support, index 1 to 4 (much) 0.008 (0.116) ns -0.503 (0.166)***
Other individual characteristics
Sex:(female=1) 0.107 (0.174) ns -0.200 (0.149) ns
Age 0.022 (0.008)*** 0.019 (0.006)***
Employment conditions,old employer
Dismissal (yes=1) 1.206 (0.154)*** 2.284 (0.265)***
Physical job demands, -0.203 (0.096)** -0.249 (0.082)***
index 1 to 4 (low demands)
Employment conditions,ordinary labour market
Number of years employed -1.070 (0.383)*** -0.444 (0.262)*
since the age of 20 divided by age
Exit conditions
Replacement rate -0.569 (0.398) ns -0.023 (0.281) ns
Replacement rate observed? (missing=1) -0.774 (0.658) ns -0.034 (0.296) ns
Income from other household members -0.290 (0.132)** 0.039 (0.030) ns
divided with the sick-listed person’s 
pre-sick leave wage2
Income from other household members -0.115 (0.251) ns 0.073 (0.134) ns
observed? (missing=1)
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Constant 2.733 (0.903)*** 2.469 (0.775)***
Gamma 0.614 (0.039) 0.495 (0.024)
Log likelihood -338.8 -419.5
Number of cases 302 354
Note:All variables are measured at the first interview,wave 1,except "replacement rate" and
"income from other household members",which are measured at waves 1 and 2.The log-logis-
tic accelerated failure time model has been selected among other parametric models (Expo-
nential,Weibull,Log-normal,Gamma) because the log-logistic model (together with the log-
normal model) provides the best fit in an AIC test.The significance levels:*:significant at a 10
percent level of significance,**:significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent lev-
el,ns:not significant at a 10 percent level.
1 Reference category:primary education.
2 Figure multiplied with 100.
3 Reference category:manager,professional.
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Appendix D
Estimation of the predicted probability of dismissal in the Danish and
Dutch data sets (used in Table 8.2).
A two-stage estimation presupposes the use of an instrumental variable,
that is, we need a variable that inﬂuences the probability of dismissal but not
the probability of returning to work. Unfortunately, no obvious instruments
are to hand. The variables that inﬂuence the probability of dismissal, educa-
tional attainment, self-rated pain intensity, seniority, and gender (see Table
7.3) may in a theoretical perspective also affect the probability of returning
to work. Instead a more pragmatic approach has been chosen. The variables
that inﬂuence the probability of dismissal have been analysed to see whether
or not they inﬂuence the probability of returning to work. This has hap-
pened in the model similar to the one depicted in Table 8.2., but with the ob-
served values of dismissal. It turns out that seniority (p=0.933) and gender
(p=0.853) are insigniﬁcant in the Danish data, whereas educational attain-
ment is insigniﬁcant in the Dutch data (secondary level, p=0.538, tertiary
level, p=0.189). Consequently, these variables are used as instruments.
Table 3 shows the results of the logistic regression model used to estimate
the predicted values of dismissal. Table 4 shows the mean and standard devi-
ation of the predicted and observed values of dismissal.
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Table 4 Mean and standard deviation of predicted and observed values of dismissal.Separate
for the Dutch and the Danish data sets.
Denmark The Netherlands
Variable Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
Predicted dismissal 0.487 (0.156) 0.084 (0.102)
Observed dismissal 0.487 (0.501) 0.084 (0.278)
Number of cases 316 369
Table 3 Logistic regression of the probability of dismissal among long-term sick-listed private
sector workers.Separate for the Dutch and the Danish data sets.
Denmark The Netherlands
Variable Coefficient (se) Coefficient (se)
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.195 (0.053)*** 0.571 (0.136)***
Educational background:1
Secondary (yes=1) -0.490 (0.497) ns -1.298 (0.480)***
Tertiary (yes=1) -1.742 (0.626)*** -0.627 (0.772)ns
Sex:(female=1) 0.466 (0.249)* 0.908 (0.426)**
Seniority:Number of months in present job2) -0.257 (0.146)* -0.391 (0.269)ns
Constant -0.553 (0.596)ns -5.266 (1.119)***
Number of cases 316 369
Note: All variables are measured at the first interview, wave 1. Significance levels: *: significant
at a 10 percent level of significance, **: significant at a 5 percent level, ***: significant at a 1 per-
cent level, NS: not significant at a 10 percent level. The model has a p value of 0.704 (DK) and
0.904 (NL) in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test and pesudo R2 of 0.073 (DK) and 0.194 (NL).
1):Reference category:Primary education
2):Figure multiplied with 100.
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Appendix E
Estimation of the predicted probability of participation in education
before returning to work in the Danish data set.
The municipalities in Denmark are obliged to assess the need for vocational
rehabilitation in all cases of long-lasting sick leave. Following Høgelund
and Holm (2002), I assume that the selection into education is inﬂuenced by
personal characteristics such as health status, educational attainment, se-
niority, income, and age. I also assume that the selection is inﬂuenced by the
municipalities’ policies in such a way that the probability of participation in
education is high when the municipality often uses vocational rehabilita-
tion measures, and vice versa (Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000;
Høgelund and Holm, 2002). The municipalities’ rehabilitation policy, i.e.
their tendency to use vocational rehabilitation, is used as an instrumental
variable: It is assumed to inﬂuence the selection into education, while it has
no effect on the probability of returning to work.
The municipalities’ rehabilitation policy is measured as the tendency to
initiate vocational rehabilitation when correction is made for structural
conditions that may affect the demand for vocational rehabilitation. The
tendency to initiate vocational rehabilitation is measured as the number of
people receiving vocational rehabilitation beneﬁt in 1996 relative to the
number of the municipalities’ adult inhabitants. The explanatory variables,
also measured relative to the number of adult inhabitants, comprise: the
number of people receiving sickness beneﬁt and social assistance, respec-
tively; the number of owned residences; and the number of residences with
four rooms. The data are from Statistics Denmark (Danmarks Statistiks
Databank). The estimated linear regression model with all (275) municipal-
ities yields an R2-value of 0.24. Table 5 shows the results of the logistic re-
gression model used to estimate the predicted values of participation in edu-
cation. Table 6 shows the mean and standard deviation of the predicted and
observed values of participation in education together with mean and stan-
dard deviation of the municipalities’ tendency to initiate vocational rehabil-
itation.
156 different policies – different outcomes
Effective Disability Policy def  29-09-2003  12:04  Pagina 156
157appendix e
Table 5 Logistic regression model of participation in education (n=310)
Variable Coefficient Std.error Significance
level
Municipalities’ vocational rehabilitation 0.210 0.109 *
tendency
Pain intensity,scale 1 to 10 (much pain) 0.120 0.068 *
Sex:(female=1) 0.018 0.336 ns
Age -0.057 0.018 ***
Educational background:1
Secondary (yes=1) 0.378 0.806 ns
Tertiary (yes=1) -0.335 0.951 ns
Living together with spouse (yes=1) -0.550 0.465 ns
Seniority:number of months in present job2 -0.172 0.252 ns
Replacement rate -1.176 0.812 ns
Income from other household members 0.378 0.367 ns
divided with the sick-listed person’s 
pre-sick leave wage2
Income from other household members 0.625 0.546 ns
observed? (missing=1)
Constant 0.857 1.325 ns
Note:All variables are measured at the first interview,wave 1,except municipalities’ vocational
rehabilitation tendency.Significance levels:*:significant at a 10 percent level of significance,**:
significant at a 5 percent level,***:significant at a 1 percent level,ns:not significant at a 10 per-
cent level.The model has a p value of 0.849 in a Hosmer-Lemeshow test and pesudo R2 of 0.104.
1 Reference category:primary education
2 Figure multiplied by 100.
Table 6 Mean and standard deviation of predicted and observed values of participation in
education and of the municipalities’ tendency to initiate vocational rehabilitation.
Denmark 
Variable Coefficient (sd)
Predicted participation in education 0.203 (0.131)
Observed participation in education 0.203 (0.403)
Municipalities’ vocational rehabilitation tendency 0.484 (1.323)
Number of cases 316
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9 Too Much and Too Little – Employers’Responsibility in
Denmark and the Netherlands
The Dutch and the Danish disability policies share the aim of reducing the
number of people entering the disability beneﬁt rolls while increasing the
labour market attachment of people with health problems. Yet we have seen
that during the 1990s different policies were enacted in order to reach these
goals, and that these policies result in very different outcomes.
The Dutch policy focuses on employers who to a large extent have become
responsible for the ﬁnancing of sickness and disability beneﬁts and the rein-
tegration of disabled people; employers have been given strong economic in-
centives to retain workers after the onset of a disability. While this policy re-
sults in the work retention of long-term sick-listed workers, it apparently
suffers from high numbers of long-term sick-listed people and the problems
of integrating disabled people with no or limited prior attachment to the
labour market.
In contrast, the Danish policy emphasises public responsibility for the
provision of social security beneﬁts and integration of work-disabled peo-
ple. The means to obtain integration and limit the load on the disability
pathway is related to a policy that induces public authorities to apply active
instruments rather than passive beneﬁt awards. This policy does not en-
courage reintegration of long-term sick-listed workers, who in spite of pub-
licly provided capacity-building measures have difﬁculties in returning to
work. But in contrast to the Dutch policy, the Danish policy nevertheless
seems to limit long-term absenteeism, and it apparently does not increase
insider/outsider problems.
The Dutch and Danish policies seem to be associated with different
strengths and weaknesses that make it difﬁcult to provide an overall ranking
of the two policies. This chapter therefore looks at the Dutch and Danish
policies from another angle, and asks whether the policy changes during the
1990s succeeded in reaching the goal of limiting the load on the disability
beneﬁt schemes. I ﬁrst set out by looking at the size of the pressures on the
Dutch and Danish disability beneﬁt schemes during the 1990s, arguing that
even though the Dutch disability problems seem much worse than those in
159
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Denmark they are not. I then discuss whether the policy changes during the
1990s succeeded in limiting the load on the disability beneﬁt schemes. I will
argue that the Danish policy indeed fulﬁlled this goal and that the Dutch
policy also did, but probably to a smaller extent and in a less visible manner.
This is followed by a discussion of how new challenges to the welfare state
may affect the two nations’ future disability policies. That is, how may we
expect that the two policies will cope with pressures from globalisation,
changing social risk structures, and ageing populations? It is argued that the
pressures may cause more problems in the Netherlands than in Denmark. I
will conclude by giving some suggestions for adaptations to the Dutch and
Danish disability policies that may enhance integration of disabled people
and thus help alleviate future welfare state pressures.
The disability figures reconsidered: an overestimated disability crisis
Before assessing the effects of the changes to the Dutch and Danish disabili-
ty policies, it might be useful to brieﬂy consider the economic pressure that
the two nations’ disability beneﬁt schemes generate. High numbers of dis-
ability beneﬁciaries generate economic pressure for two reasons. On the one
hand, the ﬁnancing of disability beneﬁts puts an economic load on the state,
and inactive beneﬁciaries on the other hand only contribute to the produc-
tion of welfare to a limited extent.
Figure 9.1. shows that the number of disability beneﬁciaries as a percent-
age of the labour force suggests that the economic load generated by the dis-
ability beneﬁt rolls throughout the 1990s was larger in the Netherlands than
in Denmark. The ﬁgure also indicates that the difference between the Dutch
and Danish numbers has been signiﬁcantly reduced during that period.
In the Netherlands, the number of beneﬁciaries fell from 12.8 percent of
the labour force in 1990 to 11.3 percent in 1997 and increased to 12.0 per-
cent in 2001. This development reﬂects an increasing number of beneﬁcia-
ries (except in the mid-1990s where the number decreased temporarily) and
an even faster increasing number of people in the labour force. In contrast,
Denmark left the 1990s with a net increase in the number of beneﬁciaries.
The number rose from 8.6 percent in 1990 to 9.6 percent in 1998, and then
decreased to 9.2 percent in 2001.
Despite the overall favourable development in the Netherlands and the
negative development in Denmark, the ﬁgures suggest that at present Dutch
disability problems are greater than those in Denmark. It is important to
note that there seem to be good reasons why one should be cautious when
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interpreting the ﬁgures. While in broad terms we may assume that the num-
ber of disability beneﬁciaries is a good proxy for the economic resources that
society transfers to people receiving these beneﬁts, it may be a poor indica-
tor of beneﬁciaries’ inactivity, at least when we wish to compare the situa-
tion in the Netherlands and Denmark. In the Netherlands 22 percent of the
disability beneﬁciaries were working in 1998 (Lisv, 2002) compared to 14
percent in Denmark (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, 2000).1 In other words,
the Dutch disability ﬁgures imply more ability and less disability than the
Danish ﬁgures. Compared to the Danish ﬁgures, the Dutch ﬁgures therefore
tend to overestimate the economic load of the disability beneﬁt scheme. To
illustrate this: when working people are excluded from the ﬁgures, disability
beneﬁciaries make up 9.1 percent of the labour force in the Netherlands in
1998 compared to 8.2 percent in Denmark. I will return to explanations for
this crossnational difference below. 
In summary, this discussion suggests that a mere comparison of the num-
bers of disability beneﬁciaries overestimates the paid inactivity present in
the Dutch disability scheme. When it is taken into consideration that Dutch
beneﬁciaries work more often than Danish beneﬁciaries, the economic pres-
sures from the disability beneﬁt schemes are not that different.
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Figure 9.1.The number of disability beneficiaries as a percentage of the labour force
Source:Danmarks Statistik (2001,2002),Lisv (2001),OECD (2001b).
Note:Dutch figures include beneficiaries under the wao (wage earners),WAZ (self-employed),and
Wajong (young handicapped) scheme.
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Policy changes – success or failure?
The development of the Dutch and Danish disability policies may be charac-
terised as a move towards a more active policy and away from a passive poli-
cy. More people with health problems should be kept on the work pathway
and consequently fewer would be granted disability beneﬁts. The Dutch
sickness and disability reforms aimed to fulﬁl these goals mainly by trans-
ferring the responsibility for integration from the collective domain to em-
ployers. Thus, in addition to the strict job-protection legislation, the indi-
vidual employer has become responsible for payments of sickness beneﬁts
during sick leave and contributions to the disability beneﬁt scheme are now
dependent on how many of the employer’s workers that are granted a bene-
ﬁt. The employer has furthermore become obliged to contract a private con-
sultancy company to assist with the implementation of a prevention and
sickness absence policy (cf. Chapter 5).
In contrast, the changes to the Danish policy involved the strengthening of
an already extensive public responsibility. Municipalities were obliged to
intensify their followup activities in cases of sick leave, they were given eco-
nomic incentives to apply active measures such as vocational rehabilitation,
and they were delegated responsibility for awarding disability beneﬁts (cf.
Chapter 6). In both nations have incentives to limit disability beneﬁt awards
and increase integration been fortiﬁed, but the pivotal actor differs. The
question addressed below is to what extent the Dutch and Danish policy
changes have succeeded.
Entry into the disability benefit schemes
It is difﬁcult to determine whether policy changes have increased the labour
market integration of disabled people. This is so because there exists neither
a uniform categorisation of disabled people nor a registration of their em-
ployment. As a consequence, the following discussion concentrates on
whether policy changes have succeeded in the limiting entry into the disabil-
ity beneﬁt rolls. In this respect the number of awarded disability beneﬁts is a
better measure than the stock of beneﬁciaries. Whereas the former measure
only depends on claimants’ entry into the disability beneﬁt scheme, the lat-
ter also depends on their exit from the scheme.2 As we will see below this
makes a difference, especially in the Danish case.
Figure 9.2 displays the development in the annual number of disability
beneﬁt awards from 1990 to 2001 measured relative to the labour force.
Figure 9.2 gives a somewhat different impression of the development in
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the Netherlands and Denmark than that given by Figure 9.1. The ﬁgure sug-
gests a much more favourable development in Denmark than in the Nether-
lands. In Denmark the relative number of awarded beneﬁts has almost been
halved, reﬂecting a marked decrease between 1991 and 1999 followed by a
slight increase in 2000 and 2001. Around 5 people per 1000 in the labour
force were granted beneﬁt in 2001 compared to more than 9 people per
1000 in 1990.3
In the Netherlands, in contrast, the number of beneﬁt awards dropped un-
til 1995 and thereafter rose signiﬁcantly until 1998 reaching a level some-
what below the 1990 level. From 1998, the number ﬁrst decreased slightly
and then returned to almost the same level. In 2001, the number of beneﬁt
awards made up 85 percent of the 1990 level or, put differently, for every
1000 people in the labour force 17 were granted disability beneﬁt in 1990
compared to 141⁄2 in 2001. In other words, it seems as exit through the
Dutch disability beneﬁt scheme declined during the 1990s, but to a much
lesser extent than in Denmark.
The consequences of policy changes?
To what extent can we believe that these developments were caused by the
policy changes carried out in the 1990s? As economic conjunctures inﬂu-
ence employment opportunities of disabled people, the economic develop-
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Figure 9.2.The number of disability benefit awards per thousand labour force
participants
Source:Statistics Denmark’s year book various years,den Sociale Ankestyrelse (2002),and Lisv (2001),
OECD (2001b).
Note:Dutch figures include benefits awarded according to the wao (wage earners),WAZ (self-
employed),and Wajong (young handicapped) scheme.
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ment could in principle explain the observed patterns. Nevertheless, there
seem to be good reasons why economic conditions should not be a decisive
factor, at least not in both nations. Firstly, despite increasing employment in
both nations in the second half of the 1990s, we note that in this period the
Dutch and Danish trajectories were very different, with an increasing trend
in the Netherlands and a decreasing trend in Denmark. Secondly it seems
unlikely that the fast drop of 40 percent in the Danish award rate between
1997 and 1999 could be caused by an increase in the overall demand for
labour alone.
Several amendments were made to the Danish disability policy during the
1990s and it is therefore difﬁcult to relate the development in the Danish
award rate to speciﬁc changes. The decreasing trend during almost the
whole period suggests that the development, on the one hand, was largely
caused by an accumulation of all the changes rather than one or two speciﬁc
changes. That is, the declining award rate may be caused by both an im-
provement of active instruments, an increased legal obligation of municipal-
ities to integrate disabled people and the strengthening of municipalities’ in-
centives to apply active instruments rather than passive beneﬁt awards (for
more details see Chapter 6). The decreasing trend in beneﬁt awards gained
momentum in the second half of the 1990s. This may, on the other hand, in-
dicate that changes to the incentive structure have been especially crucial.
That is, the fast drop in the award rate between 1997 and 1999 coincidences
with major legal changes that gave municipalities both greater administra-
tive autonomy and incentives to limit beneﬁt awards. Firstly, in 1998 munic-
ipalities were given absolute competence to award disability beneﬁts. Sec-
ondly, the right of citizens to apply for disability beneﬁts was abolished at
the same time, with the result that this decision was now only a matter for
municipalities. Thirdly, in 1999 the economic incentives of municipalities
to refrain from disability beneﬁt awards were strengthened because the
state reimbursement of disability beneﬁts was cut.4
Figure 9.2 apparently does not give too ﬂattering a picture of the Dutch re-
forms. The legal changes in 1993 and 1994 may have led to an immediate
decrease in the number of awarded beneﬁts, from almost 104,000 in 1993
to 73,000 in 1995, corresponding to a decrease from less than 15 awards
per 1000 people in the labour force to less than 10 per 1000. Among other
things the Act on the Reduction of the Number of Disability Beneﬁt Claims
in 1993 (tba) led to a reduction of the beneﬁt level, tightening of eligibility
criteria, and the re-assessment of existing disability beneﬁciaries under 50
years of age according to the new and stricter award criteria.5 In 1994 the
Act on Reducing Sickness Absence (tz) made the individual employer re-
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sponsible for the ﬁnancing of sickness beneﬁts for the ﬁrst 6 weeks of sick
leave (2 weeks for small employers), while amendments to the Act on Work-
ing Circumstances (Arbowet) made employers responsible for the imple-
mentation of a sickness absence and control policy under the guidance of a
private consultancy company. It is not possible to differentiate between the
effects of these three acts because they were implemented at almost the same
time. The positive effects may therefore stem from both the reduction in the
attractiveness of the disability beneﬁt scheme and the strengthening of em-
ployers’ incentives to limit work disability. The effect of these changes
seems only to have been temporary as the number of awards returned to the
old level during the course of 1996 and 1997.6
The fact that the number of awarded beneﬁts decreased somewhat in 1999
and then a year later returned to almost the same level as in 1998 suggests
that the 1998 reform, which made the individual employer more directly re-
sponsible for the ﬁnancing of disability beneﬁts, has not (yet) had any signif-
icant lasting positive effects.
In other words, even though the Dutch disability problems of the 1980s
were brought to a halt in the 1990s, the effect of the policy changes that
aimed to make employers more responsible for the integration of work-dis-
abled people has apparently not been an overall success.
Against this, it has been argued that the number of beneﬁt awards under
the scheme for workers (wao) in fact decreased in relative terms, whereas
beneﬁts under the scheme for young handicapped people increased (Wa-
jong). As the former group, in contrast to the latter group, is attached to an
employer and the reforms were mainly directed at employers, it is argued
that the reforms by and large had the intended effect of reducing claim levels
(Veerman, 2001). Even though this argument is appealing, it may be prob-
lematic to isolate the effects of the reforms to the disability scheme for
workers. The analysis in Chapter 8 suggests that high employer costs in the
case of work disability do not merely affect employed people but also non-
employed people. While high costs increase the reintegration of disabled
workers, they reduce the integration of non-employed disabled people and
thus make it more difﬁcult for young disabled people to enter the labour
market. The diverging trends in the two disability beneﬁt schemes may
therefore reﬂect that the Dutch reforms had positive effects for insiders and
negative effects for outsiders. In contrast, the analysis in Chapter 8 suggests
that the Danish policy changes did not fortify insider/outsider problems.
We have to look elsewhere for positive effects of the Dutch employer cost
strategy. Firstly, the average age of the Dutch working age population in-
creased during the 1990s, cf. Figure 9.3 From the ﬁgure we see that the num-
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ber of people aged between 50 and 64 as a percentage of the total working
age population increased from 21 in 1990 to 26 in 2001. This development
happened at exactly the same time as the number of disability beneﬁt
awards started to rise in the second half of the 1990s. Knowing that older
workers have a high disability risk, this development would in itself cause an
increasing trend in the number of disability beneﬁt awards. Consequently, it
can be argued that without the policy changes we would have observed an
increasing number of beneﬁt awards during this period (see also Veerman,
2001).
From this ﬁgure it can be noted that a similar development took place in
Denmark, indicating that the effects of the policy changes would have been
even more impressive had the average age not increased. 
Secondly, it is possible that the job demands of Dutch workers increased
during the 1990s. This would also have led to higher disability rates had the
policy changes not been carried through. This is supported by evidence
from a European study on working conditions that suggested that the men-
tal workload increased across Europe during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, and
particularly in the Netherlands. In the European Union as a whole the frac-
tion of workers reporting to work at a high pace all the time or almost all the
time increased from 18 percent in 1991 to 25 percent in 1996 and 24 per-
cent in 2000. Whereas the development in Denmark was close to the Euro-
pean Union average, the Dutch ﬁgures rose signiﬁcantly from 26 percent in
1991 to 38 percent in 1996, and then decreased to 32 percent in 2000
(Paoli, 1992; Paoli, 1997; Paoli and Merllié, 2001; see also Geurts, Kompi-
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Figure 9.3.The number of people aged between 50-64 in the Netherlands and
Denmark as percentages of the number of people between 15-64 years.
Source:OECD On-Line Labour Force Statistics database.
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er and Gründemann, 2000). Even though these ﬁgures are encumbered with
much uncertainty, among other things because of response rates of around
40 percent, the development in the Netherlands is supported by other pieces
of evidence. Firstly, Dutch studies ﬁnd that the work pace of workers in-
creased continuously between 1977 and 1997, then it levelled off (Hout-
man, Otten, and Venema, 2002). Secondly, the Netherlands is characterised
by a labour force with a high productivity rate (Geurts, Kompier and Grün-
demann, 2000). Consequently, when the productivity rate increases – 
between 1993 and 1997 it rose by almost 25 percent in the Dutch manufac-
turing industries (oecd, 2000) – it is likely that the workload also rises sig-
niﬁcantly. In other words, it is possible that an ageing labour force and 
increasing job demands mask the fact that the Dutch policy during the
1990s contributed to limiting labour market exit through the disability ben-
eﬁt scheme.
In summary, exit through the disability beneﬁt scheme decreased in both
nations during the 1990s, but more in Denmark than in the Netherlands.
The development in disability beneﬁt awards indicates that the Danish strat-
egy of enhancing public authorities’ incentives to apply active rather than
passive measures was successful in limiting the number of beneﬁt awards.
Although the Dutch strategy of improving employers’ incentives has not
had a lasting visible positive effect on the number of awarded disability ben-
eﬁts, it might have prevented further increases in the number of beneﬁt
awards that would otherwise have occurred because of an ageing popula-
tion and increasing work demands. 
Explaining the developments
Some of the important differences between the Dutch and the Danish dis-
ability policies, the economic pressures they cause, and the effects of the pol-
icy changes during the 1990s can be understood in the context of Figure 9.4.
In a simpliﬁed way, the ﬁgure illustrates conditions that affect the labour
market attachment of people with health problems. For the sake of exposi-
tion this group is divided into two. One group includes people who are for-
mally attached to an employer by an employment contract. They may be
workers who still are able to work in spite of their health problems or work-
ers who are sick-listed because of their health problems. Another group con-
sists of people with health problems who have no attachment to an employ-
er. These people are receiving a social security beneﬁt, e.g. a social assis-
tance, sickness, or disability beneﬁt. For both groups of people, the ﬁgure
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describes factors that inﬂuence the future labour market attachment in
terms of work, subsidised work or the receipt of social security beneﬁt. For
an employed individual the ﬁgure illustrates whether the person continues
with their original employer, starts work with a new employer, commences
work in a subsidised job or enters (and stays) within a social security
scheme. If the person continues with the old employer he or she will move
from the left of the ﬁgure and into the box labelled ‘Old Employer’ (indicat-
ed by arrow A). If the person instead enters a social security scheme he or
she will move to one of the boxes representing the different social security
schemes (indicated by arrow B). For people without attachment to an em-
ployer, the ‘integration process’ is depicted in a similar manner. If the per-
son, for example, starts to work he or she will move from the left of the ﬁg-
ure and into the box labelled ‘New Employer’ (indicated by arrow C).
The ﬁgure, which draws on Chapter 1 (Figure 1.1) and Chapter 3 (Figure
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3.1), suggests that three types of conditions inﬂuence the (re)integration of
disabled people: 1) the individual characteristics of the disabled person; 2)
employment opportunities; and 3) exit opportunities through social securi-
ty schemes.
People with several resources, e.g. relatively good health, and many educa-
tional and vocational skills, have a high probability of becoming (re)inte-
grated. In a similar manner, a person with a ‘taste’ for work will perceive it
as socially and psychologically costly to be without work and he or she will
therefore have a high probability of (re)integration. In Figure 9.4 this is il-
lustrated by arrow C showing a disabled person without attachment to an
employer who starts to work because he or she possesses many resources
and work-oriented values.
The institutional conditions related to a nation’s social security schemes
inﬂuence whether a work-disabled person will enter one of these schemes
and, if so, which of the schemes he or she will enter. This is because social se-
curity schemes either directly or through various actors affect the work-dis-
abled individual. Firstly, if exit schemes appear attractive in terms of eligi-
bility criteria, beneﬁt level and beneﬁt duration, it is likely that the afﬂicted
person will enter and stay in one of these schemes. Secondly, institutional
conditions in terms of how formal rules are administered and how beneﬁt
schemes are organised will also inﬂuence whether a person with a limiting
health condition will be allowed to enter and stay in a particular exit
scheme. In Figure 9.4 this is depicted by arrows 1, 2, 3, and 4 ‘pulling’ the
disabled individual toward the social security schemes, and thus increasing
the probability that the disabled person enters and remains in a beneﬁt
scheme. The thickness of the arrow reﬂects how good exit conditions
through the particular scheme are. Figure 9.4 shows a situation where pos-
sibilities for exit through the disability pathway are good compared to exit
possibilities through other schemes. As a consequence people with health
problems will relatively often exit through the sickness and disability
schemes (see arrow B).
The chance that a disabled person remains attached to the work pathway
is high when employment opportunities are good. Thus, the probability
that a worker who is affected by a health problem will remain working is
high when the opportunities for returning to work with the old employer are
good, cf. arrow 5, or if the possibilities of ﬁnding a job with a new employer
are good, cf. arrow 6. Similarly, the chance that a disabled person without
attachment to an employer starts to work is high when the opportunities of
ﬁnding a job with a new employer are good. The thickness of the arrows re-
ﬂects how good the employment opportunities are with the old employer
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and with a new employer, respectively. The ﬁgure shows a situation where
employment opportunities with the old employer are very good, whereas
opportunities for integration into a new job with a new employer are more
limited. Consequently, workers that become disabled have a high chance of
remaining in work with the old employer (indicated by arrow A).
In summary, Figure 9.4 suggests that disabled peoples’ labour market par-
ticipation will be high when policies support their individual resources, em-
phasises work oriented values, limit exit opportunities through social secu-
rity schemes, and create employment opportunities.
This is not to say that all people who encounter a disability are able to
work if the employment opportunities are good; in many cases health prob-
lems prevent people from continued labour force participation. Nor is it to
say that all workers with a limiting health condition will leave the labour
force if they are provided with good exit opportunities, as in fact most peo-
ple with health problems continue to work. Rather, the point is that our ac-
tions are inﬂuenced by the opportunities and constraints we face, and that
social and labour market policies are important in this respect.
The Dutch and Danish polices revisited: the importance of exit schemes
In the context of Figure 9.4, the previously noted differences between the
Dutch and Danish disability ﬁgures may reﬂect that in the Netherlands in-
stitutional conditions related to the disability pathway facilitate its use and
at the same time make it attractive compared to other exit possibilities. This
is less so in Denmark. The comparison of the Dutch and Danish disability
policies suggests that the possibility of Dutch workers entering and staying
on the disability pathway is somewhat better than in Denmark. As argued in
Chapter 8 the whole welfare state context in the Netherlands in terms of
how beneﬁt schemes were ﬁnanced until recently and the extensive job-pro-
tection legislation during sick leave probably make it more socially accept-
able to report sick and to perceive oneself as work-disabled. This facilitates
workers’ entry into the disability pathway. In Denmark a tax ﬁnanced sick-
ness beneﬁt scheme (combined with employers contributions during the ﬁrst
two weeks) and lax job protection does not promote similar results.
When a Dutch worker with health problems has entered the sickness ben-
eﬁt scheme the institutional conditions related to the sickness and the dis-
ability beneﬁt scheme facilitate in some respects that the worker stays on the
pathway. That is, application for a disability beneﬁt and the following eligi-
bility assessment happens almost automatically, and the low eligibility
threshold that only demands an invalidity degree of 15 percent makes sure
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that most of those sick-listed people who come close to the end of the 1-year
waiting period are granted beneﬁt. As we have seen there are of course also
mechanisms that prompt a return to work such as strong employer incen-
tives and recently also the new followup procedures during sick leave. The
point here, however, is that there exist strong incentives and mechanisms
that enhance the use of the disability pathway.
When Danish workers have entered the sickness beneﬁt scheme there are
mechanisms that counteract their continued attachment to the pathway.
The disability beneﬁt scheme operates with a high eligibility threshold, i.e.
demanding a reduction in earnings capacity of at least 50 percent (this was
increased in 2003, cf. Chapter 6). In addition, municipalities have strong in-
centives to apply active measures rather than awarding disability beneﬁts,
and to award social assistance instead of disability beneﬁts. In contrast to
the Dutch policy, it is furthermore required that applicants participate in ac-
tive measures before beneﬁt can be awarded. In other words, the Danish pol-
icy does not promote that people enter and stay on the disability pathway to
the same extent as the Dutch policy. This might be a reason why we observe
more disability beneﬁciaries and more beneﬁciaries with a potential for
work in the Netherlands than in Denmark. Referring to Figure 9.4, the grey
area within the disability beneﬁt scheme, indicating that people both receive
a disability beneﬁt and work, is larger in the Netherlands than in Denmark.
The apparently limited effect of the Dutch reforms on the number of new-
ly awarded disability beneﬁts can also be interpreted in the light of Figure
9.4. Even though the disability reforms limited the attractiveness of the dis-
ability beneﬁt scheme, changes to other social security schemes may at the
same time have contributed to restrict exit through other exit pathways. If
this is the case, workers who encounter health problems will continue to use
the disability pathway more often than other pathways.
This explanation is supported by changes to the unemployment policy.
Since the beginning of the 1990s the Dutch unemployment policy has been
changed in order to inﬂuence the behaviour of the unemployed and employ-
ers (Clasen, Kvist and Oorschot, 2001; Oorschot and Abrahamson, 2003).
With respect to the unemployed, the work-related eligibility and entitlement
criteria in the unemployment insurance scheme have been tightened. In
1996 the Act on Penalties and Measures increased sanctions on unemployed
people unwilling to participate in activation measures. And in 1995 eligibil-
ity to unemployment beneﬁts became more closely linked to the previous
work record, such that on average more people were entitled to lower bene-
ﬁts for shorter periods (Oorschot and Abrahamson, 2003). In 1997, the Act
on Penalties and Measures was also implemented in the social assistance
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scheme, resulting in more rigid and systematic implementation of beneﬁcia-
ries’ obligations, for example, to actively seek work and accept suitable
work (Oorschot, 2001). It seems in other words as it has become more difﬁ-
cult for people with health problems to enter and stay on social assistance
and especially in the unemployment insurance scheme. Thus, the Dutch dis-
ability reforms would probably have had a more visible effect on the number
of awarded disability beneﬁts without these changes to the unemployment
policy.
In summary, this all suggests that the Dutch and Danish disability policies
differ with respect to how exit schemes affect disabled people. The Dutch
policy seems to promote the use of the disability pathway more than the
Danish policy. This results in somewhat higher disability ﬁgures in the
Netherlands than in Denmark. But in contrast to the Danish policy, the
Dutch policy results in more disability beneﬁciaries who are working as well
as receiving beneﬁt. In short, while the Danish policy aims to secure attach-
ment to the work pathway by preventing people with the potential for work
from entering the disability beneﬁt scheme, the Dutch policy combines dis-
ability beneﬁt receipt with work. This, an ageing labour force, increasing
job demands and perhaps also changes to the Dutch unemployment policy
tend to underestimate the effects of the Dutch reforms.
Dutch and Danish polices revisited:employment opportunities 
An important message of the empirical analyses in this book is that Dutch
and Danish disability policies differ in respect to how they inﬂuence em-
ployers’ incentives to recruit and retain people with health problems (cf.
Chapter 8). The Dutch policy exhibits strong elements that signify a Con-
servative welfare state. By means of regulations the responsibility for the ﬁ-
nancing of sickness and disability beneﬁts and the (re)integration of dis-
abled people is delegated to the individual employer. As a consequence, em-
ployers have strong incentives to retain workers after the onset of a disabili-
ty (cf. the thick arrow 5 in Figure 9.4). Employers do, however, also have
strong incentives to refrain from recruiting disabled people, resulting in dis-
abled people without attachment to an employer having a poor chance of be-
coming integrated (cf. the thin arrow 6 in Figure 9.4) The policy tends in
other words to create a divide between insiders and outsiders.
In contrast, the Danish policy possesses characteristics associated with a
Social Democratic welfare state. The ﬁnancing of beneﬁts is mainly a public
responsibility and employers can relative easily dismiss workers with health
problems. While this policy does not seem to cause insider/outsider prob-
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lems, it may limit the integration of those disabled people with the poorest
employment chances (independent of whether or not they are attached to an
employer). If employed, these people are often dismissed, and because of
their poor employability they have only a limited chance of returning to
work. Unfortunately this chance seems to remain low despite public efforts
to help them to work.
Disability policies in the context of future challenges
Labour market exclusion caused by health problems may turn out to be a
problem that will also warrant great concern in the future. Increased global-
isation, changing social risk structures and ageing populations seem to pro-
mote greater work disability in the coming years. An increasing competition
from low-wage nations may necessitate structural adaptations in the labour
market because the demand for unskilled and skilled workers will decrease
in certain sectors. This may in turn raise labour market exit and the pressure
on the disability pathway. An increasing demand for ﬂexible workers may
also give rise to health-related labour market exit among workers unable to
meet the changing demands. The consequences of ageing populations are
more dubious. On the one hand, older people have high disability incidence
rates. A decreasing labour supply may on the other hand improve the em-
ployment prospects of people with a health condition. How might the in-
creasing pressures inﬂuence labour market exit through the disability path-
way in the Netherlands and Denmark?
It is likely that increasing globalisation, changing risk structures and age-
ing populations will exacerbate some of the problems associated with the
two nations’ disability policies. This seems most evident in the Dutch case.
Clearly, increasing health problems among workers caused by changing job
demands and an increasing average age will increase exit through the dis-
ability pathway. As employers bear the greater part of the costs that follows
from an increased use of the sickness and disability beneﬁt schemes, this will
force additional costs upon employers. This will in turn raise employers’ in-
centives to limit work disability among their staff, for example, through im-
provements of working conditions and increased reintegration efforts.
However, it is likely that this positive effect will be very limited because em-
ployers’ incentives to retain sick-listed workers are already very strong. 
At the same time increasing costs will make employers even more reluc-
tant to recruit people with health problems. The ageing of the Dutch popu-
lation, which will reduce the supply of labour and thus improve the employ-
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ment possibilities of work-disabled people, will to some extent offset this
tendency. But because of the high and increasing employer costs this effect
may also turn out to be very limited. That is, the potential risk (or cost) as-
sociated with the recruitment of disabled people may make employers
choose other strategies to fulﬁl their demand for labour. Such strategies
could be to prompt workers to retire later, to pay workers to increase their
working hours and to facilitate policies that raise the female labour supply.
In addition, it is possible that the pressures toward labour market exclu-
sion unrelated to workers’ health problems will also increase exit through
the Dutch disability pathway. If increased competition from low-wage na-
tions result in a decreasing demand for certain types of workers, this will put
pressure on the disability pathway insofar as this pathway remains more ac-
cessible than other exit pathways (see above). It could be argued that it is of
little importance whether people with health problems use one or another
beneﬁt scheme to exit from the labour market. In the Dutch case, however, it
does matter because sickness and disability beneﬁt schemes are almost en-
tirely ﬁnanced by employers, whereas employers’ contributions to other
beneﬁt schemes are much more limited. Consequently, this development
may increase employers’ costs and therefore further add to the existing in-
sider/outsider problems. Whether this would happen may in addition to the
development of the unemployment policies also depend on how the recent
changes in the followup procedures during sick leave work out in practice.
That is, will the increased obligations of sick-listed workers to cooperate
with employers in order to return to work increase their attachment to the
work pathway and thus limit exit through the disability path?
With unchanged policies, it seems reasonable to expect that the future
pressure on the disability pathway will be more limited in Denmark. Be-
cause of the institutional conditions related to the disability pathway, rela-
tively few people will be allowed to exit through the disability pathway. In-
stead people will use other exit schemes. On the one hand, increasing health
problems caused by changing job demands and an ageing labour force will
probably increase exit through the disability pathway. That is, employers
will continue to solve problems with disabled workers through dismissals,
which will increase labour market exit. On the other hand, the ageing
labour force and the resulting lack of manpower will induce employers to re-
tain more workers with health problems. In a similar manner, an increasing
demand for labour may beneﬁt the integration of disabled people without
attachment to an employer because employers’ future expenditures of em-
ploying workers with a high disability risk will remain low despite increas-
ing pressures on the disability pathway. In other words, the recruitment of
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people with a limiting health condition may under certain circumstances be
a better option compared to increasing working hours and the retirement
age of the existing staff. The negative consequences that may follow from
future welfare state pressures therefore seem to be less serious in Denmark
than in the Netherlands. As a consequence, the pressure towards new and
signiﬁcant changes in the disability policies will probably be more pro-
nounced in the Netherlands than in Denmark.
Towards a more effective disability policy
The above considerations point to some of the weaknesses of the Dutch and
the Danish policies. In both cases there are the weaknesses related to struc-
tures that inﬂuence labour market ﬂexibility; in the Netherlands the disabili-
ty policy limits ﬂexibility, while the Danish policy advances ﬂexibility. It
seems that in the Netherlands more ﬂexibility and in Denmark less ﬂexibili-
ty may improve the labour market integration of work-disabled people.
We have seen that Dutch employers are to a great extent obliged to contin-
ue the employment relationship independent of the worker’s abilities. While
this may increase the retention of sick-listed workers, it has important draw-
backs. Firstly, it has been demonstrated that this obligation counteracts the
integration of disabled people without attachment to an employer. Second-
ly, overly limited ﬂexibility may also lead to an inefﬁcient match between
workers and jobs. If employers are forced through regulations to continue
the employment of workers who, because of health problems or for other
reasons, no longer match job demands it will raise employers’ production
costs. That is, the employer would be better off with a new worker even
though this would be costly in terms of expenditure on recruitment and on-
the-job training. At the same time the disabled worker would in principle
also beneﬁt from a better job match because it would give more job satisfac-
tion and/or a higher wage. Figure 9.5 illustrates the association between the
economic responsibility of employers and the resulting societal efﬁciency,
i.e. the ratio between the total welfare in society and the resources used to
obtain that welfare.
If employers costs become too high the beneﬁts of increased retention of
workers with health problems is more than offset by the limited integration
of outsiders, and by a poor job match of insiders. This is probably what has
happened in the wake of the Dutch disability reforms. The apparently limit-
ed effects of the premium differentiation within the Dutch disability beneﬁt
scheme support this. That is, the lack of a visible net reduction in the num-
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ber of awarded disability beneﬁts may indicate that the gains in terms of in-
creased retention of disabled workers is offset by the reduction in the inte-
gration of disabled people without attachment to an employer. Consequent-
ly, if the regulations that make it costly and difﬁcult for employers to get rid
of sick-listed workers are relaxed, it would probably reduce insider/outsider
problems and promote a better match between employers’ demand for
labour and workers’ supply of qualiﬁcations.
The Danish policy facilitates labour market ﬂexibility. Employers can dis-
miss sick-listed workers easily and with little cost. While this limits the re-
tention of workers with health problems, it promotes the integration of peo-
ple with health problems without attachment to an employer because em-
ployers do not risk high future costs if a worker becomes disabled. Put an-
other way, the policy facilitates the possibility of employers only employing
those workers who produce the desired output at the lowest cost. This is
clearly beneﬁcial for employers but not necessarily for society. Let us as-
sume that a worker with health problems is dismissed but returns to work
with another employer after 3 years of vocational rehabilitation. Clearly, if
the worker had stayed with the old employer instead, e.g. in a new job or in
the original job after it had been adapted, it would have been cheaper for so-
ciety even though it would have been more expensive for the original em-
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ployer. In the context of Figure 9.5, the present Danish policy may thus be
inefﬁcient because employers’ costs are too low. This suggests that it may be
cost-effective to increase employers’ incentives to retain disabled workers. 
One way to achieve this would be to increase the job protection of sick-
listed workers and/or to increase employers’ responsibility for the ﬁnancing
of sickness beneﬁts. This would of course increase the risk of insider/out-
sider problems.7 Another way to increase employers’ incentives to retain
disabled workers would be to provide employers with economic support to
establish the necessary measures such as workplace adaptations and job
training. However, the problem seems not to be that such support does not
exist, but rather that it is not used (Høgelund and Modvig, 1998). Conse-
quently, policy changes that facilitate early contact between employers and
public authorities would provide employers with more information about
available support and thus be a ﬁrst step towards greater work retention.
This could be obtained, for example, by requiring that employers and public
authorities come into contact before sick-listed workers are dismissed.
In short, it is argued that an optimal disability policy neither should de-
mand too little nor too much of employers, whose cooperation is after all a
precondition for the integration of disabled people. It might therefore be
worth considering this aspect when nations consider reforming their dis-
ability policies in order to meet future welfare state pressures. 
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Notes
Notes Chapter 1
1 This section draws on these publications. 
2 In the simplest form, this model is based on a choice between work and leisure. For
a thorough and technical presentation of the model, cf. Aarts and de Jong, (1992),
and for a general introduction and critique of the push model, see Stattin (1998).
3 As Stone (1984:145-46) notes, this is strategic not fraudulent behaviour.
4 The data was collected as part of the project, Work Incapacity and Reintegration,
which was carried out under the auspices of the International Social Security As-
sociation, cf. Bloch and Prins (2001).
Notes Chapter 2
1 This chapter is adapted from a chapter published in: Bloch, F.S. and Prins, R.
(Eds.): Who Returns to Work & Why? International Social Security Series. Vol-
ume 5. New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.): Transaction Publishers,
2001, pp. 27-54.
2 Furthermore, within the medical discipline the review focuses on sick-listed work-
ers with the same diagnoses as in the present study, i.e. low back pain.
3 Veerman and Palmer (2001) consider variables belonging to the medical, econom-
ic and sociological research sphere and the study is therefore also considered in
some of the following sections. 
4 This is supported by Aarts and de Jong (1992) who found that male workers’ (esti-
mated) unemployment risk inﬂuences the probability of their enrolment in the dis-
ability beneﬁt scheme. At the same time they also found that male workers’ unem-
ployment risk affects their probability of becoming long-term sick-listed, but not
their transition from long-term sick leave to the disability beneﬁt scheme.
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Notes Chapter 3
1 In principle the reverse is also true: individuals react on structural conditions,
which either may reinforce or change existing structural conditions. Such feed-
back mechanisms are discussed in the ﬁnal section of the chapter.
2 Thus, the existence of health problems is taken for granted, such that the model
does not directly aim to explain why some healthy people become work-disabled
in the ﬁrst place. For such models see, e.g. Aarts and de Jong (1992) and Ilmarinen
(1999).
Notes Chapter 4
1 The national statistics cover beneﬁts paid by municipalities. This means that bene-
ﬁt payments during the employer period (varying between 2 and thirteen weeks in
the period considered) and almost all beneﬁt payments to public workers (except
for 2000) are excluded.
2 With this deﬁnition, permanently subsidised employment such as sheltered em-
ployment is not regarded as an active measure.
3 Public services and administration is not considered here because it is unclear to
what extent it reﬂects activation. Differences in these expenditures may, therefore,
express differences in administration costs.
4 This is reﬂected in the average weekly working hours, which in 2000 were 36.1 in
Denmark and 31.8 in the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2001b). Consequently, using
Danish working hours as reference, the Dutch employment rate in 2000 decreases
from 72.9 to 64.2 percent (oecd, 2001c).
Notes Chapter 5
1 A further reason was that public sector wages also were linked to the wage devel-
opment in the private sector (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).
2 Private sector workers were covered by the wao scheme (Wet op de Arbeid-
songeschiktheids Verzekering) whereas public sector workers were covered by the,
almost similar, abp scheme (Algemeen Burgerlijke Pensioenwet), which operated
with invalidity degrees of between 25 and 100 percent.
3 Visser and Hemerijck (1997) characterise this development as an example of poli-
cy learning, which was one of the important factors that lead to signiﬁcant policy
changes: politicians learned that the existing organisation of the social security ad-
ministration was ineffective.
4 At the same time wage subsidies to therapeutic work resumption was abolished.
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Notes Chapter 6
1 An exception is the unemployment insurance scheme, which was (and still is) ad-
ministered by unions and ﬁnanced by contributions from the insured and the state. 
2 The description of the sickness and disability beneﬁt schemes is based on the legis-
lation in force January 1980 (Bekendtgørelse af Lov om dagpenge ved sygdom
eller fødsel, 21. februar 1978; Bekendtgørelse af Lov om invalidepension m.v., 15
december 1978).
3 The regional committees could (and often did) make their own inquiry in order to
provide further information about the applicant (Bengtsson, 1987).
4 Andersen (1998) notes that the courts in their decisions have emphasised, the du-
ration of the sickness absence in relation to the worker’s seniority, how much the
company is affected by the sickness absence, and whether the sickness absence is
work related.
5 Statsministerens åbningstale in Folketingets forhandlinger (1982)
6 The description of the 1982 and 1987 changes is based on law proposals with re-
marks and the following parliament negotiations: Lov om ændring af lov om dag-
penge ved sygdom eller fødsel (Karensdag, forlængelse af arbejdsgiverperioden,
varighedsbegrænsning m.v.), L571; Lov om ændring af lov om dagpenge ved syg-
dom og fødsel og ophævelse af lov om begrænsning af løn under sygdom
(Ophævelse af karensdag m.v.), L60.
7 In the same period, a parallel political consensus was reached in the unemploy-
ment policy.
8 The following is based on law proposals with remarks and the following parlia-
ment negotiations (Lov om dagpenge ved sygdom eller fødsel, L29; Lov om æn-
dring af lov om social bistand, L30).
9 Remarks to proposal of changes to the social assistance act, L30.
10 The Danish sickness beneﬁt scheme gives entitlement to full wage compensation
with a daily ceiling of 603 dkk (2002), whereas the Dutch scheme entitles work-
ers to 70 percent wage compensation with a daily ceiling of 842 dkk (converted
from Euros to dkk by 1999 Purchasing Power Parities).
Notes Chapter 7
1 The data set does also include public sector workers, but they are excluded from
the analysis in order to improve the comparability between the Danish and Dutch
data sets.
2 The 1-year employer period in the Dutch sickness beneﬁt scheme was introduced
in March 1996 meaning that it came into effect approximately a year after the re-
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spondents’ ﬁrst day of work incapacity. It is likely therefore that this reform did
not affect the respondents in any notable extent.
3 This section draws on Høgelund (2002).
4 On the contrary the correction of explanatory variables seems to increase the
crossnational difference in the risk of dismissal. The odds ratio of Danish respon-
dents versus Dutch respondents obtained from Table 7.2 is 8.4 with a 95% conﬁ-
dence interval on [5.7;12.8], whereas the odds ratio based on the coefﬁcient from
the logistic model is 14.3 with a 95% conﬁdence interval on [8.4;23.8].
5 Neither does the analysis support that the general dismissal tendency in combina-
tion with company size affects the probability of dismissals (the interaction term
has a p-value on 0.626).
6 The data also contains information about participation in “vocational education,
or job training without public subsidies” (see Bergendorff and Gordon, 2001).
However, the inclusion of two different measures within the same category ham-
pers a sound crossnational comparison of how capacity-building measures are
provided, because a presumably publicly provided measure, vocational education,
is mixed with an employer-provided measure, job training without public subsi-
dies.
7 Because of the low number of people in the Dutch cohort who participated in gen-
eral education, it is impossible to take account of other explanatory variables.
8 This is supported by Høgelund and Modvig (1998) who ﬁnd that establishment of
workplace-based vocational rehabilitation seldom involves public authorities.
9 The separation into only two groups, a low and a high-income group, is not ideal
and it has been chosen due to the fact that very few persons in the Dutch data are
entitled to sickness beneﬁt, cf. Table 7.6 A division into more groups would there-
fore imply that each group would consist of very few persons.
Notes Chapter 8
1 The selection of explanatory variables has been made on the basis of a preliminary
analysis.
2 Occupation may to some extent also reﬂect job demands and may therefore also
measure employment conditions with the old employer.
3 The study by Høgelund and Holm (2002) that applies a more robust estimation
procedure supports this. The authors ﬁnd that the effect of separations (dismissals
and quits) becomes insigniﬁcant in the Danish data (including both private and
public sector workers) when unobserved variables are taken into account.
4 Using the same estimation procedure as in the estimation of the effect of general
and vocational education, see Appendix E.
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5 It is measured as a (lagged) variable of the quarterly unemployment rate in the resi-
dence county of the sick-listed worker, and it is allowed to change value every third
month during the sickness spell.
6 The present measure of unemployment conditions, i.e. the quarterly unemploy-
ment rate in the sick-listed worker’s county of residence, may be too inaccurate.
For example, employment opportunities may not depend on the unemployment
rate in general but on the unemployment rate within the sick-listed worker’s occu-
pation, and maybe also on the unemployment rate in neighbour counties.
7 The actual level of income of other household members and the sick-listed work-
er’s pre-sick leave wage income has also been included in the model, but it does not
alter the conclusion. The ﬁnding may reﬂect the fact that the incomes of other
household members and/or the sick-listed worker’s pre-sick leave wage are en-
dogenous variables and that these exit variables therefore also reﬂect other condi-
tions. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the inﬂuence of the exit
variable decreases when correction for unobserved variables is performed, cf.
Table 8.2 and Table 2 in Appendix C.
8 It would be unfair to assert that a municipality has a lax exit policy if the munici-
pality has extraordinary social problems that necessitate several disability beneﬁt
awards. I therefore use a model by Gregersen (1994) to correct for structural dif-
ferences between municipalities, e.g. in age composition and the number of social
security beneﬁciaries. More than 40 socio-demographic variables are used to cor-
rect for structural differences between the 275 municipalities. The adjusted bene-
ﬁt award rate of the 24 municipalities varies between -1.71 per thousand inhabi-
tants (harsh policy) and 2.98 (lax policy) with an average of 0.17.
Notes Chapter 9
1 Furthermore, the Dutch beneﬁciaries who are working seem to work more hours
than their Danish counterparts. A Dutch study of people who applied for a dis-
ability beneﬁt in 1998 found that among those who were working 6 months later,
about 80 percent worked more than 20 hours per week (Molenaar-Cox and van
der Giezen, 2000). In contrast, the Danish disability beneﬁciaries who were work-
ing had an annual wage of 29.100 dkk in 1998 (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening,
2000). This corresponds to approximately 4 hours of work per week, assuming
they receive a wage similar to an average production worker. 
2 In principle a more complete assessment of labour market exit through the disabil-
ity pathway would also take into consideration to what extent beneﬁciaries exit
from the disability scheme because they enter employment. In both nations this is
a rare event; the lion’s share of exit from the disability beneﬁt scheme is caused by
compulsory transition into the old age pension system.
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3 The fact that the stock of beneﬁciaries kept growing well into the 1990s (cf. Figure
9.1.) reﬂects a previous high inﬂow of young beneﬁciaries resulting in a low out-
ﬂow of beneﬁciaries during the 1990s.
4 It may also have had an impact that municipalities in 1999 were forbidden to con-
sider disability beneﬁt applications unless active measures had been applied (pre-
viously it was possible to consider beneﬁts, but not to award them, without having
applied active measures).
5 During the ﬁrst 2 years after its implementation, the reassessment resulted in a
withdrawal of the full disability beneﬁt in 50 percent of the reassessed cases. Bene-
ﬁciaries who lost their beneﬁt were declared fully unemployed, and those who had
their beneﬁt reduced were declared partially unemployed (Oorschot and Boos,
2000). As a consequence, many existing disability beneﬁciaries were partly or ful-
ly transferred from the disability beneﬁt scheme to the unemployment insurance
scheme. The reassessments meant that the outﬂow from the disability beneﬁt
scheme increased in 1994 and 1995 and for the ﬁrst time in the history the outﬂow
exceeded the inﬂow, but in 1996 the situation returned to ’normal’ (see Lisv,
2001).
6 The changes seem however to have had a lasting effect on the level of sickness ab-
sence, which decreased from 6.2 percent in 1993 to 4.9 percent in 1994 where it
stayed during the second half of the 1990s (Geurts, Kompier and Gründemann,
2000).
7 The exact shape of the curve in Figure 9.5. is unknown and we cannot therefore
know when higher employers costs yield a positive or negative net effect.
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